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1An Introduction to 
Sovereignty Games
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and 
Rebecca Adler-Nissen
Baha Mousa was working as a receptionist at the Haitham Hotel in Basra. On the morning of September 14, 2003, he was detained by 
British soldiers as they suspected the hotel was used as storage for hiding 
illegal weapons. Mr. Mousa was taken to a nearby military base where 
he was subjected to harsh interrogation techniques and brutally beaten 
until he died from his injuries on the following evening.
The incident attracted little attention until family relatives brought it 
to the British courts along with five other cases concerning the killing 
of Iraqi civilians following shooting incidents involving British armed 
forces.1 The legal questions are anything but simple when trying to sort 
out who, if anybody, can be held responsible. What are the rules of the 
game? Does British law apply to soldiers operating in Iraq? Does the 
European Convention on Human Rights or other international human 
rights instruments? And if the answer to these questions is no, does that 
mean that British soldiers are simply free to do outside their territory 
what they clearly may not do inside?
In the end, the British House of Lords took a cautious approach. While 
British soldiers were deemed to be responsible in Baha Mousa’s case since 
he died in British custody, the other five cases were dismissed as British 
forces were not deemed to exercise “effective control” in the legal sense of 
the word. Although activist have expressed great concern that this may 
create an accountability vacuum whenever States act abroad, the secre-
tary of defense may have sighed in relief over not having to deal with com-
plex human rights questions in situations where it was argued that they 
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were never intended to apply. Yet, the House of Lords ruling is merely one 
round in the political and legal interplay around this issue. The remain-
ing cases are currently being appealed to the European Court of Human 
Rights and the result remains to be seen.
More fundamentally, the earlier case points to the way new and global 
modes of organization challenge some of the most firmly established 
principles of sovereignty. In the world of today it has become increas-
ingly common for States to operate vital functions outside its territory; 
not just military, but also production, finances, and migration control. 
At the same time, power and competences are progressively delegated to 
nonstate actors, be it private military companies in Iraq or supranational 
organizations such as the European Union (EU).
A pressing question is how to bring order to such a world. Sovereignty 
prescribes that ultimate and exclusive authority is maintained by each 
individual State within their territory. Yet, what happens when two sov-
ereigns are occupying the same physical space or start bartering off sov-
ereign prerogatives among each other? And how should we deal with new 
polities that are brought to coexist alongside the traditional State and 
increasingly take over responsibilities in areas that hitherto were thought 
to define the essence of sovereignty? While these instances may hitherto 
have been downplayed as aberrations or exceptions to the ordinary func-
tioning of the Westphalian order, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
this is more likely a systemic feature of a globalized age.
For the political scientist it may seem as if the concept of sovereignty, 
or at least how we use it, is undergoing rapid changes. In many EU debates 
across Europe, sovereignty is invoked by both the nationalists, eager to 
avoid further EU empowerment, and the Eurocrats, seeking to down-
play the importance of further integration. Repeatedly the concept is 
brought to life to serve a multitude of purposes for anyone who demands 
it. Similarly, lawyers have identified a struggle of the current interna-
tional legal framework to adapt to this reality. While some push for the 
extension and reassertion of State responsibility, others are keen to move 
beyond the Westphalian framework and push for the development of 
norms that can make international organizations, private companies, or 
even the individuals employed by them directly accountable.
In both the political and the legal spheres, what emerges is an expan-
sion of the playing field relating to sovereignty. Whether it be State 
executives looking to avoid domestic scrutiny and legal responsibility by 
outsourcing core functions, or diplomats entering into a tricky game to 
simultaneously allow international cooperation and communicate a sense 
of sovereignty to the domestic audience, it is the ability to successfully 
maneuver among the varying and overlapping claims to sovereignty and 
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its content that remains decisive. Understanding these processes is what 
motivates the present volume. Together, the contributors make the argu-
ment that State sovereignty is far from waning in the context of increased 
Europeanization and globalization. Rather, States and other actors have 
become increasingly creative in instrumentalizing their use of sovereignty 
to reassert legitimacy, power, and control in face of new challenges.
Speaking of Sovereignty
Few words have begotten so much dispute, confusion, and opaqueness 
as that of sovereignty. Thus, a first obstacle for any work so prominently 
claiming the word as part of its title is necessarily to try and clarify what 
we are talking about. In its usage sovereignty appears to be a multifaceted 
technical concept. For starters it is generally approached somewhat differ-
ent depending on the disciplinary baggage in which it is framed. In legal 
terms, sovereignty sets out the material and geographical scope of polity’s 
authority and thereby the mutual exclusive claims in a world inhabited by 
a plurality of States; in political terms, sovereignty signifies the suprem-
acy and inviolability of a State’s institutions, its unboundedness both inter-
nally and externally (Espersen, Harhoff, and Spiermann 2003, 142). As a 
legal-political concept, sovereignty in this sense transgresses any simple 
definition, but it may perhaps best be described along the continuum of its 
different guises. These include sovereignty as a competence, a set of legal 
rights toward both the peers and the subjects of the polity; sovereignty as 
power or control, whether envisaged in political, economic, or symbolical 
terms; sovereignty as legitimacy, especially since the rise of debates on pop-
ular sovereignty; and sovereignty as personality, entailing a certain number 
of duties and obligations for those claiming it.
In these various incarnations scholars of several disciplines have been 
wedded to an ongoing discussion of whether, and to which extent, State 
sovereignty is still a meaningful concept in today’s world. In particular, 
those claiming that sovereignty as a property of the State is absolute and 
indivisible have had a hard time identifying role models of States exercising 
sovereignty in this ideal typical sense. Rather, several analysts have argued 
that sovereignty as we know it is being challenged to a point where former 
UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali concluded that “[t]he time of 
absolute and exclusive sovereignty… has passed” (Forsythe 2000, 22). But 
if sovereignty is an absolute condition, either States have it or they do not 
(Sørensen 1999, 593). Does it really make sense to argue that a State is 75 
percent sovereign? (Wæver 1995, 417).
Those skeptical of the continued importance of State sovereignty 
identify at least four, somewhat interrelated, developments that can be 
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argued to erode the traditional picture of the sovereign State in Europe. 
Firstly, as a development of interstate cooperation after 1945, more and 
more sovereign prerogatives have been transferred to international insti-
tutions. Whether it be military sovereignty, as in the case of NATO, eco-
nomic sovereignty, as in the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and the World Bank, or most extensively political sovereignty, as in the 
case of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Council of Europe, and the EU, States are seemingly willingly 
entering into arrangements that de jure or de facto confers or “pool” 
substantial aspects of their sovereign power (Sassen 1995, xv). This is 
particularly manifest in Europe where the EU transgresses the territorial 
boundaries and political authority of its Member States (Mattli 2000). 
Those arguing that European integration is fundamentally compromis-
ing State sovereignty may point to the infringements on constitutional 
independence, the cessation of economic and monetary autonomy, and 
the increasing pooling of other core sovereign competences, such as 
immigration, internal security, defense, and foreign policy (Wallace 1999, 
96; Kelstrup and Williams 2000, 4; Tokar 2001). In its place a system of 
overlapping decision making is appearing in which each Member State 
has to succumb not only to qualified majority decisions among its peers, 
but also to hand over the right of initiative to supranational institutions 
and bow to an increasingly independent European judiciary (Werner 
and de Wilde 2001, 304). To some, this represents an abandonment and 
erosion of the traditional modes of regulations (Sur 1997, 436).
Second, what we normally refer to as globalization creates an image in 
which global flows of capital, commodities, and people seems to make it 
increasingly difficult for States to assert effective jurisdiction over their 
borders, economic flows, and indeed human activity in general (Sassen 
1995; Krasner 1999, 105; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton 1999). 
Today, even the most developed States are struggling to control irregular 
migration; new transnational identity groups are emerging and their cur-
rencies and government bonds are being settled on the global financial 
markets. The State model alone simply does not stand the test of economic 
Europeanization and globalization, which entails a shift of components 
of State sovereignty to, for instance, private transnational corporations.
Third, since the Second World War and the decolonization process 
many States have emerged that clearly struggle to uphold any meaningful 
authority within their territory. These “quasi-States” seem to exist more by 
the grace and support of the international community than on any capac-
ity on the part of the governments to establish internal power (Jackson 
1993; Krasner 1999, 127). Thus, today the concept of State sovereignty 
risks being reduced to upholding international borders and the “negative 
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sovereignty” conveyed by the international normative framework rather 
than the “positive sovereignty” that emerged in the early Westphalian era 
of modern State building (Jackson 1999). Further, it is clear that the for-
mal equality of all States granted by this normative frame is not matched 
by any meaningful substantial equality (Sørensen 1999, 600). These weak 
States are intimately dependent on development aid, economic support, 
and security arrangements provided by its more developed colleagues. In 
turn, it becomes difficult if not impossible for these States to refuse when 
more developed States require access or favors, be it for reasons of secu-
rity interests, oil concessions, or migration control.
Last, it has been argued that while before 1945 international law 
existed primarily to keep States apart, leaving the individual State sov-
ereign in an “almost absolute sense, exercising supreme legal authority 
within its jurisdiction,” the emergence of EU law and human rights law 
has substantially altered this relation (Forsythe 2000, 22). The willing-
ness of governments to comply with rulings from the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) and European Court of Human Rights is an ultimate 
demonstration that States are no longer totally free to exercise power 
within their territory regardless of the consequences for its subjects. 
The ECJ challenges national social sovereignty through its far-reaching 
legislation on citizen rights, which means that nation states no longer 
control who are legitimate participants in their national political 
 societies. The judicial dialogue between the ECJ and national courts 
may also change the relationship between the legislative and judicial 
branch inside Member States (Claes and de Witte 1998). So, is this the 
“end of sovereignty” (Camilleri and Falk 1992)?
On the other side of the fence stand those who believe that one 
should not readily buy into the historical assumptions or the analyt-
ical conclusions of the earlier claims. First, some scholars have argued 
that the arguments above build on an implicit assumption of a “hey-
day” of State sovereignty that is ultimately imaginary. Thus, while the 
earlier observations may be correct, one should take a closer look at 
the history of the Westphalian State system before making too strong 
a juxtaposition between the world today and 50 or more years ago. 
Stephen Krasner argues that the four different aspects of sovereignty 
also identified earlier—internal authority, recognition by other States, 
autonomy in decision making, and control over transborder f lows—
have never been fully claimed by any State; indeed, the various aspects 
are unlikely to be possessed simultaneously, as the strive for one may 
fundamentally impair the other (Krasner 1999, 3, 220).
Second, even among the proponents of the earlier arguments, there 
seems to be a recognition that elements of State sovereignty seemingly go 
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untouched even when put under the duress of such fundamental changes. 
While enticing to think so, no international organization or institution 
has so far managed to escape the Statist framework and the legitimacy 
and legal base of these institutions remains the limited powers con-
ferred to them by independent States (Keohane 1995, 172; Sur 1998, 1). 
Similarly, international political economists have stressed that the State 
is itself the necessary institution for a globalized market and argue that 
the capitalist State needs borderless globalization just as much as global 
markets are better able to reproduce themselves within national forma-
tions (Sakellaropoulos 2007). Further, the proclamations for the rise of 
the international judiciary as a threat to State sovereignty needs to be 
moderated by the homage paid by these bodies to the institution of State 
sovereignty and the extensive leeway granted to States by introducing, for 
example, “margins of appreciation” (Sur 1998, 4; Wilde 2005, 782).
Third, while we may speak of fundamental differences in the qual-
ity of and claims to sovereignty made by weak or “failed” States, what is 
perhaps most surprising is the resilience of their existence, which seems 
to reflect the continued strength of sovereignty as an international legal 
concept. Indeed, the increasing number of States and attempts to claim 
Statehood over the last half century is perhaps the best evidence of the 
continued popularity of State sovereignty (Sørensen 1999, 594).
This suggests that we need to temper the claims that State sovereignty 
is being eroded because of globalization or Europeanization. In other 
words, what may be changing is not the importance of State sovereignty 
but a transformation of the social State to a headquarters State with 
contracted functions—implying that some State functions are either 
delegated or simply erode away (Sakellaropoulos 2007).
Other authors have questioned the ontological assumptions made 
earlier. Both sides of this discussion on “more or less” sovereignty are all 
build on the assumption that sovereignty is something that can some-
how be measured “out there” as a property of the State, international 
organizations, or something else. In contrast to this view, a number of 
scholars have argued that both “sovereignty” and the “State” need to 
be understood as social and historical constructions (Kratochwil 1989; 
Ruggie 1993; Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 2).
Against the “descriptive fallacy” sovereignty must be understood more 
fundamentally as a claim to authority or as an institutional fact for the 
supreme ordering of power (N. Walker 2003, 6–7). To this end it is main-
tained as an existential value of international political and legal life that 
when mobilized allows for exceptional measures (Werner and de Wilde 
2001, 297). Despite the challenges set out earlier we thus need to appreci-
ate sovereignty as a still solid claim to the ultimate ordering power that 
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constitutes the polity (N. Walker 2003, 8). It may be that the “speech act” 
of sovereignty is more complex to perform in an era of globalization and 
constitutional pluralism, yet it remains an essential political tool in con-
stituting the functional national and international legal orders in which 
power politics are played out (N. Walker 2003, 6, 19–25).
In this sense, it becomes the very nature of sovereignty to be contested. 
It is exactly in the struggle over differing claims to authority that sover-
eignty comes most to the fore. The performative moments of sovereignty 
are strongest in times of crisis, when the State appears to loose the ability 
to ensure effective internal rule and freedom from external interference 
(Koskenniemi 1989, 210; Werner and de Wilde 2001, 287). It is also in 
these moments that the inquiry of this book becomes most evident. How 
can we understand workings of such sovereignty claims, who perform 
them and under which conditions? To advance this investigation in more 
detail, we propose an analytical framework, which pictures the State and 
other actors in a web of legal, economic, political, and cultural institu-
tions and processes. It is this web that constitutes the playing field of what 
we have termed “sovereignty games.”
The Constituents of Sovereignty Games
In furthering the idea of “sovereignty games,” one should of course be 
careful how far the notion is pursued. “Game” is a loaded word and may 
immediately lead some to think about “game theory” or other ratio-
nal choice approaches in which sovereignty may be won by one, lost by 
another. To be clear, the notion of “sovereignty games” as employed in 
the present volume is merely intended as a heuristic device rather than 
signifying any particular theoretical heritage (N. Walker 2003, 4).2 
Where we feel the idea of “games” is useful, however, is in emphasizing 
and bringing analytical attention to the three necessary components of 
any game—rules, players, and moves. It is around these three themes, 
and in particular the interplay between them, that the contributions to 
present volume are anchored.
First, by emphasizing moves as part of sovereignty games, we hope to 
progress beyond the descriptive level set out earlier. The present volume 
does not purport to give any answers as to whether States have more or less 
sovereignty in today’s international order. Rather than looking to mea-
sure sovereignty as something “out there,” the emphasis is rather placed 
on how it is used, or being played out, as legal and political practices. This 
allows for a more nuanced analysis of the strategic ways that States and 
other actors use the framework of sovereignty. In this sense, the moves in 
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the sovereignty game may perhaps best be described as claims to author-
ity and the social practices that surround them. Claims may be more or 
less institutionalized or settled, and more or less successful in bringing 
about change in the configuration of this authority (N. Walker 2003, 6–9; 
Werner 2004, 133). This explains why sovereignty continues to be such 
a coveted “property” at a time where State authority seems increasingly 
under pressure; it is in a time of crisis that what is ordinarily taken for 
granted needs to be most vigorously defended (Werner and De Wilde 
2001, 287). Second, it opens analysis of how different moves may be made 
to achieve different outcomes, both in the horizontal games of claiming 
and relinquishing authority between States and in the vertical game of 
allocating competence between sub-State, State, and EU actors.
Further, our proposition by emphasizing the notion of sovereignty 
games is that these moves may be seen to have a strategic dimension, a 
skilled use of sovereignty claims. Indeed, a closer look at the different 
dimensions of sovereignty and how they are used to assert certain con-
ceptual ideas, suggests that States are becoming more instrumental in 
their claims to sovereignty and skilled in adapting it to the challenges that 
they face. Just as much as the EU and its interaction with globalization 
and international legal regimes constrain the exercise of sovereign power 
for the individual State, it also provide new opportunities for exploiting 
the relationship that sovereignty establishes between States, institutions, 
and individuals.
Second, implicit in the notion of sovereignty games is the presup-
position that someone is playing them. Who are then these players? 
Compared to scholars anxious to relocate sovereignty somewhere else, 
with sub-State entities or suprastate institutions, our particular perspec-
tive, or prism, keeps the sovereign State system and States in focus. By 
this we mean that even though changes in the world may create a window 
of opportunity for those looking to claim authority from other positions 
than that of the State, the contributions in this book generally affirm the 
homage paid in any articulation of sovereignty to some conceptualiza-
tion of the State. Although ideas of “late sovereignty” (Neil Walker) and 
the possibility of “global community” (Jens Bartelson) both hint toward 
some kind of emancipative potential in relinquishing the statist optic, the 
State is still reaffirmed as an epistemic starting point that is inherently 
difficult to change.
This is not to say that States are the only players of sovereignty games. 
First, opening up the State “box” the contributions of the present volume 
also hope to shed light on how these games are played out at different lev-
els, be it State executives (Rebecca Adler-Nissen), national banks (Christoph 
Herrmann) or individual lawyers (Ole Spiermann). Second, one should 
Nissen_Ch01.indd   8 8/21/2008   10:17:43 AM
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVEREIGNTY GAMES   9
realize that playing the sovereignty game is not necessarily tied to a per-
sonal claim to sovereignty, but it may involve anyone seeking to influ-
ence or invoke such claims. This may be seen in both the outsourcing of 
security and migration control functions to private companies and third 
States (Anna Leander and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen) and in the role 
played by international courts and EU institutions (Andrew Glencross). 
Although these dynamics generally reaffirm State sovereignty at the dis-
cursive level, they nonetheless play a vital role in the interpretation and 
development of sovereign rights and duties.
Last, the idea of sovereignty games entails the existence of certain 
game rules. These rules may be understood at several levels. To some 
scholars, the conceptual content of sovereignty is simply that—game 
rules. Within international law, State sovereignty has been described as 
shorthand for a definite set of competencies, claims, and duties (Ross 
1961, 42–56; Koskenniemi 1989, 197). Similarly, within international 
relations, sovereignty has been equated with a certain doxa of interna-
tional political life, first and foremost the principle of nonintervention 
(Jackson 1999, 423f).
The struggle within both disciplines to determine the exact rules 
f lowing from the concept, especially at a time when even core princi-
ples seems to be revised, has lead several authors to dismiss the concept 
entirely as, at best, superfluous and, at worst, directly misleading (Kelsen 
1928, 320; Koskenniemi 1989, 198; Clapham 1999, 522; Henkin 1999). 
Yet, in the continued importance of the term in international life, what 
this critique may be pointing to is perhaps rather a need to probe deeper 
into the structures of sovereignty games. If we want to understand why 
both States and academics are still concerned with sovereignty, we need 
to examine how the concept works for those using it. In this sense, the 
“rules of the game” may not only be thought of as legal prescriptions 
or the principles of power relations but also reflect nonexplicit rules 
that structure the way we think and act in the name of sovereignty 
(Kratochwil 1989, 83).
To this end, the present volume opens up with three contributions 
probing into the epistemic, ideological, and systemic foundations of sov-
ereignty games. Neil Walker opens by arguing that while the rules of the 
sovereignty game at the ideological and systemic levels may be chang-
ing and relocating, the core epistemic functions on which these rules 
are premised remain intact. As long as we can identify something called 
the State, sovereignty will serve a key role both in conceptualizing the 
State and in conditioning its peer relations. For this purpose, we may 
employ the language of “late sovereignty” as a way of describing the way 
that States and other actors relate to and interpret sovereignty to reassert 
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control, power, and legitimacy in changing contexts. Sovereignty games 
thus become strategic maneuvers through which sovereignty is claimed 
and reinterpreted to simultaneously protect autonomy and enhance 
influence on the international scene (see also N. Walker 2003, 19–25; 
Werner 2004, 131). Faced with globalization, transnational political 
activities, legal or illegal, and current strategic uses of traditional terri-
torial understandings of sovereignty, for example, the US detentions at 
Guantanamo, it has been argued that it no longer makes sense to see sov-
ereignty as a purely territorial phenomenon, as a spatially bounded con-
cept. Rather, sovereignty can and should also be defined functionally, 
that is, by its effects and scope, which may allow for both Cuban and US 
sovereignty (and hence responsibility) to be exercised in different ways 
in the same territorial space (Raustiala 2005).
Following on from this, Jens Bartelson argues that we need to step back 
and take a critical look at the current academic debate for and against 
State sovereignty if we want to understand the analytical and normative 
significance of this concept in the future. A fair share of this debate comes 
down to an underlying conflict between those who maintain a semantic 
view to the concept of sovereignty as referring to something “out there” 
and those who take the nominalist position that sovereignty is simply a 
label through which we order the world. While under the former view, 
conflict continues to rage as to what exact norms and facts sovereignty 
denotes, the concept itself remains largely unaffected to changes at this 
level. More recently, however, studies in sovereignty have been drawn 
toward the linguistic turn. At first glance, much of this analysis would 
seem to suggest that the meaning sovereignty is wholly contingent on the 
political and discursive practices through which we claim it. Yet, the trap 
of such approaches, however much they may help our understanding of 
how the meaning of sovereignty may change in different contexts, is the 
irrefutable temptation to inject some assumptions and meanings to the 
concept by the researcher to meaningfully structure the analysis. In this 
sense, “the linguistic turn has brought us full circle” as any analysis of 
concepts and their referents necessarily presupposes some idea of what 
we are talking about. In each view sovereignty is thus reproduced and 
only a radical break with our conceptualization of the world as interna-
tional will ever see it whither away.
Last, a more formulaic approach is presented, in which sovereignty 
must necessarily be analyzed through a double optic. For Ole Spiermann 
the basic rule of any sovereignty game is that something takes superiority 
over something else. Yet, this “something” is not fixed but dependent on a 
preliminary, material choice (Spiermann 1995, 320). In other words, sov-
ereignty games become a question of which descriptive frame to employ. 
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Within national law, the framing has traditionally been based on the 
Bodinian concept of sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power of 
a commonwealth, whereas in international law the State is poised as an 
international law subject. These frames may seem fundamentally at odds 
but are nonetheless both present and continue to play themselves out in 
the international adjudication of, for example, the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the ECJ. For the international lawyer it becomes 
a daily quest to operate between the two, and each frame may be used to 
emphasize different normative implications.
An underlying question for these first three contributions is the 
potential for change in the more deep-seated and epistemic levels. How 
does the playing out of sovereignty games affect the rules of the game? 
Here the contributors sketch out rather different scenarios. While to Ole 
Spiermann the input to the sovereignty game is open, and thus adapt-
able to new contexts and cases, the fundamental structure, the double 
structure, is unlikely to change. Nor will lawyers easily rid themselves 
of the historical frames in which the concept of sovereignty has been 
posited. Jens Bartelson, on the other hand, seems to suggest at least a 
transformative potential at the epistemic level of the sovereignty game. 
However far away such a world may seem, a fundamentally post-Statist 
order is fathomable. Between these stand Neil Walker who by employ-
ing the language of “late sovereignty” suggests a fundamental conti-
nuity even in the light of current changes and transformations in the 
actors and shapes of sovereignty games which points to an epistemic 
core that, while in principle not immutable, is likely to remain with us 
for the time being.
Playing the Games
To understand how these intriguing games of sovereignty are played out 
in practice, the theoretical and conceptual insights developed in the first 
part of the book are applied to a range of empirical cases in the remaining 
part of the book. These chapters are structured around two dimensions 
of the instrumentalization of claims to authority, which seem to be par-
ticularly striking in the European context: the horizontal and the vertical 
sovereignty games. In both dimensions, various actors aim at simulta-
neously enhancing autonomy and legitimacy by playing strategically on 
the discursive and legal structure of sovereignty.
The vertical dimension of the sovereignty games are played out as 
authority is passed strategically up and down between different political 
and legal levels to enhance political autonomy. International and regional 
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organizations provide a particularly useful playing ground for such stra-
tegic moves and sovereign claims become instrumental to carve out new 
spaces for inter- and transnational decision making. In vertical games, 
political and administrative elites are playing on the different legal and 
symbolic structures related to sovereignty to enhance their autonomy in 
both the domestic and the international arena.
In comparison, horizontal sovereignty games are characterized by 
the conceptual stretching of sovereignty to cover activities outside the 
area traditionally reserved for exercises of ultimate authority—the 
national territory. Facilitated by international institutions and private 
companies, everything from immigration policies to military interven-
tions can be exercised far away from where the decisions were originally 
taken, but with the crucial legitimization built into the language of sov-
ereignty. By tactically shifting sovereignty outside the national territory 
and to nonstate actors, political autonomy is enhanced and maybe even 
justified as it brought to bear on particular problems stemming from 
globalization.
Vertical Sovereignty Games
The second part of the book deals with vertical sovereignty games. This 
type of game emerges when States, often driven by national executives, 
are playing on the legal and symbolic arsenal provided by the concep-
tual framework of sovereignty to enhance their autonomy in both the 
domestic and European or international arena. Sovereignty seems to 
shift up and down from levels above and below the State. Thus, the 
handing over of formal powers to the EU or other international organi-
zations may be instrumental in reasserting both domestic and interna-
tional control.
Recent decisions taken by States regarding the delegation of their 
monetary sovereignty is analyzed in the chapter by Christoph Herrmann. 
Traditionally, the right of coinage has been considered to constitute one 
of the core elements of sovereignty of modern nation states. However, 
hardly any other “core element” of sovereignty demonstrates a greater 
variety in its usage and its failure alike. Some States have deliberately no 
currency of their own; others adopt foreign currencies or bind their own 
tightly to them. The Euro zone with 13 Member States have transferred 
their monetary sovereignty to a supranational institution, while other 
States put extreme pressure on their citizens to protect the currency and 
to enforce its use, often without success. These decisions are part of a 
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 vertical dynamic where monetary sovereignty is passed around between 
the domestic and international layers of authority.
States play out sovereignty games to maximize their power drawing on 
the exact same processes of Europeanization and globalization that are 
seemingly constraining them. The main actors gaining autonomy how-
ever are not States per se but one particular branch of the State—national 
executives. Rebecca Adler-Nissen demonstrates how opt-outs from the 
EU and EC Treaties obscure the degree to which statehood is changing 
because of regional integration. In international and regional cooperation, 
sovereignty claims are made by national politico-administrative elites 
in what may be termed a “two-dimensional sovereignty game.” Hence, 
the controversial opt-outs from common currency and the cooperation 
on immigration, asylum and civil law granted to the United Kingdom 
and Denmark with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 allow the mediators to 
 preserve the figure of an autonomous State despite its entanglement in the 
European integration process. Serving the purpose of legitimizing con-
tinued EU membership to the Euroskeptic domestic audiences, the dip-
lomatic strategies of opting in and out articulate a game, an “organized 
duplicity” that allow States to pick and choose from the buffet of new EU 
legislation. The game, however, easily gets out of control as the opt-outs 
are translated into diplomatic routines and popular guarantees are chal-
lenged. This demands a continuous need to reinterpret sovereignty to fit 
the two dimensions where it is exercised.
In his chapter, Andrew Glencross examines the democratic conse-
quences of the European sovereignty games, which are driven by both 
ideological motivations and strategic calculation. Glencross argues that 
the EU is a hybrid polity combining federal and confederal principles, 
which is why Member States and the EU share the claim and burden 
of representing citizens. The balance of confederalism and federalism 
can be seen as a tacit sovereignty game between two antagonistic prin-
ciples. States have asserted aspects of sovereignty (through the treaties, 
domestic, and EU politics) to manage expectations about integration 
in the face of unexpected supranational developments. The problem of 
controlling the course of integration to the satisfaction of states and 
citizens constitutes sovereignty game with dramatic consequences for 
democracy. Responses to this “democracy game” include democratiz-
ing the EU or redefining democracy to make it compatible with the rep-
resentation of states. Both responses are problematic and the chapter 
suggests that the impact of sovereignty games on democracy is still not 
fully understood. There is no simple solution for ensuring that these 
games do not take democracy as a hostage.
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Horizontal Sovereignty Games
In the remaining part of the book, three chapters are devoted to the 
analysis of how claims to sovereignty transform our sense of geography 
as sovereign functions are outsourced or privatized. The contributors 
explore how States engage in conceptual stretching because they increas-
ingly experience that they are constrained by domestic and international 
legislation restricting their exercise of power. Policies to disconnect State 
power from the sovereign territory, understood as the locus of these 
responsibilities, are therefore starting to grow increasingly fashionable. 
Most well-known is the US administration’s argument that because the 
offshore detention facilities at the Guantanamo base lies in Cuba and 
is not part of the sovereign US territory, certain responsibilities toward 
the detainees can be avoided. However, similar arguments are heard in 
Europe, as Member States assert that legal obligations such as the Refugee 
Convention cannot be made applicable to migration control conducted in 
international waters. These arguments are illustrative of recent attempts 
to “reconstruct” the notion of sovereign treaty responsibilities, such as 
human rights obligations, as something solely pertaining to the sovereign 
territory and separate from the extraterritorial acts of States. Whether 
one accepts such arguments, it is evident that sovereign power conducted 
“out of sight” of national judiciaries, media, and civil rights groups is 
likely to substantially affect access to rights otherwise owed to those sub-
jected to that power.
This horizontal broadening of the concept of sovereignty is particu-
larly intriguing in the processes of legitimization of the use of armed force 
in new circumstances and locations. Wouter Werner and Tanja Aalberts 
examine how sovereign claims have been used to push the boundaries of 
self-defense. Originally, the right to self-defense was included in the UN 
Charter as a limited and temporary exception to the prohibition on the 
use of force. Paradoxically, however, the attempts to outlaw the use of 
force results in the creation of several new discursive spaces to legitimize 
the use of force: armed force could (and should) now be justified in terms 
of exceptions, as exceptional measures aimed at restoring and protecting 
sovereignty and normalcy. This discursive practice already started in the 
late 1940s but gained new momentum after the 9/11 attacks. Werner and 
Aalbert demonstrate how the recent attempts to further stretch the limits 
of the sovereign right to self-defense is linked to large-scale reconstruc-
tions of domestic societies where “the enemy” can be found both inside 
and outside the national borders.
An opposite but related trend in this horizontal stretching of sov-
ereignty claims is the commercializing of State functions such as the 
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legitimate use of force. Anna Leander explores how States delegate secu-
rity provisions to private actors. Leander argues that when private actors 
take the use of force into their own hands, be it as terrorists or as mer-
cenaries, this does not weaken the state “monopoly” on the use of force. 
The outsourcing and privatization of the use of force strengthens security 
establishments and those who share their interests both within the field of 
security but perhaps more importantly in relation to actors of other fields. 
The commercialization of the use of force is hence not undermining sov-
ereignty as much as it is altering its meaning. Security establishments 
have effectively extended their say in how sovereignty is understood and 
have given security a greater place in sovereign practices, sovereignty is 
“secured” not undermined.
A similar argument of the horizontal broadening of sovereignty can 
help to gain an understanding of how the global migration pressures are 
countered by the emergence of global migration control regimes. Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen explores the sovereign function of migration control 
as it is “extra-territorialized” and “commercialized” in Europe. He dem-
onstrates how and why the traditional picture of the refugee arriving at 
the border and surrendering herself to the authorities uttering the mag-
ical word, “asylum,” is increasingly seldom. Rather, migrants and refu-
gees are sought intercepted before they arrive, either by EU States acting 
extraterritorially or by private or third State partners. Over the last years, 
the EU has radically expanded its migration control on the high seas and 
forged a range of cooperation agreements with North African countries 
to ensure their cooperation in naval interdiction operations. By moving 
migration control outside their territory, States are not acting beyond the 
law; rather they exploit the conceptual dualism and interpretative space 
inherent in the notion of sovereignty and jurisdiction. This has allowed 
States to play on more territorial understandings of jurisdiction or shift 
legal regimes to perform migration control while simultaneously shifting 
corollary human rights obligations to its southern neighbors. As such, 
this chapter demonstrates how the deliberate delegation of traditional 
sovereign rights through horizontal sovereignty games is often countered 
by an increase in the actual capacity to exercise control.
Together, the contributions on horizontal and vertical sovereignty 
games demonstrate that State sovereignty is not just eroding with pro-
cesses of Europeanization; rather, the application of sovereign power 
takes new creative forms as States play sovereignty games. The main 
argument brought forward is that States and other political and legal 
actors are not just observing passively how economic flows transgress 
their borders or how the national legal order is subjugated to interna-
tional and supranational EU law. Instead, they engage in new practices 
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and modify understandings of their own sovereignty, which, paradoxi-
cally, may end up strengthening their position vis-à-vis other actors not 
only in Europe but also on the global scene.
How these practices may affect the institution of sovereignty in the 
longer run remains to be seen. How stable is the present situation? 
Revisiting once more the theoretical debate, the concluding chapter 
attempts to draw together and reflect on the insights provided in the 
analysis carried out earlier. The sovereignty games described may cer-
tainly carry a transformative power, yet one should be careful when 
discussing where such transformations occur. Thus, we present a new 
model to conceptualize three layers of sovereignty and the dynamics 
between them. The most visible layer constitutes sovereignty as everyday 
practices, be they social, legal, political or symbolic, and it is at this layer 
that the most obvious sovereignty games are played out. In playing these 
games, however, reference is inevitably made to a second layer, namely 
the concept of sovereignty as legal and political authority. This is the 
layer from where norms and rules are derived and where contestation 
is increasingly referred as sovereign practices probe the boundaries of 
hitherto established principles. Below these is the epistemic layer. This is 
where sovereignty simultaneously constitutes and is reconstituted; here 
sovereignty represents a way of thinking of the foundation and structure 
of the political and legal world.
Although at the level of practices, sovereignty appears relatively open 
to change, it is a more intricate question whether new practices trickle 
down to the deepest layers. Sovereignty skeptics argue for the emergence 
of either an empire or a cosmopolitan commonwealth, yet our analysis 
does not support any radical break to a post-sovereign order. Sovereignty 
may find new guises and adapt to changing conditions, but as a founda-
tional institution it is likely to remain with us for the time being. Thus, the 
contribution of the present volume is rather centered on the analysis of 
how this powerful concept operates today and we hope that the following 
chapters will provide a set of tools for both practitioners and academics to 
continue reflection on this topic.
Notes
1. Al-Skeini and others v. Secretary of State for Defence. June 13, 2007. House of 
Lords. UKHL 26.
2. To be certain, the metaphor of “sovereignty games” is not original to this vol-
ume. In particular, it has been employed by Robert H. Jackson in his seminal 
book Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and by Georg Sørensen in 
“Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution” (In 
Sovereignty at the Millennium, ed. Robert Jackson, Oxford: Blackwell and 
Political Studies Association, 1999). We are indebted to these authors at the 
nominal and conceptual level; however the idea of “sovereignty games” as 
developed in the present volume does not build in any large part on the theo-
rizations in these works.
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2The Variety of Sovereignty
Neil Walker
Introduction: Relocating Sovereignty
This chapter seeks to engage simultaneously with three related sets of chal-
lenges to sovereignty in contemporary understandings and with three ques-
tions of sovereignty’s “relocation” that issue from these challenges. First, 
and at the highest level of abstraction, “relocating” conveys the search for 
something that has been lost. It suggests that for whatever reason or com-
bination of reasons, the conceptual relevance of sovereignty is no longer 
apparent—because either it is simply redundant or it has become such a pro-
tean concept as to be meaningless—and that active efforts have to be made 
to rediscover this sense of relevance. Second, by “relocating” sovereignty we 
may have in mind a less definitive but still fundamental theoretical project, 
for even if, as the present chapter urges, we resist the idea that sovereignty 
is in mortal conceptual danger, we should avoid the opposite mistake of its 
conceptual reification. We should instead acknowledge that it may require 
to be repositioned and reordered within our conceptual cartography—that 
the role of sovereignty in the mental map through which we make sense 
of our legal, social, and political world(s) has to be readdressed. Third, 
and final, “relocating” carries a more basic spatial connotation. If sover-
eignty has traditionally been viewed as an attribute of states and of relations 
between states, then in a less state-centered world we have to be aware of the 
various new sites—subnational, supranational, and functional—at which 
sovereignty or its equivalent may be located, or at least where the attributes 
of sovereignty may be shared with traditional state sites. What is more, we 
are likely to discover that it is in significant part this third spatial sense of 
relocation that underpins the conceptual discontinues and challenges sug-
gested by the first two, nonspatial senses of relocation.
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Thinking about Thinking about Sovereignty
Even to think about rethinking—and relocating—a concept so basic to 
our traditional understanding of the social world as sovereignty requires 
some prior appreciation of the reasons why it occupies such a basic place 
and of the dangers thereby posed. Two clusters of threshold questions in 
particular will be addressed.
In the first place, as sovereignty has traditionally been associated with 
ideas of a special kind of power—one that is both final and presumptively 
legitimate—it is no surprise that there is much contestation as regards 
the things that are deemed the appropriate subject of sovereignty and as 
regards the modalities through which they are recognized as sovereign. 
Should we associate sovereignty with individuals or, as is commonly the 
case, with forms of social organization? If the latter, are we concerned only 
with holistic forms of social organization such as states, or with specific 
dimensions of social organization, such as those concerned with money, 
security, border control, or the environment? Through what register of 
regulation is sovereignty best conceived—legal, political, or economic, or 
some combination of all? Is the sovereignty prize something that by its 
nature must be exclusive or distinctive to the party who wins it, or can it 
be shared around? And however we define the subjects and modalities of 
sovereignty, how much if any of it can be found in today’s world, or will 
remain in any future possible world? All of these are deeply contested 
questions, and all admit of deeply diverse answers. In the face of this, 
how, if at all, can we hope to lend any order or coherence to the debate 
over sovereignty? Where, in other words, are we to begin to locate or relo-
cate the concept of sovereignty in the first and second senses referred to 
earlier?
Secondly, if sovereignty is such a basic idea, how do we understand 
the connection between the second order question as to the nature and 
existence of that quality of “basicness” and first order questions that 
take that basic quality for granted? How, in other words, do we relate the 
question whether sovereignty is an inescapable and irreplaceable feature 
of the social world as opposed to a category of social thought that is in 
danger of becoming obsolete (as the first meaning of “relocating” sug-
gests), to other questions concerning its particular and contingent mani-
festations? In turn, this subdivides into two forms of inquiry and two 
types of difficulty—one to do with the normative or evaluative dimen-
sion of sovereignty and the other concerning its explanatory dimension. 
In normative terms, what is the relationship between the irreducible core 
of sovereignty, if there is such a thing, and its ideal form? If sovereignty 
is an inevitable social category, or at least a highly resilient one, does it 
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make sense to ask whether and how it may be shaped differently, and just 
how differently may it be shaped without it ceasing to be sovereignty? In 
explanatory terms, how do we think of such a deeply embedded concept 
as sovereignty in a dynamic mode? How, in the face of the pressures we 
mentioned under the third, spatial, sense of relocation suggested earlier, 
do we avoid the danger of conceptual rigidity, and so either of ignor-
ing the evidence and reifying sovereignty as something that is entirely 
immune from change or of too easily conceding its redundancy or obso-
lescence? Alternatively, how in the face of these same pressures do we 
avoid the opposite danger of conceptual vacuity, of treating sovereignty 
as stretched in various different directions but essentially unbreak-
able—as a highly contingent and event-sensitive category whose resilient 
causal significance is lost and whose continuity is reduced to the merely 
nominal (Bartelson 2006)?
These two prior considerations—the question of finding any common 
ground within sovereignty’s highly contentious politics of definition, and 
the question of the relationship between a sovereignty “core” on the one 
hand and, on the other, its evolved “superstructure”—inform the way in 
which the present chapter proceeds. In what follows we seek to address 
the problems that they pose and the issues that they raise through a con-
ceptual apparatus that grounds sovereignty in certain conditions of possi-
bility that are sufficiently historically and politically grounded to exclude 
certain modalities of authority but flexible enough to allow meaningful 
variations on a theme. A key move in this exercise is to separate sover-
eignty into different dimensions of significance, thereby allowing us to 
address it as a concept that exhibits internal variety rather than one that 
comes in different varieties. These dimensions are, in turn, epistemic, 
symbolic, and systemic.1
The Dimensions of Sovereignty
Epistemic
In a basic epistemic sense, sovereignty may be seen as a particular way 
of knowing, representing, and ordering the social and political world, 
as something that “silently frames the conduct of much of modern poli-
tics” (Jackson 1999). Unlike mediaeval forms of authority linked to and 
divided in accordance with a myriad of statuses, functions, and locations, 
sovereign authority implies the existence and, indeed, describes the form 
of a specialized species of political authority, one developed through a 
sharp differentiation of public and private domains and subsequent 
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generalization of the public domain (Loughlin 2003, ch. 5; Grimm 2005). 
First and foremost through the modern state and in terms of its claim to 
hold such specialized public-political authority comprehensively within a 
particular territory, sovereignty involves conceiving of the possibility of 
creating an ultimately authoritative “unity [out] of a manifold” (Lindahl 
1997). The perspective of sovereignty is a perspective that imagines and 
identifies discrete polities or political communities that can organize 
and act in the name of an undifferentiated collective notwithstanding an 
internal diversity of interests, values, and wills. Given its framing prop-
erties, the perspective of sovereignty is epistemically before both politics 
and law and does not necessarily privilege either. Rather it is a process of 
imagining the polity that enables a form of politics and a form of law both 
within and between such polities.
What does this basic epistemic framing of politics and law imply for 
our understanding of the potential of both? As regards politics, while 
what is enabled through the sovereignty frame is by no means all of poli-
tics, sovereignty is certainly the organizing template for two key types of 
politics (Huysmans 2003). First, politics self-defined by their key actors 
as “constitutional politics” (i.e., politics within that legal-constitutional 
framework of the polity that is presupposed and sustained under the 
authority of the “sovereign”); second, politics self-defined by their key 
actors as “international” or “transnational” politics (i.e., politics between 
thus created and sustained polities on the basis of the doctrine of “sover-
eign equality”). This leaves at least two other forms of politics that are not 
directly framed by sovereignty. First the very politics of sovereignty asser-
tion that precedes and always underpins the successful “sovereign” frame 
are themselves not structured by the sovereign frame, except as an aspi-
ration (see e.g., Tierney 2005). Indeed, these politics of “sovereign becom-
ing” point us toward the well-known paradox of sovereignty as both 
pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué, as ruler and ruled, creator and 
created, political and legal, Schmitt and Kelsen.Second, there are these 
diverse forms of national or transnational politics that ignore or resist 
the framing of constitutional or international law. These politics will also 
be a form of collective action, and thus of political agency—whether we 
are dealing with transnational civil society or the Al-Qaeda terror net-
work. Accordingly, to be effective actors, and indeed, to be identifiable as 
distinct actors, the bearers of these political forms need to be organized, 
however fluidly, so as to assume and construct their own sense of unity 
(Lindahl 2003). However, beyond this basic epistemic common ground, 
resistance does not imply imitation. Whether because their defining pur-
pose is critique, destabilization, or destruction, or because they envisage a 
new kind of political authority, they do not claim the comprehensiveness 
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or continuity of decision-making authority required for sovereign polity 
constitution and maintenance.
If some politics remains capable of being conceptualized other than 
under the sovereign frame, it is more contentious whether any law does. 
For many legal positivists, all domestic law flows from the command 
of the sovereign. Even those who would modify or reject a traditional 
Austinian or Kelsenian conception of positivism in favor of a concep-
tion of law as a complex form of custom or social practice (see e.g., 
MacCormick 1993; Wade 1996) or as a matter of natural (Finnis 1980) 
or socially constructed and contended (Dworkin 1986) right or obli-
gation, are apt to trace the formal pedigree of law—if certainly not its 
moral credentials—back to the sovereign creator (although there is also 
a robust tradition of legal pluralism that would reject even this formal 
pedigree in favor of a more diverse sourcing of original legal-normative 
authority in other sites of social and political power such as indigenous 
communities, the workplace, and even the family (see e.g., Santos 1995). 
Of course, such is the self-referentiality of law—the claim of law to pro-
vide its own final source of authority, that even the sovereign creator is 
typically reconceptualized within legal discourse as a construction of 
law, and, it often follows, as something that can be modified by law—for 
example, through the commonly available technique of amending the 
constitution, and so changing the form of the “sovereign” law-giver, by 
virtue of a mechanism provided for in the constitution itself. In other 
words, within domestic legal discourse “law” is seen as before “politics,” 
even if it remains palpably the case that the effectiveness of law is sus-
tained or complemented by an underlying political commitment to sov-
ereignty assertion and maintenance.
What of international law? Clearly this too presupposes sovereignty, 
in that sovereignty identifies the salient actors of international law. Yet 
there is a hint of paradox here. Given that its overriding purpose is to 
establish and sustain the identity of the polity qua polity, does the very 
sovereignty claim that makes international law possible not also, in its 
resistance to any external claim that might compromise that purpose, 
render international law impossible? As Koskenniemi (1989) famously 
suggested, is not the very idea of law between sovereigns oxymoronic? 
Or, can we, with Kelsen (1960), claim to rescue the purity of interna-
tional law either by positing it as having its own independent and super-
ordinate sovereign source, or more modestly, by understanding it as 
emerging and stabilizing itself at the point of coincidence between vari-
ous national sovereign wills?
To summarize then, in epistemic terms, sovereignty frames much of 
politics and, arguably, all of law. It does so by limiting and constraining 
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the space for both other than in its own terms, while simultaneously 
problematizing one aspect of the field of law that it helps to create.
Symbolic
Here we are concerned with sovereignty as a symbol of power—as an 
expressive claim to authority. The claim to sovereignty is important in 
providing a distinctive discursive register in which the bid for ultimate or 
supreme authoritative unity is made. That is to say, that the claim is made 
to sovereignty rather than, say, to representation or agency more gener-
ally, involves a certain type of signification. The invocation of sovereignty 
involves a “speech act” (see e.g., Austin 1961; Searle 1969; Werner and de 
Wilde 2001) with not only locutionary and illocutionary force but also 
perlocutionary force. It has real effects on social and political practice, 
and these effects are inseparable from sovereignty’s particular history 
and present constellation of meaning associations. If ideology is about 
the ways in which meaning is constructed to facilitate domination, then 
sovereignty is a deeply ideological category.
For example, if we look to the internal or intra-polity dimension of 
sovereignty, the sovereign label is often reserved for a particular type or 
degree of unity of institutional arrangements over and above the basic epi-
stemic unity of a polity; namely, a vertical and rigidly hierarchical politi-
cal architecture, which may be contrasted, often unfavorably, with a more 
horizontalized and heterarchical system of “governance” or “network” 
arrangement. Equally, the language of split or divided sovereignty, or even 
post-sovereignty, is often used of federal states where the basic epistemic 
unity of the polity under the federal constitution remains undeniable but 
where there is a strong territorialized division of institutional authority. 
Adjectives are also important here, with, for example, the parliamentary 
sovereignty/popular sovereignty divide tracking diverse claims as to the 
preferred mode of democratic legitimacy and organization of the polity. 
Here, in the domestic domain, there is undoubtedly a degree of fluidity 
and contestation around sovereignty, often reflecting particular historical 
compromises in state-building and state-sustenance. Crucially, however, 
behind this diversity there has remained a deeper common ideological 
assumption that ultimate authority over the internal operation of the pol-
ity is exhausted by these internal sources and modes of expression and 
that there is no remainder available to external sources.
If we turn now to external sovereignty, there are two salient and con-
nected ideological uses of sovereignty, both of which reaffirm the pre-
dominance of the state in the international domain. Here, strikingly, 
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the use of the language of sovereignty is less f luid and more hegemonic. 
One pattern of usage concerns the deep resistance to the conceptuali-
zation of any entity other than the national or pluri-national state as a 
unity that can be legitimately represented as sovereign. In other words, 
the title of sovereign is never granted by states to nonstate entities, and 
indeed rarely even claimed by nonstate entities (other than entities that 
themselves aspire to statehood), even in the case of the most mature and 
“state-like” nonstate polity—the European Union (EU), and even though 
the EU in many of its other claims such as “supremacy” or “primacy” and 
“direct effect” of laws seems to presuppose and affirm its own epistemic 
unity (de Witte 1995; de Burca 2003). The second concerns the resilience 
of the language of sovereignty as a code for understanding the connec-
tion between states—the idea that relations between states are essentially 
relations between indivisible sovereigns with exhaustive title to repre-
sent these states, regardless of the internal division of authority within 
each state. In other words, the existence of a strong currency of thought 
within a federal state such as the United States to the effect that its inter-
nal authority may be split or divided, tends not to translate in ideolog-
ical terms into a self-conception and self-projection as anything other 
than unqualifiedly sovereign in the external domain (Keohane, 2002). 
In turn, this close fit between the internal and the external claim to sov-
ereignty is made possible by the conviction, already referred to, that the 
plenitude of ultimate authority over internal affairs, however diversely 
institutionalized and however contested its legitimate mode of expres-
sion, continues to reside within the polity. This equation of internal and 
external sovereignty as both implying an exhaustive internal authority 
sharply highlights the difficulties of binding such self-referential units 
of authority to the stable discipline of international rules.
Systemic
International relations theorists often use the language of “system”—as 
in the “system of states” or the “Westphalian system” (see Jackson 1999). 
Sovereignty is again important in accounting for this systemic quality. 
Apart from its epistemic and symbolic dimensions, sovereignty speaks 
to an idea of system or structure—of wholeness and self-regulation, of 
latency and self-reproduction. The very systemic qualities of the sover-
eignty configuration make for a degree of path dependency. In the final 
analysis, however profound the epistemic difficulties of establishing a 
stable legal order between sovereign states, the deeply iterative pattern 
of their mutual recognition as the key actors of the international system 
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provides a stability to the general enterprise of international law and the 
general practice of international relations, if not necessarily to some of 
their particular manifestations. Conversely, if we look beyond the state 
form, the same systemic qualities resist other forms of recognition.
The example of the EU again points us toward one of the significant 
ways in which recognition is rendered problematical. The difficulty for a 
nonstate polity, even one as powerful as the EU, to break into or break up 
the sovereignty frame is exacerbated by the fact that in the world of dis-
crete territorial states each claiming supreme authority, just because the 
dominant ideological mode of that claim has been one of exclusive author-
ity within the relevant territorial domain, the claim of other putative sov-
ereigns, to be plausible as supreme claims within the default system, also 
have to be exclusive claims over territory. If, instead, a new claim were to 
countenance competing claims of “old sovereigns” within the same ter-
ritorial domain, then, since any such competing prior sovereignty claim 
would by definition be exclusive, that prior claim would be incapable of 
the mutual and reciprocal act of recognition of the sovereign title of the 
new claim. If coexistence within the one territorial domain is not permit-
ted, in short, then the systemic logic of sovereignty tends to drive toward 
new claims themselves being made in territorially exclusive terms. The 
EU tries to escape this bind by claiming a kind of “functional” authority 
(as do other supranational organizations, if to a lesser extent)—one that 
is not a claim to ultimate authority over all matters within a territory, 
but only as regards the particular functions that fall within its asserted 
jurisdiction. It seeks thus to decouple the claim to finality (or original-
ity) of authority—of nondependence on any other authority—from the 
stronger claim to exclusivity (N. Walker 2003). But as we have seen, the 
EU shies clear of the explicit language of sovereignty in describing this 
“sovereign-like” claim, and its Member States would certainly emphat-
ically deny in their dominant political discourse that the EU is a rival 
sovereign (de Witte 1995).
So a kind of zero-sum strategic logic attaches to sovereignty, compet-
ing claims tending to be framed in the same exclusive language or not at 
all. We are used to that in the language of domestic politics, in contexts of 
secessionist or other nationalist movements (Tierney 2005). In the trans-
national context, this zero-sum systemic logic joins with the ideological 
difficulty of nonstate entities claiming sovereignty to create a situation in 
which nonstate entities tend to be doubly resisted. The logic of the system 
makes it difficult for them to make a claim to independent or original 
authority without also making the stronger claim to exclusivity, but in any 
case the stronger and more systemically orthodox claim to sovereignty 
would be strongly denied them on ideological grounds unless they were 
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also to make—and succeed with—the claim to statehood. Accordingly, 
however plausible and effective the “sovereign-like” claims of a body such 
as the EU, there remain a degree of systemic and ideological drag imped-
ing their full acceptance.
Beyond claims to independent polity status by nonstate entities, the 
conservative quality of the systemic logic can also be seen at work in the 
broader unfolding of international relations and international law. On 
the one hand, there is no deep structural reason why nonstate actors 
should not have some kind of “title” or agency or personality in inter-
national law short of sovereignty, and indeed in recent years we have 
seen a substantial growth in this, with NGOs and other nonstate actors 
increasingly allowed standing before international tribunals and in inter-
national legislative contexts (see e.g., Jackson 1999; Held 2004). On the 
other hand, there are structural or systemic limits to this of three sorts. 
First, as the historically dominant actors of the international system, 
states will not lightly use their sovereignty to reduce their own authority. 
Second, and reflecting this, many of the substantive precepts of interna-
tional law such as equality, noninterference, sovereign immunity, and 
the like have a conservative quality, a disposition to maintain the for-
mal internal and external sovereignty of states that is the starting point 
of international law—the international “state of nature” (Knop 1993; 
Kingsbury 1998). Third, the point or purpose of having title crucially 
depends on whom you can claim to legitimately represent and whom 
you can effectively commit. Since, in the first place, notions of legitimate 
representation are developed in the image of the state and, in particular, 
the population of the state is deemed to be the relevant community of 
attachment—the object represented—and since, in the second place, the 
monopoly or at least the preponderance of the means of effective imple-
mentation lies in the hands of the states as the sole domestic sovereigns, 
again this marginalizes nonstate actors.
The Primacy and Resilience of the Epistemic Core
So while sovereignty is far from being a purely nominal category—a loose 
container of many and quite distinctive varieties, sovereignty is neverthe-
less a multilayered idea, one that displays considerable internal variety. We 
can distinguish between the core epistemic features of sovereignty that fur-
nish the idea with its basic integrity on the one hand, and its secondary 
symbolic and systemic properties on the other. The symbolic and systemic 
features are finally contingent—all ideology is contestable and all systems 
are more or less open to transformation. If we recall our two prior questions 
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of deep definitional contestation and of finding a balance between immu-
tability and excessive deference to changing geopolitical circumstances, we 
should focus on both the practical interweaving and the analytical separa-
tion of these different layers or dimensions. The effects of the sovereignty 
frame cannot be fully appreciated without understanding the close rela-
tionship between the epistemic on the one hand and the symbolic and the 
systemic on the other. Yet the space for transforming while still retaining 
the sovereignty frame depends on the possibilities of reimagining and 
asserting the symbolic and systemic dimensions differently from their 
dominant traditional formulations against the backdrop of an unchanging 
epistemic core. The limits thereby set are both sociological and normative. 
They ask both to what extent it is plausible to alter the contingent sym-
bolic and systemic dimensions against a background where the epistemic 
remains constant, and how and in what circumstances this may be done 
in a justifiable manner—one that redeems the promise of self-legislation, 
rights protection, and popular accountability contained in many claims of 
popular sovereignty (Habermas 1996) rather than reverting to older sover-
eign-associated traditions of peremptory top-down power or community 
reification (Yack 2001).
Elsewhere, I have coined the term “late sovereignty” (N. Walker 2003) 
to try to capture the domain of possibility of such internal transforma-
tion. The label serves two main purposes. Positively, the idea of late sov-
ereignty seeks to capture both the force of the sociological dynamic and 
the f lexibility of the normative possibilities that is reflected in the shift 
in the ideological and systemic superstructure of sovereignty. Late sov-
ereignty, with its uneven, often resisted but gradually self-reinforcing 
openness toward forms of “sovereign-like” authority beyond the state 
does appear to be increasingly distinct from and discontinuous with 
earlier forms of Westphalian sovereignty. The global configuration 
of authority of 2008 looks very different from the postwar world into 
which the emphatically state-centered United Nations was born only 
60 years ago.
Negatively, the idea of late sovereignty also suggests the resilience of 
this new phase. On the one hand, late sovereignty is probably irrevers-
ible. Once categories of “sovereign-like” authority have been conceded or 
successfully claimed beyond the state, it is hard if not impossible to imag-
ine the circumstances under which we might rewind to the old world of 
purely or predominantly state sovereignty. This is not to say, of course, 
that we cannot imagine the powerful reassertion of uncompromising sov-
ereign authority by states in certain times and places—think of the United 
States in the period after the cold war, and, more forcibly still, since 9/11. 
Rather, it is to suggest that the cumulative force of the changing systemic 
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imperative and of attendant shifts in the ideological climate militates 
against any general reversal in these terms.
However, we should not assume that the late phase of sovereignty is 
also a terminal phase. Indeed, the burden of proof points in the oppo-
site direction. This is so because anyone who questions the continuing 
robustness of the sovereignty frame and is skeptical of the sustainability 
or acceptability of transformation within that frame of the sort outlined 
earlier—and so contemplates the final breaking of the frame of sover-
eignty, must ask an even more formidable set of questions of any more 
fundamental alternative. Having given up on the task of “relocating” the 
lost or disappearing world of sovereignty, they must commit themselves to 
replacing sovereignty at the epistemic level. They must ask how, if at all, to 
conceive of an alternative matrix of political agency in which sovereignty 
no longer figures prominently, or perhaps at all. Then they must ask the 
same sociological and normative questions that we ask of sovereignty. At 
the level of social praxis, is such an alternative framing, whatever form it 
might take, strategically possible and plausible? At the normative level, 
would this alternative framing produce more just answers to questions 
of the overall pattern and distribution of normative power relevant to the 
ordering of social relations?
What this makes clear is that whether it is possible to replace the epi-
stemic frame of sovereignty, and to do so in a manner that meets the 
threshold of sociological plausibility and normative adequacy—are deep 
questions—by definition epistemological questions about the very possi-
bility of other ways of knowing and ordering the world—and ones that 
have never yet convincingly been answered in the positive (Huysmans 
2003). Indeed, on this epistemically grounded view of sovereignty, it 
would appear that what passes for empirical claims or predictions or nor-
mative aspirations concerning the demise of sovereignty and the rein-
vention of politics by other means—whether they focus on the growth 
of politically intelligent forms of sub-state and cross-state nationalism, 
or on the rise of regional systems such as the EU, or on the intensifi-
cation of transnational economic power and its invigilation by bodies 
such as the World Trade Organization, or on the emergence of a new 
American “empire”—typically tend to speak only to internal movements 
in the ideological and systemic superstructure (N. Walker 2003; 2006; 
Van Roermund 2003) of the sort that precisely seem to fit within the 
container of late sovereignty.
This is not, of course, to rule out the demise of sovereignty in the more 
fundamental sense. It is merely to indicate that most contemporary writ-
ing on sovereignty, even if it may seek to reject the language of sovereignty 
as undesirable (see e.g., MacCormick 1993; 1999), is in fact concerned not 
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with utopian (or dystopian) alternatives. Rather, it is concerned with how 
gradual shifts in that part of the modern “social imaginary” (Taylor 2004) 
that addresses our understanding of the domain of politics are informed 
by and in turn may (re)inform the myriad transformative opportunities, 
dangers, and limitations located at the symbolic and systemic levels of 
our still sovereign-coded global configuration (Fraser 2005).
Note
1. For an earlier attempt to develop this scheme, see Walker 2006.
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3Sovereignty Before and After 
the Linguistic Turn
Jens Bartelson
Is the sovereign state here to stay, or is it withering away? Frequently posed in terms of the consequences of globalization, this question has 
been one of the main sticking points within academic international rela-
tions and international law during the past decades. Unsurprisingly, the 
answers provided by different authors display a considerable variety, both 
in terms of their basic assumptions about the nature of sovereignty, as 
well as in terms of their conclusions about its future prospects (see e.g., 
Ayoob 2002; Cohen 2004; Agnew 2005; Sassen 2006). On the one hand, 
we find those scholars who remain convinced of the staying power of 
state sovereignty. To them, those new forms of political authority that 
are believed to challenge the predominance of the sovereign state are 
ultimately derivative of state sovereignty, and therefore indicative of its 
endurance rather than anything else. Thus, when properly defined and 
understood, the concept of sovereignty is likely to retain its analytical 
and normative relevance even in the future. On the other hand, we find 
scholars who argue that the state is unlikely to remain the main locus of 
sovereignty in the future. Sovereign statehood is challenged by new forms 
of political authority that eventually will transform the international sys-
tem into something new and different. The concept of sovereignty should 
either be abandoned, or at least understood very differently, to make bet-
ter sense of these new constellations.
As I would like to argue in this chapter, a fair share of this disagreement 
is generated by underlying philosophical differences about concepts and 
their relationship to the world. To some extent, the question of endurance 
does not even concern the actual makeup of the political world and what 
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kind of entities this world might be composed of. Rather, as I shall suggest, 
this debate is kept alive by profound and underlying disagreement about 
the ontological status of concepts. This problem has largely been neglected 
by those who have participated in the debate about the endurance of sov-
ereignty. Indeed, many of these scholars are blind to the implications of 
their own tacit assumptions about the ontological status of concepts. To 
my mind, a fair share of the disagreements about the endurance of sover-
eignty derives from a selective uptake of insights from the linguistic turn 
within the legal and political sciences.
One would have suspected that the linguistic reorientation within 
political and legal science had reduced the question of endurance to a 
quibble over the meaningful usage of the term sovereignty, but judging 
from the contemporary debate on sovereignty, the linguistic orientation 
has made the problem of endurance look more enduring that ever. As I 
shall argue below, the belief that sovereign statehood is here to stay has 
been nourished by a semantic view of concepts and their meaning, while 
the belief that sovereign statehood is undergoing profound changes has 
been greatly facilitated by a nominalist view of concepts. According to the 
former view, concepts derive their meaning from a capacity to refer to 
classes of objects that exist independently of our efforts at classification 
and description. According to the latter view, concepts are nothing but 
general names that we use to constitute objects into distinct classes, the 
resulting classificatory schemes being means of which we literally create 
the world. For reasons of simplicity rather than historical accuracy, I shall 
use the term “linguistic turn” to describe the transition from the former 
view to the latter (see e.g., Toews 1987; Wagner 2002; Bartelson 2007).
For obvious reasons, I will not embark on the impossible task of assess-
ing the validity of these different views of concepts and their meaning. 
Instead, I shall focus on their implications for how the problem of endur-
ance has been formulated and resolved within some exemplary texts on 
sovereignty. These considerations will lead me to make a further point. 
Not only does the contemporary debate on sovereignty revolve around 
factual questions, such as the makeup of the political world, but there is 
always also a short step from explaining political phenomena to actually 
justifying them. As I would like to suggest, the contemporary debate on 
sovereignty can equally well be viewed as a question of the legitimacy of 
various forms of political authority as well as the larger political order of 
which they are part. As I contend, one unintended consequence of the 
selective and sometimes distorted uptake of insights from the linguistic 
turn has been to make sovereignty look as an inescapable precondition 
of political authority and order. Doing this, I shall proceed in three steps. 
In the first section that follows, I shall first describe the view according 
Nissen_Ch03.indd   34 8/22/2008   10:36:18 AM
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN   35
to which concepts do have stable meanings by virtue of their referen-
tial capacity, and then go on by exemplifying how this view has found 
expression in some contemporary studies of sovereignty. I shall then go 
on to describe the more recent view according to which concepts derive 
their meaning from their function and usage within different linguistic 
and historical contexts, and then assess the implications that this view has 
had for the ways in which the question endurance has been formulated 
and answered. Third, I shall discuss how these different views of polit-
ical concepts might hang together, and finally indicate what I take to be 
the proper way to resolve the tension between these views for the benefit 
of a more coherent understanding of the problem of sovereignty and its 
endurance.
Sovereignty Uncontested
At least since Plato’s Republic, (1955, 299–325) the question of the onto-
logical status of concepts has been intimately connected with problems 
of political order and authority. In Book Six of the Republic, the inde-
pendence of universals turn out to be a condition of possible order as 
well the ontological foundation on which all claims to legitimate political 
authority ultimately rest. But even if few people today think that concepts 
exist independently of their instantiations, many people believe that they 
must be defined to be of any value when making logical inferences or 
making sense of the world. According to a reasonably modern version of 
this view, concepts do have a life of their own only to the extent they refer 
to classes of objects. As such, concepts are essentially predicates, and as 
such, they are necessarily concepts of something, and hence cannot exist 
independently of that something. Concepts are conditions of objectivity 
insofar as they put us in touch with things, and this referential capacity 
is in turn a condition of their possible meaning. The logical properties 
of concepts imply that their meanings are universal and timeless (Frege 
1984a, 1984b; see also Ogden and Richards 1936; Russell 1962). Since 
empirical analysis presupposes the prior analysis of conceptual mean-
ing, we could expect the outcome of empirical analyses to reflect this 
view of concepts as well.
As long as this background understanding remained unchallenged 
within political and legal science, one of the main problems encountered 
was how to define the term “sovereignty” in ways that made further inquiry 
possible and fruitful. Although scholars agreed that the concept of sover-
eignty had to refer either to political facts or legal norms, this was no easy 
since this concept had been repeatedly recycled throughout the history of 
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modern political and legal thought and thus had accumulated a manifold 
of sometimes incompatible connotations. As Kelsen once lamented, “the 
term ‘sovereignty’, while denoting one of the most important concepts of 
the theory of national and international law, has a variety of meanings, 
a fact that causes regrettable confusion in this theory” (1969, 115). As 
Benn then concluded, “it would appear to be a mistake to treat ‘sover-
eignty’ as denoting a genus of which the species can be distinguished by 
suitable adjectives, and there would seem to be a strong case for giving 
up so Protean a word” (1969, 85). But many others were more optimistic 
about the usefulness of the concept of sovereignty. Hence Hinsley could 
argue with impeccable logic that “this concept has involved the belief 
that there is a final and absolute authority within the society. Applied 
to the problems that arise in the relations between political societies, its 
function has been to express . . . the principle that internationally, over 
and above a collection of societies, no supreme authority exists” (1969, 
275). Accordingly, it becomes very hard to see how sovereignty ever could 
change profoundly or wither away completely, since “the concept of sov-
ereignty is the inescapable justification of the authority of the state in an 
integrated community; and as long as there is an international system it 
will be made up by territorial communities” (Hinsley 1969, 287).
Similar semantic sensibilities are still very much in evidence in the lit-
erature on sovereignty. Despite widely divergent assumptions about the 
nature of sovereignty and the causes of its mutability, there is an underly-
ing agreement about the relationship between concepts and objects among 
more empirically oriented scholars. As Krasner states, “any theoretical per-
spective must make some assumptions about the nature of the world; that 
is, about the units that are the subject of study” (1999, 45; 2001). By the 
same token, to Jackson, “the traditional academic approach to sovereignty 
is usually driven by the aspiration to organize into more systematic and 
coherent terms that are evident from international political activity, past 
and present” (1999a, 3). Finally, to Philpott, “it is both the contemporary 
global prestige and its urgent need of definition that merits sovereignty 
such an involved discussion” (2001, 19).
But while their Platonist predecessors regarded sovereignty as an immu-
table foundation of modern political life, recent authors have emphasized 
its mutability and flexibility. To some extent this emphasis has been made 
possible by an early offspring of the linguistic turn. The concept of insti-
tutional facts (Searle 1995) and the idea that they depend on our lin-
guistic conventions for their existence has been crucial to many of these 
attempts to account for changes in sovereign statehood. Yet even to those 
who admit that the institutional fact of sovereignty is capable of historical 
change, sovereignty retains a hard and immutable core that itself seems 
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rather unaffected by institutional transformations. As Reus-Smit claims in 
his broad survey of different international systems from antiquity to the 
present, “these systems have all been organized according to the princi-
ple of sovereignty; their member states have all claimed supreme authority 
within their territories, and these claims have been deemed legitimate by 
the community of states” (1999, 10).
So while Krasner (2001) concedes that some of the more basic  meanings 
of sovereignty within an international system of states frequently have 
been compromised by the activities of those states, he is able to conclude 
that the basic institutions of sovereignty have displayed such a remark-
able durability precisely because of their inherent flexibility and ability 
to accommodate those compromises. As we learn from Spruyt, “it was 
the concept of sovereignty that altered the structure of the international 
system by basing the political authority on the principle of territorial 
exclusivity” (1994, 3). Hence, to him “there are serious impediments to 
changing the de iure nature of the state system” (1994, 193). Given  similar 
starting points, it becomes easy to conclude that “notwithstanding its 
very real limitations and imperfections, to date the societas of sovereign 
states have proved to be the only generally acceptable and practical basis 
of world politics” (Jackson 1999b, 34; see also James 1999). While both 
the theory and practice of sovereignty have undergone major transforma-
tions since the early-modern period, “we can yet view the revolutions in 
sovereignty as part of a common movement toward a global system of 
sovereign states, and the revolutions in ideas as part of an unfolding logic 
of liberation” (Philpott 2001, 253).
Although these scholars sometimes disagree sharply about the meaning 
of the concept of sovereignty, and consequently also about its political and 
legal implications, they are in agreement that the concept of sovereignty 
indeed does have a set of stable core connotations that make theoretical 
and empirical inquiry possible and meaningful. They are also inclined to 
believe that the sovereign state will remain the main source of political 
authority in the future, and that phenomena that appear to be indicative 
of world beyond that of states in fact are dependent on, if not reducible to, 
what goes on within an international system of states. Thus, and at least 
partly as a consequence of their underlying commitments to a semantic 
view of concepts, these authors are likely to conclude that however pro-
found and lasting the changes in the institution of sovereignty, sovereignty 
itself remains essentially the same since it is constitutive of the international 
system of states as a domain of inquiry. These authors are then left with 
the difficulty of finding a way to tell under which conditions we would be 
entitled to say that we have left this international system behind for good, 
and entered into a new political universe that supposedly knows nothing 
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of the concept of sovereignty. Thus, from this point of view, sovereignty 
appears to be an immutable condition of modern political life, as well as a 
necessary condition of its intelligibility. But if my diagnosis is correct, sov-
ereignty appears to be necessary only to the extent that stable conceptual 
meaning is perceived to be a necessary condition of further inquiry. And 
such stability in turn appears to be a condition of possible inquiry by virtue 
of conceptual meaning being based on capacity to refer to a class of objects, 
in this case states.
Contesting Sovereignty
One main upshot of the linguistic turn has been to claim that our con-
cepts are actively involved in the constitution of legal and political 
reality, rather than merely being descriptive of norms and facts. But as 
Ian Hacking has argued, most such arguments presuppose a nominal-
ist view of concepts and their meaning (Hacking 1999, 80–84). Such a 
view entails the belief that concepts are nothing but names that we use 
to label individual objects, thereby lumping them together in categories 
of our own making. As Locke puts it, “since all things that exist are only 
particulars . . . Words become general by being made the signs of general 
ideas; and ideas become general by separating them from the circum-
stances of time and place” (Locke 1991, 212). Consequently, in a more 
modern version, “we reject any statement or definition . . . if it commits 
us to abstract entities.” (Goodman and Quine 1947, 105; Goodman 1978, 
1–22). When these objects also are things of our own creation—such as 
practices and institutions—naming them indeed becomes a way of mak-
ing them. Since concepts themselves do not enjoy any existence indepen-
dently of their usage, their meaning cannot be timeless and universal. 
Instead, since they are likely to be used in different ways and for different 
purposes in different linguistic and historical contexts, their meaning 
are likely to vary across these contexts as well. Conceptual meaning thus 
only remains stable as long as the linguistic conventions governing their 
usage within these contexts remain stable.
Such a view of conceptual meaning is very evident in much recent 
scholarship in international law and international relations theory, within 
which the concept of sovereignty has become a major bone of conten-
tion. Much of this contestation has been achieved thanks to the linguis-
tic reorientation within the social and legal sciences, and the sense of 
conceptual relativism it has brought. From having been a preoccupation 
mainly of critical theorists within the discipline of international relations, 
many scholars now start out from the assumption that the meaning of 
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sovereignty is wholly contingent on its usage, and that this usage in turn 
is governed by a blend of linguistic conventions and rhetorical intentions. 
Rather than assuming that the concept of sovereignty has any timeless 
or universal meaning, a recent wave of scholarship has focused on its 
changing meaning and function across a variety of historical and political 
contexts. This has led scholars to raise questions about how and why the 
meaning of this concept changes across time and space, and under what 
conditions these changes might spill over into relocations of political 
authority to agents other than states, and perhaps even into a wholesale 
transformation of the international system into a global society.
When this contestation started, much attention was focused on how 
sovereignty had been constituted in fundamental opposition to anarchy 
within international relations theory, and in what ways this distinction was 
involved in the legitimization of power politics. As Ashley observed, sov-
ereignty is “conceived as a transcendental origin of power that is not itself 
a political power because it is also the timeless and universal source of all 
that can be meaningful and true in history” (Ashley 1995, 103). Political 
realism and the practices of power politics were held to be responsible 
for the bifurcation of modern political life into two distinct and opposed 
spheres of thought and action (Ashley 1987). Similar lines of inquiry were 
vigorously pursued by Walker, who argued that the “conventional history 
of state sovereignty, while conformed by practice and offering a persuasive 
resolution of the most basic political and philosophical questions about 
the nature and location of political community, must also be understood 
as a reification” (R. Walker 1990, 171). In an attempt to understand how 
sovereignty had been reified into a constitutive principle of modern polit-
ical life through practices of intervention, Weber argued that “sovereignty 
marks not the location of the foundational entity of international rela-
tions theory but a site of political struggle. This struggle is the struggle to 
fix the meaning of sovereignty is such a way as to constitute a particular 
state . . . with particular boundaries, competencies, and legitimacies avail-
able to it.” (Weber 1995, 3). Finally, as I argued myself back then, “[t]o say 
that sovereignty is contingent is to say that it is not necessary or essential, 
but that its central and ambiguous place in modern political discourse is 
the outcome of prior accidents” (Bartelson 1995, 239).
When these authors disputed the allegedly timeless and universal 
meaning sovereignty, they did so by questioning the underlying notion 
that concepts and their meaning could be understood independently of 
their actual usage in concrete linguistic contexts. But in this first wave of 
contestation, there was little agreement as to the ultimate sources of con-
ceptual meaning and conceptual change beyond the point that they were 
intimately connected to those practices and institutions that conditioned 
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the meaningful usage of this term. Neither had these authors very much to 
say about the actual changes the concept of sovereignty had undergone as 
a result of having been employed in different ways in different contexts, by 
different agents and for different rhetorical purposes. Despite the almost 
ritualistic emphasis on the contingency of sovereignty, the first wave of 
contestation arguably strengthened the sense of entrapment by equat-
ing conceptual change with the possibility of total transcendence of the 
international system, and then denying the possibility on the former on 
grounds of the impossibility of the latter. Yet the first wave of contestation 
undeniably opened up a new domain of inquiry: few people in the trade 
today doubt that sovereignty is what human beings make of it.
More recent scholarship has done a lot to improve our understanding of 
how the concept of sovereignty and its meaning change as a consequence 
of its different use in different contexts, and how these changes in turn 
provide legitimizations of different constellations of power. As Werner and 
de Wilde have argued, “the question as to what state of affairs corresponds 
to the meaning of the term ‘sovereignty’ should be replaced by questions 
like—in what context is a claim to sovereignty likely to occur?” (Werner 
and de Wilde 2001, 3). Suggestions such as these have been taken seri-
ously by many scholars. Thus, in an attempt to make sense of the constitu-
tional pluralism of the European Union (EU), Walker defines sovereignty 
as a discursive claim concerning the existence and character of a supreme 
ordering power for a particular polity. He then goes on to argue that such 
a conception indeed is indispensable to understand and justify the transi-
tion from good old Westphalian sovereignty to our present condition of 
late sovereignty. The constitutional pluralism and multidimensional order 
characteristic of late sovereignty display considerable continuity with the 
old order in the way they handle the tension between law and politics, 
yet they have some distinctive features of their own. Boundaries are no 
longer territorial, but they have become functional to the effect that “it 
becomes possible to conceive of autonomy without territorial exclusivity” 
(N. Walker 2003, 23). If we are to believe this account, there is no way back 
from this new world, only a way forward: not only is the condition of late 
sovereignty here to stay, but it also contains the seeds for a piecemeal trans-
formation of the international system into a global society within which 
political authority is decentralized and dispersed.
In a similar vein, Huysmans has recently raised the question whether 
transnational practices really make any difference to the logic of sover-
eignty in international politics, or if they merely constitute one of its many 
reproductive circuits. Rather than simply reiterating any of the standard 
views about the corrosive effects of transnational practices on state sover-
eignty, Huysmans reformulates this problem in terms of how these practices 
Nissen_Ch03.indd   40 8/22/2008   10:36:18 AM
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN   41
might affect the matrix of sovereignty, understood as the way in which the 
question of the political conventionally has been formulated in terms of 
a territorialized distinction between the domestic inside and the interna-
tional outside. From this perspective, transnational flows “fragments the 
international society of sovereign states into functionally defined arenas 
and consequently challenges the neat fix that territorialized the tension 
and the gap that characterize the matrix of sovereignty” (Huysmans 2003, 
220). The existence of such practices thus opens up the possibility of envis-
aging politics in terms of pluralization instead of unification, making it 
possible to rework the matrix of sovereignty and thus to align it closer with 
a democratic ethos.
In another recent volume, Beaulac focuses on the constitutive functions 
of the concept of sovereignty within early-modern legal and political dis-
course, and he tries to make sense of the concept of sovereignty and the 
myth of Westphalia in the shaping of the modern society of states. As he 
aptly phrases the role of such a myth in international life, it “triggers reality 
to become larger than life” (2004, 39). Hence words and myths have the 
power not only to describe and represent reality, but also to actively create 
and transform it. What appears to be universalistic and timeless connota-
tions are in fact constituted through the changing employment of the term 
sovereignty across different contexts, but for what turns out to be similar 
ideological purposes.
Finally, Malmvig has studied how the concept of sovereignty takes on 
different meanings depending on its different usages in justifying prac-
tices of intervention and nonintervention in the international system. One 
upshot of this analysis is to show that sovereignty and intervention not only 
are mutually constitutive concepts, but also hierarchically arranged insofar 
that sovereignty can be regarded as normal only by virtue of intervention 
being considered pathological, and vice versa. At first glance, such an analy-
sis would seem to reinforce the belief that the meaning and applicability 
of the principle of sovereignty are wholly contingent on political and legal 
practices, and that there is no hard core of meaning left that could function 
as an uncontested foundation of those practices. When sovereignty simply 
is what we make of it through our discursive practices, any attempt to define 
the meaning of this concept independently of those practices is nothing but 
a concealed attempt to seize the rhetorical initiative, and thereby a chunk 
political power as well. So sovereignty is not only what we make of it, but 
equally that which constitutes the identity of its makers by virtue of being at 
stake in their recognition games (Malmvig 2006).
This brings us over to the fundamental problem faced by those scholars 
who have taken the linguistic turn. Although these authors readily have 
accepted some version of nominalism and hence believe that concept are 
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but general names by means of which we shape our world, they have nev-
ertheless felt compelled to attribute at least some basic meanings to the 
concept of sovereignty for their inquiries into its actual usage to get off the 
ground. Much like those scholars who are trying to make sense of the insti-
tutional realities of sovereignty earlier, those who are trying to make sense 
of the language games of sovereignty are equally compelled by scholarly 
conventions to convey some sense of what they are talking about, if not by 
means of definitions so at least by consistent usage and coherent implica-
tion. The very possibility and relative immutability of such meanings in 
fact condition further contestation, insofar as these meanings constitute 
a baseline agreement about what interlocutors meaningfully can disagree 
about, in and out of the academy. Not only are many of those who have 
taken the linguistic turn inclined to believe that sovereignty is likely to 
remain a permanent feature of international and global political life for a 
foreseeable future, but they arguably do also unwittingly contribute to its 
reproduction as a consequence of their adherence to those linguistic con-
ventions that happen to govern their particular sovereignty game.
Sovereignty Decontested
So taking the linguistic turn appears to have brought us full circle, since 
it turns out that underlying even the most radical attempts to contest the 
concept of sovereignty in academic debates we find assumptions about 
the conceptual identity of sovereignty and its basic meanings, being 
safely removed from contestation. The tension between a semantic and a 
nominalist view of concepts turns out to be that which keeps the debate 
on sovereignty alive, and hence what makes the topic of sovereignty so 
salient in contemporary legal and political thought. This order of things 
also correspond neatly to the way the concept of sovereignty is supposed 
to function outside the academic debate, where the constant contestation 
of its meaning supposedly reinforces those incontestable core connota-
tions that make contestation possible in the first place, and its endurance 
more likely in the second. Thus sovereignty seems to remain an ines-
capable part of modern political life and a condition of its intelligibility, 
not despite but rather because of the above attempts to historicize and 
denaturalize its meaning.
Many scholars today would agree that we live in a world in which the 
territorial differentiation into distinct and bounded political communities 
like states is being challenged by new constellations of political authority 
and community. In this world, new claims to sovereignty by new kinds 
of agents can be justified with reference to several competing normative 
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frameworks. The traditional framework of international relations and law 
has been challenged, first by universal human rights and pleas cosmopol-
itan democracy, and then by emergent claims to imperial authority made 
by the United States and its allies (Cohen 2004). These latter challenges 
are notoriously hard to separate from each other, so that each attempt to 
justify the exercise of authority with reference to global demos is likely to 
be seen as little but a concealed expression of imperial ambition. But even 
if we would agree that sovereignty is in the process of being relocated from 
states to supranational entities, this kind of conclusion seems possible to 
reach only against the backdrop of some idea of what sovereignty basically 
is or means.
But this is hardly the end of the story. If the earlier analysis is correct, 
the tension between different conceptions of sovereignty has more to do 
with our view of concepts in general than with our view of the concept of 
sovereignty in particular. In that case, the reason why sovereignty appears 
to be a condition of its own contestability has little to do with the concept 
of sovereignty itself or its range of connotations, but it is rather the out-
come of a lingering tension between different attitudes to concepts and 
the contradictory sensibilities they engender within academic and political 
discourse. Whereas a semantic view of concepts seems to be a necessary 
condition of inquiry insofar as we need to know and convey what we are 
talking about, a nominalist view of concepts seems necessary to under-
stand how concepts shape and transform those things we are trying to talk 
about as a consequence of our very trying. To these different attitudes to 
concepts thus corresponds two distinct dimensions of language within 
which the contestation of sociopolitical concepts like sovereignty can take 
place. According to Skinner, the first of these “has conventionally been 
described in the dimension of meaning, the study of the sense and refer-
ence allegedly attaching to words and sentences,” while “the other is best 
described . . . as the dimension of linguistic action, the study of the range of 
things that speakers are capable of doing in (and by) their use of words and 
sentences” (Skinner 2002, 3–4).
But as the earlier analysis has made plain, it seems not possible to speak 
of concepts and their referents within any of these dimensions without 
presupposing that about which one speaks. This implies that these two 
dimensions of language indeed are fundamentally interdependent, insofar 
as the activities undertaken within one of these dimensions will determine 
what kind of activities that can be undertaken within the other. Not only 
practices of definition provide the baseline for further disagreement and 
contestation, but disagreement and contestation also generate those con-
notations that make attempts at definition possible and necessary. The fact 
that the two dimensions of language are interdependent points further to a 
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more fundamental fact of language, namely that the use of language invari-
ably involves making presuppositions about those things we speak about, 
while simultaneously allowing us to speak about those presuppositions. 
The thing itself—in this case sovereignty—only exists within language as a 
consequence of being spoken about, yet it is possible to speak about sover-
eignty only by presupposing it (Agamben 1998b, 27–38).
But by presupposing things we also remove them from contestation. 
As Freeden has described this practice, “[w]e can only access the  political 
world through decontesting the contested conceptual arrangements 
that enable us to make sense of that world, and we do so—deliberately 
or unconsciously—by imposing specific meanings onto the indetermi-
nate range of meanings that our conceptual clusters can hold” (2006, 
19). According to him, by removing certain concepts from contestation 
we also turn their meanings into starting points of political ideologies, 
and these ideologies are then used to legitimize the very same conceptual 
arrangements. This brings me over to my final and concluding point. If 
talk about sovereignty always and invariably implies presupposing sover-
eignty, and if presupposing sovereignty implies decontesting sovereignty, 
and if decontesting sovereignty implies turning it into ideology, we might 
as well wonder what kind of political order thereby is legitimized? This 
kind of question is certainly no news to those who have taken the lin-
guistic turn, and much energy has been spent answering it during the last 
decade. To the first wave of critics, sovereignty was regarded as intimately 
involved in the justification of the practices of power politics and the 
imposition of Western values globally. The critical upshot of these con-
tentions was to dispute the moral legitimacy of sovereignty on the basis 
of its undesirable implications for mankind as a whole. In the second 
wave of linguistically oriented scholarship, students of sovereignty have 
focused more on its function in legitimizing particular claims to power 
by specific agents within delimited political and historical contexts. One 
important consequence of these inquiries has rather been to demonstrate 
in some empirical detail how sovereignty has been reproduced through 
these practices, and why the concept of sovereignty remains an indispens-
able rhetorical resource to those who want to raise successful claims to 
power in international politics.
Yet a more obvious but more disturbing conclusion has been avoided 
by most of the authors discussed earlier. To my mind, the most basic ideo-
logical function of the concept of sovereignty is not to legitimize particular 
claims to power by specific agents, but rather to legitimize the very politi-
cal order within which those claims can be made and understood as mean-
ingful by the agents involved. Actual claims to sovereignty can only make 
sense in a political world within which political authority and community 
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already have been thoroughly particularized, such as within the modern 
international system of states. The concept of sovereignty helps us to make 
sense of a world—and only makes sense within a world—in which the 
division of mankind into distinct peoples is regarded as an inescapable 
and perhaps even desirable condition. Before that world came into being 
sovereignty made no sense, yet the reason why sovereignty makes sense 
within this world is because that world was brought into being by sover-
eignty. When that world has withered away, so will sovereignty.
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4Playing with Sovereignty: 
Examples from the 
Theory and Practice of 
International Law
Ole Spiermann
Positioning Public International Law
International law represents an expansion of the rule of law beyond the 
con nes of national law to, in the  rst place, what is traditionally phrased 
relations between states.
Many lawyers seem to know that international law maintains a some-
what uneasy relationship with bindingness, in Hans Kelsen’s phrase Das 
Problem der Souveränität (Kelsen 1928; and e.g., Sukiennicki 1927, 55; 
Hart 1994, 220). However, the true problem is not whether international 
law is binding, but whether relations between states—and other issues 
taken to affect the interests of a plurality of states—may be subject to law 
at all. Relations between states are located outside the conceived con-
fines of national law for the simple reason that each national legal system 
is linked to a particular, sovereign state and, therefore, inapt to govern 
issues involving other equally sovereign states. Once an issue has been 
defined as involving the interests of a plurality of states, for whichever 
reason, tradition or otherwise, national law no longer recommends itself, 
not even to national lawyers. It is recognized that states are not only sov-
ereign; they are also independent.
Whether law is excluded from certain areas of life is a philosophical 
conundrum of considerable intellectual depth. Suffice it to say that the 
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positioning of international law on the periphery of law adds an idealis-
tic, if not missionary, flavor to international lawyering, even today. More 
significantly, lawyers confronted with specific cases generally recognize 
the need for as well as the possibility of law also in situations related to 
the interests of more than one state. Reconciling sovereignty of a state 
with the binding character of international law has been more agreeable 
than a Hobbesian vision of the state subjecting other sovereign states 
to its national legal system in contradiction with their sovereignty and 
independence. In this light, bindingness presents itself as the lesser of 
two evils. To put it differently, the cardinal dichotomy, national versus 
international, does not at its most fundamental level translate as internal 
versus external, but as one national sovereign versus more national sover-
eigns, or single versus plural.
It is rather trivial, to a practitioner at least, that international law is 
binding; and to look for the explanation in international law, and so to 
assume the system to be self-referential, is certainly a misconception. 
Nevertheless, in theory it has been rather more difficult to overcome Das 
Problem der Souveränität. Martti Koskenniemi has taken the view that 
international law is indeterminate. This is because, “[o]n the one hand, we 
seem incapable of conceptualizing the State . . . without reflecting on the 
character of the social relations which surround it” and “[o]n the other 
hand, we cannot derive the State completely from its social relations and 
its liberty from an external (and overriding) normative perspective with-
out losing the State’s individuality as a nation and the justification for its 
claims to independence and self-determination” (Koskenniemi 1989, 193). 
This argument emphasizes an external perspective on the state. However, 
when considering situations related to the interests of more than one state, 
lawyers do not start out with a perspective that is external to both or all 
states. Lawyers start within a national legal system and so with a perspec-
tive that is internal. It is possible with the internal perspective to reject, 
or at least be critical of, the notion of another sovereign (another state), 
or its representative, being a national law subject. What follows is a need 
for law other than national law, law that is common and international and 
within which the perspective on sovereignty is external. But this external 
perspective on interstates relations is generated by, and is dependent on, 
the internal perspective of national legal systems mastered by one state. 
For the same reason, the most fundamental conception of sovereignty is 
not external or international; it is internal or national.
A seed sown by Kelsen and nursed by Alf Ross is instructive (Kelsen 
1928, 308). This is the view that the “current” definition of international 
law is circular. Referring to a definition of international law as “the body 
of legal rules binding upon states in their relations with one another,” 
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Ross wrote: “The term ‘International Law’ is defined with reference to 
the term ‘state’ and the definition of the term ‘state’ again refers back 
to the term ‘International Law’. A definition thus biting on its own tail 
is circular. The consequence is that on the point in question the defi-
nition is in reality a blank” (Ross 1947, 12). This vicious circle was on 
the basis of the following definitions: “(1) A definition of International 
Law as the law valid between states; (2) A definition of the state by the 
concept of sovereignty; and (3) A definition—explicit or implicit—of sov-
ereignty as sole subjection to International Law” (Ross 1947, 12, note 1 
and 41). According to Ross, the circle could be avoided by changing the 
conception of state. Ross substituted the term “self-governing commu-
nity” for the term “state” and held that “a legal community is called self-
governing when and in so far as it is the highest legal power in relation to 
its individual members” (Ross 1947, 15). Ross’s analysis impressed some 
Continental scholars (Verdross 1950, 10; Antonowicz 1966/67, 195; see 
also Koskenniemi 1989, 262, note 279). On a closer look, however, what 
Ross had changed was better described as the conception of sovereignty 
(Spiermann 2003, 680–682). The external perspective on sovereignty that 
takes part in the circular definition (sovereignty being independence, or 
the state only being subject to international law) had been exchanged for 
the internal perspective on sovereignty echoing Jean Bodin’s definition of 
sovereignty being the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth, 
or supreme and absolute power over citizens and subjects. Leaving aside 
Ross’s seemingly relentless pursuit of iconoclasm and his claim, obvi-
ously unfounded, that the dichotomy between external and internal was 
a novelty, Ross’s circle and the way in which it was undone illustrates the 
importance to international law of the internal perspective or the national 
conception of sovereignty. Disregarding this Bodinian conception and 
international law cannot be fully appreciated.
This is not to say that the national conception of sovereignty is suffi-
cient for purposes of international law. Quite to the contrary, additional 
meanings or conceptions of sovereignty—external perspectives—have 
to be introduced to reconcile sovereignty with bindingness and public 
international law. The resulting complication has dogged international 
lawyers till this day. On the one hand, the national conception is the rai-
son d’être of international law. It is exactly because national law is seen 
as a projection of supreme and absolute state power that national law is 
inadequate when a plurality of sovereign states are involved; instead, 
international law has been envisaged as a complementary and residual, 
common legal system to which issues affecting the interests of more 
than one state may be referred. On the other hand, although interna-
tional law may only be properly conceived against the background of 
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the national conception of sovereignty (which determines the scope of 
internationalism), when engaged with international law, and its content, 
lawyers are in need of international conceptions of sovereignty. To put it 
shortly, international lawyers need to be familiar with and yet distance 
themselves from the national conception of sovereignty.
The outside observer struck by state sovereignty being presented as 
the very basis of legal reasoning, internationally as well as nationally, 
has taken the first step toward understanding the limited role that is 
entrusted to law and the consequent distinctions between political the-
ory, day-to-day realities, and (international) law. When misguided theo-
rists go the whole hog and strike the pejorative word “sovereignty” off 
the vocabulary of international law, they confirm the importance of the 
word, at least to legal reasoning: nobody would care about striking off 
an irrelevant word (e.g., Téson 1992, 54 and 92; MacCormick 1994, 1; 
Henkin 1995, 8; Franck 1995, 5).
The Wimbledon
 e Wimbledon was a case decided in 1923 by the newly established 
Permanent Court of International Justice, the predecessor of the present 
International Court of Justice. Essentially, the case raised the question 
whether Germany had put itself under an obligation, pursuant to the 
Versailles Treaty, to give access to the Kiel Canal to vessels carrying weap-
ons intended for a belligerent. N e position of the German Government, as 
reproduced in the judgment, was that an obligation to this eO ect would be 
contrary to Germany’s obligations as a neutral toward other belligerents 
as well as Germany’s sovereignty and, for this reason, not obligatory. N e 
Permanent Court rejected the latter argument in what has been referred 
to as the classical statement of a governing axiom (Schwebel 1980, 188):
The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any treaty by which a State 
undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an 
abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating an 
obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sover-
eign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in 
a certain way. But the right of entering into international engagements is 
an attribute of State sovereignty.1
What the Permanent Court contemplated was the national concep-
tion of sovereignty, that is, the conception of the state as a national sov-
ereign, on which “an obligation of this kind places a restriction”; and 
the Permanent Court invoked, as a counter-argument, an international 
Nissen_Ch04.indd   50 8/21/2008   10:28:33 AM
PLAYING WITH SOVEREIGNTY   51
conception of sovereignty that may be termed the conception of the state 
as an international sovereign: “the right of entering into international 
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty” (Spiermann 2005, 180). 
This is a famous dictum, and it makes a nice quotation. It has impressed 
generations of international lawyers. Referring to the theoretical dichot-
omy between sovereignty and bindingness as “the sovereignty dilemma,” 
Jan Klabbers has concluded as follows (1998, 364):
Instead of being plagued by the sovereignty dilemma, the Wimbledon 
court had managed to make a virtue out of a vice; it had squared the circle, 
and its solution has been with us since 1923, internalized as probably no 
other international legal dogma has become internalized in the collective 
mind of the “invisible college of international lawyers.”
Still, it all boils down to international lawyers not being secure in the 
normative status of public international law and the much less sophis-
ticated argument, articulated by the Permanent Court the year before, 
that the provision in question “is part of the Treaty and constitutes an 
obligation by which the Parties to the Treaty are bound to one another.”2 
The subsequent dictum pronounced in The Wimbledon appeals to those 
not willing to rely on bindingness, or the other international conception 
of sovereignty, which may be referred to as the conception of the state as 
an international law subject.
The Lotus
A parallel example is the following famous, some would say infamous—
and certainly provocative—paragraph taken from  e Lotus, which 
involved jurisdiction to legislate in relation to a collision between a 
Turkish and a French vessel on the high seas. In 1927, the Permanent 
Court held:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules 
of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as 
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achieve-
ment of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States can-
not therefore be presumed.3
The question arises what is the exact implication of the last sentence. 
This has not been a game played within the Permanent Court, but between 
the majority of the Permanent Court and the readers of its judgment.
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Often the last sentence has been read against a background colored by 
the national conception of sovereignty to the effect that “independence” 
has been taken to be synonymous with sovereignty and that the Permanent 
Court has given support to a presumption against international law: 
in dubio pro libertate, or when in doubt the state is free, as the Turkish 
Government had been arguing.4 Indeed, most lawyers work and think on 
the basis of a national legal system; they rarely pay regard to international 
law and see the national legal system as being self-contained, capable of 
solving on its own disputes and other issues as they present themselves. 
But it would have been truly extraordinary had a newly established inter-
national court favored this national principle of self-containedness over 
international law. Nor was it the intended meaning. The sentence relates 
to the conception of the state as an international, as opposed to a national, 
sovereign (Huber 1928, 47–48; De la Grotte 1929, 387; Huber 1936, 84–85; 
Anzilotti 1958, 58). When put in its own context, the sentence implies 
that a state is not bound by international law unless it has agreed so: “The 
rules binding upon the States therefore emanate from their own free will.” 
No state may legislate with binding effect on another state, or at least 
this cannot be presumed. This follows from what the Permanent Court 
had referred to earlier as “a fundamental principle of international law,” 
in French “la base même du droit international,”5 that is, independence 
(Huber 1974, 277).
The Double Structure of International Legal Argument
N e analyses of  e Wimbledon and  e Lotus suggest that in the context 
of international law, the internal perspective on sovereignty and the con-
ception of the state as a national sovereign is fundamental but not suQ  -
cient. International conceptions of sovereignty are needed, together with 
a clear distinction between them: in relation to the making of interna-
tional law the state is to be seen as an international sovereign ( e Lotus), 
and in relation to the application of international law as an international 
law subject ( e Wimbledon).
In consequence, international legal argument is erected upon not one, 
but three different conceptions: the (national) conception of the state 
as a national sovereign, the (international) conception of the state as an 
international sovereign, and the (international) conception of the state as 
an international law subject. The main question is not one of choosing 
between the intentions of the different conceptions, but one of extensions 
and the categorization of issues within the structures of international 
legal argument.
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There are two main structures. One of them, the basic structure, 
advances from the national principle of self-containedness (and the 
conception of the state as a national sovereign) to general or customary 
international law (the international law of coexistence) (still mainly the 
conception of the state as a national sovereign); the line dividing the two 
categories reflects national lawyers’ needs for a common legal system 
that supplements the several national legal systems in respect of issues 
involving conflicting state interests (thus also based on the conception of 
the state as a national sovereign). The other, dynamic structure advances 
from treaty law (the international law of cooperation) (and, at least as a 
starting-point, the conception of the state as an international law sub-
ject) to the residual principle of sovereignty (the conception of the state 
as a national sovereign), the dividing line being generated by treaty mak-
ing (reflecting the conception of the state as an international sovereign). 
What makes each of the two structures normative is that, in practice as 
well as in principle, lawyers do not have a free hand in categorizing issues. 
It is not left with the individual lawyer to decide whether there is such a 
clash between the interests of national sovereigns that it triggers interna-
tional law. Nor can it be said to be a matter of the individual lawyer’s will 
whether international law has been made by concluding a treaty, explic-
itly or implicitly.
The two structures of international legal argument are in a sense the 
opposite of each other: the basic structure advances from the national 
to the international and the dynamic structure from the international 
to the national. Each and every issue may be categorized within both 
structures, often with different results. Accordingly, even if accepting 
that each structure taken on its own is normative, the question remains 
whether choosing between the structures is governed by international 
law. An answer in the negative and this model of international legal argu-
ment would reproduce well-known indeterminacy arguments (Kennedy 
1987, 29–54; Koskenniemi 1989, 42–50). But the claim ingrained in 
international law is precisely that international law remains essential 
also when choosing between the basic and the dynamic structures of 
international legal argument. Thus, there is not merely two structures 
of international legal argument, but a double structure of international 
legal argument in which the two structures are hierarchically ordered. 
The questions where in each structure to categorize a specific issue, and 
which structure to treat as the hierarchically privileged, form a perti-
nent and sometimes difficult task confronting, for example, the mem-
bers of an international court. Categorizing specific issues within the 
double structure may be uncertain; obviously, categorizations may also 
change over time. Nevertheless, it takes a distortion of international law, 
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alienating it from national as well as international lawyers, to conclude 
that lawyers may choose between the two structures at will as if moving 
in vicious circles.
Taking the two structures together as a double structure of international 
legal argument, discussions of a general hierarchy between sovereignty 
and bindingness are misconceived. From the international lawyer’s point 
of view, sovereignty does not carry a fixed, general meaning, nor are sov-
ereignty and international law mutually exclusive. Sovereignty is neither 
passé nor all-embracing. In respect of issues coming within the national 
principle of self-containedness, it can be said that sovereignty restricts, if 
not excludes, international law (sovereignty contra legem), while the inter-
national law of coexistence may furnish examples of international law 
determining sovereignty (sovereignty infra legem). In yet other cases, those 
that fall under the international law of cooperation, international law can 
indeed be said to have gone beyond sovereignty, thus the conception of the 
state as an international law subject, which implies that sovereignty is not, 
prima facie, relevant in treaty interpretation. In respect of issues that do 
not fall under the international law of cooperation, while belonging to the 
same dynamic structure of international legal argument, there is a resid-
ual principle of state freedom that makes sovereignty supplement interna-
tional law (sovereignty praeter legem). In addition, sovereignty determines 
international law in the sense that states are free to conclude treaties. The 
variety of meanings given to sovereignty emphasizes the importance of the 
hierarchical relationship between the two structures of which the double 
structure consists.
Some of the most notable illustrations of international legal argument 
in recent decades have emerged within regional courts in Europe estab-
lished under treaty regimes which states, as international sovereigns, have 
extended to individuals. Thereby, international law has been brought to 
comprise not only relations between states, but also relations between 
state and individual. In respect of the latter, both the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have experienced 
serious difficulties in substituting the conception of the state as an inter-
national law subject for the conception of the state as a national sovereign, 
or in other words to accept the dynamic structure of international legal 
argument as hierarchically privileged, just as in The Wimbledon.
The European Court of Human Rights
It is common for institutions operating under human rights instruments 
like the European Court of Human Rights to make observations such 
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as the following: “Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the 
Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between 
contracting States. It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilat-
eral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the 
Preamble, bene t from a ‘collective enforcement’.”6 As individuals may 
invoke responsibility and bring claims of their own before the European 
Court of Human Rights, the court also found that in “interpreting the 
Convention regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the 
collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”7 
Ultimately, involvement of individuals led the court to the language of 
constitutionalism, as well as supranationalism. Lawyers have evidently 
been taking advice from national law in conceptualizing the human 
rights movement.
In applying the European Convention of Human Rights to specific 
cases, it has been of some significance that, from early on, the court 
defined its own task as one of reviewing the decisions of national author-
ities rather than itself subsuming facts of the case under the relevant 
 provisions of the convention. The first case in point, Wemhoff v. Germany, 
raised the question whether the length of detention before trial was “rea-
sonable” as required under Article 5(3) of the convention. In previous 
cases, the Commission of Human Rights, the original supervisory body 
of first instance, had defined a set of seven criteria on the basis of which to 
assess the length of detention. The court took a different position:
The Court does not feel able to adopt this method. Before being referred 
to the organs set up under the Convention to ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken therein by the High Contracting Parties, cases 
of alleged violation of Article 5 (3) must have been the subject of domestic 
remedies and therefore of reasoned decisions by national judicial author-
ities. It is for them to mention the circumstances which led them, in the 
general interest, to consider it necessary to detain a person suspected of an 
offence but not convicted. Likewise, such a person must, when exercising 
his remedies, have invoked the reasons which tend to refute the conclu-
sions drawn by the authorities from the facts established by them, as well 
as other circumstances which told in favour of his release.
It is in the light of these pointers that the Court must judge whether the 
reasons given by the national authorities to justify continued detention 
are relevant and sufficient to show that detention was not unreasonably 
prolonged and contrary to Article 5 (3) of the Convention.8
Responding states only having to provide “relevant and sufficient” 
reasons in what resembled a doctrine of misuse of powers, the approach 
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was equal to admitting states a “margin of appreciation,” as the court 
would put it.
Power to fill gaps in open texture is not a privilege granted to subjects 
of international law generally. The articulation of a margin of apprecia-
tion could hardly be anything but a witness to state authorities, the sup-
posed subjects, being seen as the more appropriate master of individuals, 
very much in accordance with the internal perspective on sovereignty. 
Admittedly, the court’s approach also stressed the role of national courts 
in applying the convention before local remedies having been exhausted. 
But the margin of appreciation was more than a symbolic gesture 
intended to bring national judges around, nor simply an expression of 
interinstitutional comity. Being a margin indeed, this doctrine has reg-
ularly, though erratically, served to lessen the burdens imposed on the 
state precisely by stressing the sovereignty of the latter and not eman-
cipating the individual fully from its curb. In Waldock’s phrase, “[t]he 
doctrine of the ‘margin of appreciation’ . . . is one of the more important 
safeguards developed by the Commission and the Court to reconcile the 
effective operation of the Convention with the sovereign powers and 
responsibilities of governments in a democracy” (Waldock 1980, 9).
It might be difficult today to imagine human rights jurisprudence, in 
Europe and elsewhere, without the doctrine of a margin of appreciation. 
It facilitates the functioning of overburdened systems, and it is familiar to 
many national legal systems, not least in the areas of constitutional and 
administrative law. On the other hand, bearing in mind that states come 
to an international court as, in the first place, subjects of international 
law—as opposed to national sovereigns—it is not self-evident that an 
international court less impressed by state sovereignty would have ended 
up with the same general doctrine justified by the nature of the supervi-
sory system, as distinct from the interpretation of specific treaty rules.
The European Court of Justice
N e ECJ, which is an integral part of the European Union (EU), has stated 
that “[t]he essential characteristics of the Community legal order . . . are in 
particular its primacy over the law of the Member States and the direct 
eO ect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nation-
als and to the Member States themselves.”9
This pronouncement echoed some of the most celebrated moments in 
the court’s own making of the community legal order. As for “the new legal 
order,” the phrase had been coined in 1963 in the first judgment on direct 
effect of treaty provisions on individuals. “The EEC Treaty,” the court 
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had noted, was “more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states.”10 In a famous statement, the 
court had declared that “the Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sov-
ereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which com-
prise not only Member States but also their nationals.” Direct effect made 
the community legal order “new” because, in the court’s view, individuals 
were not subjects of international law and, accordingly, international law 
did not have direct effect. As the European Economic Community (EEC) 
Treaty, in addition to the Member States, counted individuals as its sub-
jects, the legal order set up by the treaty was “a new legal order of interna-
tional law.” The phraseology of a “new legal order” endowed the study of 
Community law with self-confidence. Thirty years after the decision in 
Van Gend en Loos, Judge G. Federico Mancini wrote: “But if the European 
Community still exists 50 or 100 years from now, historians will look 
back on Van Gend en Loos as the unique judicial contribution to the mak-
ing of Europe” (Mancini and Keeling 1994, 183).
The other “essential characteristics” mentioned by the European 
Court in 1991, in addition to direct effect, was “primacy over the law of 
the Member States.” This principle was articulated by the court in what 
was essentially its second judgment on direct effect, Costa v. ENEL from 
1964. On this occasion, it was stated that the community had “real powers 
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from 
the States” because the community legal order was “a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves.”11 For this reason, the court 
juxtaposed the EEC Treaty with international law: “By contrast with 
ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal 
system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral 
part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are 
bound to apply.” The Community legal order was no longer, as in Van 
Gend en Loos, “a new legal order of international law.” It was now “an 
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States,” a new legal order 
of national law, as it were.
The rationale was as straightforward as it was antiquated: because of 
its direct effect, community law was not merely applicable to relations 
between states, and consequently the community legal order was part of 
national law, as opposed to international law. This was a consequence of 
the national conception of sovereignty. In this light, it was only logical 
that the court should take seriously the Italian Government’s national law 
argument that the Italian act of ratification had been overturned by a new 
Italian act. This misplaced argument would have carried no weight in inter-
national law. But the court saw the community legal order as belonging 
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to the very system that bred the argument, namely Italian national law. 
Although the “new legal order” phraseology had convinced Community 
lawyers that international law had been left behind, the principle of prece-
dence equipped them with a new understanding of the community legal 
order: Community lawyers began to talk about constitutionalism, with 
the EEC Treaty being a constitution. This was so even though the ulti-
mate basis for precedence was trivial, as made clear in a passage in which 
the court was hardly carried away by its own eloquence:
The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which 
derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit 
of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord 
precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system 
accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity.12
As a matter of principle, precedence stands as a poor translation of 
pacta sunt servanda, yet the exceptional gesture toward the state, its sov-
ereignty and national law, might have more than one explanation. Van 
Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL were preliminary rulings requested by 
national courts. Framing the court’s decisions in a language familiar 
to national lawyers might add to the trenchancy of community law. A 
national court envisages not only the treaty but also national law and thus 
potential conflicts between treaty rules and national law, making a prin-
ciple of precedence more appealing than simply pacta sunt servanda. That 
being said, Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL were clearly not only 
about rephrasing ordinary principles of international law. It can safely be 
said that community lawyers, judges, and readers alike, were themselves 
attracted by the national conception of sovereignty, a key value of national 
law that captivates any lawyer distancing himself or herself from interna-
tional law. Had the new legal order phraseology been merely a rhetorical 
device for purposes of seeking a higher degree of autonomy in adjudicat-
ing future disputes, members of the court would hardly have chosen a 
language and a discourse so familiar to that conception of sovereignty.
It is instructive that, as certain human rights lawyers, community 
lawyers have tended to assume that international law contains a general, 
sovereignty-based principle of restrictive treaty interpretation (Riese 
1966, 27; Donner 1974, 135; Kutscher 1976, 31; Mancini 1989, 596), an 
assumption that certainly says more about their own preference for state 
sovereignty than it does about international law. Equally misconceived 
are community lawyers who express doubt about the European Court’s 
style of interpretation on the assumption that treaty interpretation 
is confined to the text, or to the original intention of the Contracting 
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Parties (Rasmussen 1986, 25–33; Hartley 1999, 22–42). Still, most law-
yers familiar with Community law have not appreciated the evident 
defects in the court’s self-acclaimed new legal order. For when seen 
against the national conception of sovereignty, and the national prin-
ciple of self-containedness, the court’s making of the community legal 
order has appeared innovative, even though it did not quite come up to 
the promises contained in the community treaties.
Conclusions
N e analyses of  e Wimbledon and  e Lotus suggest that in relation 
to the making of international law the state is to be seen as an interna-
tional sovereign and in relation to the application of international law as 
an international law subject. N ese form the international conceptions of 
sovereignty needed for purposes of international law.
The analyses of the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ 
suggest that this is a lesson that cannot be learned once, a hindrance that 
international law could not simply overcome in the golden age of inter-
national adjudication. Rather, it is a daily quest for international lawyers. 
International law being a complementary and residual legal system that 
owes its existence to national law, there is always the risk that the inter-
national lawyer fails to restraint the national lawyer, and accompanying 
conceptions, lurking within him or her.
From this perspective, lawyers may be said to be engaged in a game of 
sovereignty that, albeit never-ending, produces losers and perhaps also 
winners each and every day.
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5Play Money? Contemporary 
Perspectives on Monetary 
Sovereignty
Christoph W. Herrmann
Introduction
The more books one reads on money, the more one gets confused and 
frustrated about one’s incapacity to grasp the very essence, the idea of 
what constitutes money. Yet one can derive at least some comfort from 
the fact that even Nobel Prize laureate economists such as John Maynard 
Keynes or famous bankers such as Baron Rothschild—almost coquett-
ishly—admitted to know only two or three people who actually under-
stood money, but unfortunately disagreed about its nature (Ingham 2005, 
xi). Rephrasing slightly another quote of unknown origin, one could say 
that there are three roads to madness: love, ambition and the study of 
money (Chown 2003, 5).1 I am still undecided whether me being a lawyer 
by training—and therefore allegedly equipped with a natural confusion 
about numbers2—will make me go down that road even faster or rather 
slower.
The disagreement as to the nature of money is not restricted to the 
different disciplines that deal with money: Economics, Law, Sociology, 
Political Science (and even Geography3), but also manifests itself in the 
economic discipline.4 To some extent, the difference in thinking about 
money reflects the diverse interests the disciplines have in the subject 
and is of no relevance to the others: Economists do not necessarily have 
to consider in their treatment of monetary theory that money is a sym-
bolic medium and a precondition of modern detached lifestyle from a 
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sociological point of view.5 Nor does a lawyer always have to consider 
what is used in practice as money when he has to answer the question as 
to the legal tender of a given country.6 However, thinking about monetary 
sovereignty means thinking about the nature of a relationship between 
the State, the individual, and the economy.
According to the still important “State Theory of Money,” formulated 
in 1905 by G. F. Knapp, money is “a creature of law” (Knapp 1923, 1)7, law 
being identified with the modern state. The key argument of this the-
ory is the existence of debt. The State provides its power of enforcement 
of contractual debts, but defines what serves as satisfaction of the debt 
through the definition of legal tender. This definition is always a historic 
one, on the basis of a recurrent link to the former currency in which old 
debt may have been denominated (Knapp, 9–20).
However, this legalistic understanding of money is widely rejected in 
economic circles, which tend to define money in a functional way (“money 
is what money does”) and emphasize the actual acceptance as payment 
by economic entities as being decisive for something to become money. 
According to this view, money bears the functions of unit of account, 
means of exchange, standard of deferred payments, and store of value. An 
item that fulfils all these functions will normally be considered by econo-
mists as “money” with the medium of exchange function given supreme 
importance by mainstream economists (the so-called commodity theory 
of money).8 This view may have been correct in the past, that is, from 
early ancient times until the beginning of the twentieth century. In those 
times, money stuff were predominantly precious metals (or banknotes 
and state-issued paper currencies convertible into metal), and accord-
ingly the acceptance of money was on the basis of the appreciation the 
money stuff itself enjoyed as a commodity.
However, things have changed. Change began more or less one and 
a half centuries ago with the development of true nonredeemable paper 
currencies and found its ultimate completion with the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods System in 1971, when the remaining indirect link between 
all currencies and gold was given up. It is obvious that in our times money 
cannot simply be—as it has widely been believed for thousands of years—
the most fungible commodity available anymore, even though this may 
have been the historical origin of money. It would contravene the ordinary 
meaning of the word “commodity” to use it for money that is made of a 
substance that has no practical use whatsoever, or at least no real value 
that comes even close to the exchange value it normally embodies.9 It holds 
even truer for book money that nowadays may be transferred electroni-
cally and has no bodily existence at all or for E-Money10 or virtual curren-
cies such as the Linden Dollars used in the virtual world of Second Life.
Nissen_Ch05.indd   64 8/22/2008   9:39:21 AM
PERSPECTIVES ON MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY   65
Hence, the nature of money must be something different. As Georg 
Simmel has correctly pointed out in his Philosophy of Money (1900), 
money rests on the trust of individuals who accept it as payment only 
because they believe that other individuals will accept it in their turn in 
the future (Simmel 1930, 162). The very core of this societal relationship 
is that of credit. According to that view, money embodies a negotiable 
claim on society to receive goods and services of real value in the future 
in return for it. It certifies that its owner has made a real contribution to 
the economy for which he has received only the money stuff and no real 
goods or services. This view does neither contradict with the functions 
ascribed to money by economic monetary theory—Schumpeter devel-
oped a very similar position later in his writings on the nature of money 
(Schumpeter 1917, 627–715; 1970) and the credit theory of money, on 
which these thoughts were based, dates back to John Law’s writings at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century (cf. Schumpeter 1954,  321–323)—nor 
does it necessarily conflict with the State theory of money. Claims may 
very well be traded as commodities and trust in social and legal institu-
tions has an extremely close relationship with the State and the law. It is 
a necessary sociological precondition of all legal institutions and of com-
munity as such. The importance of “credibility” of monetary policy and 
the need for a “culture of stability” are nowadays also widely accepted 
among monetary economists; hence, the persistent call for independent 
central banks.
It has been purported in academic writings that the two defining fea-
tures of “national currencies,” that is, their distinctness and exclusivity in 
a given territory, are under threat by different trends: denationalization, 
regionalization, and virtualization of money (cf. Gilbert and Helleiner 
1999). In the following, we will try to tackle the question what mone-
tary sovereignty is and what use States make of it at the beginning of the 
 twenty-first century.
Monetary Sovereignty in Public International Law
The power over money has persistently been regarded as one of the core 
elements of statehood, institutionalized with the notion of “sovereignty” 
by Jean Bodin (1583, 211). The emergence of national currencies as such, 
that is, money that is distinct and exclusive to the territory of a State, is 
seen as closely related to the formation of Nation States in modern times 
(Helleiner 2003) and the use of the respective legal tender has often been 
coerced by authorities upon citizens (Simmel 1930, 173). Money is con-
sidered a symbol of national independence as well as integration and 
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identity. However, national money is not always appreciated. In the words 
of John Stuart Mill:
So much of barbarism still remains in the transactions of the most civi-
lized nations, that almost all independent countries choose to assert their 
nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and that of their neigh-
bours, a peculiar currency of their own. (Mill 1909, 615)
The presumption that an independent State would normally also 
have its own currency is also implied in the Statute of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). At its conclusion in 1944, it seemed rather unreal-
istic that an independent country could opt for not having a currency of 
its own (Gianviti 2005b, 817–821).
Sometimes, the relationship between a Nation and its money can have 
almost obsessive, even erotic traits, as may, for example, be the case with 
us Germans and the British. Calls for a “Denationalization of Money” 
(Hayek 1977) have therefore—leaving aside the amazing introduction of 
the Euro—neither been very frequent nor have they gained a great deal of 
support. Even liberal economists, for example, the ordo-liberal Freiburger 
School of Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, tend to take the State monop-
oly over money for granted or at least accept it.
Public International Law reflects this general acceptance of the 
State power over money. According to an often quoted decision of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1929,
[ . . . ] is [it] indeed a generally accepted principle of public international law 
that a State is entitled to regulate its own currency. (PCIJ 1929, 44)
The key legal consequence derived from this ius cudendae monetae 
(right to issue money) is that the definition of a State’s currency to which 
a reference may be made in contracts, is solely described by the law of that 
State, the lex monetae. That means that national courts have to respect 
measures taken by other States in exercise of their monetary sovereignty 
(Proctor 2005, 331–347, 499–520). It becomes relevant first and foremost 
in cases of a currency reform or reconstruction such as the introduction 
of the Euro.11 Furthermore, given the lack of specific treaty obligations, 
there will normally be no basis for a legal challenge of another State’s 
measures to organize its monetary system or of its conduct of monetary 
policy as long as this does not interfere with the monetary sovereignty of 
another State, for example, by State-controlled counterfeiting of foreign 
currency (cf. Proctor 2005, 531–538).
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Elements of Monetary Sovereignty
Monetary sovereignty encompasses a number of sovereign rights as well 
as policy tools.12 Internally, the State is free to define its unit of account, 
to issue banknotes and coins and to declare them legal tender, to impose 
criminal sanctions on counterfeiting, to prohibit the use of other cur-
rencies inside its territory, to regulate the money supply and the banking 
system, and to determine and change the value of its currency.
Given its impact on the effective demand for a currency, one should 
also consider the definition of the means of payment for taxes and state 
debts as forming part of the monetary sovereignty of a State (van Dun 
1998, 47). Regarding the external dimension of their currency, States may 
decide to impose exchange restrictions and controls on the flow of capital 
and payments, opt for a floating or fixed exchange-rate regime and define 
the exchange-rate vis-à-vis other currencies.
Limitations to Monetary Sovereignty Deriving from 
the IMF Statute
The sovereign rights of a State are limited by the provisions of interna-
tional agreements it has entered into. Relating to monetary sovereignty, 
the main source for such limitations is the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF.13 With its 185 member countries, the IMF constitutes the virtually 
universal legal framework for the exercise of monetary sovereignty.14 
However, it must be emphasized that every country is free to join and 
to leave the IMF,15 that is, membership is not an exogenously imposed 
restriction on sovereignty, but a deliberate self-restraint, something that 
is sometimes forgotten in the discourse about the waning of sovereignty 
in the times of globalization.
For the present contribution, there are two main aspects of the rules of 
the IMF that deserve mentioning:
● First, since the second amendment to the Articles, which came into 
force in 1978 and was designed to adapt the legal framework to the 
practice of freely f loating exchange-rates that had emerged with 
the breakdown of the par value system in the early 1970s, mem-
bers of the IMF are free to decide to fix or f loat the exchange rate 
of their currency against other currencies (art. IV Sec. 2 [b] IMF). 
Even though one of the main purposes of the IMF is “to promote 
exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
amongst members and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation” 
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(see art. I [iii] IMF), there is “no clearly defined and self-standing 
legal duty to maintain stable currencies” presently laid down in 
the IMF Articles (Proctor 2005, 564). Even the most substantive 
“hard obligation,” to “avoid manipulating exchange rates or the 
international monetary system to prevent effective balance of 
payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage 
over other members” (art. IV Sec. 1 [iii] IMF) has turned out to be 
not very effective and has therefore been subject to changes most 
recently.16
● Second, the introduction of restrictions on the making of pay-
ments and transfers for current international transactions17 with-
out the approval of the Fund is prohibited (art. VIII Sec. 2 (a) IMF). 
Whether a member is allowed to restrict the transaction itself is 
a matter not for international monetary law, but for international 
trade law to decide. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
regime, which applies to the trade of its 152 member countries, 
quantitative restrictions on trade in goods are generally prohibited 
(with some exceptions), but may for example, be imposed in case 
of balance-of-payments problems (see art. XII, XV GATT, art. XII 
GATS). Contrary to payments for current transactions, the IMF 
members are under no obligation to liberalize international capital 
transfers (art. VI Sec. 3 IMF). Efforts in the 1990s that were aimed at 
introducing disciplines in that regard have lost momentum follow-
ing the Asian crisis of the late 1990s.18
The Waning of Monetary Sovereignty
It is one of the prominent and fashionable tenets of our time that the 
sovereignty of States is diminishing owing to the process of globaliza-
tion. The same claim is being made regarding “monetary sovereignty.” 
According to Treves, the statement of the PCIJ nowadays is a mere fig-
ure of speech. However, Treves writings also reveal the source of much of 
the misunderstandings in the debates about the waning sovereignty in the 
post-Westphalian world order. According to him, sovereignty is a factual 
question, not a question of a right. However, this is exactly where legal 
understandings of sovereignty and political concepts differ significantly. 
From a purely legal point of view, sovereignty erodes only where obliga-
tions for a State may arise and be enforced without or even against the 
consent of that State. Sovereign is who is not subject to legally enforce-
able commands from a third party. From a traditional political science 
perspective, sovereignty is often taken to mean absolute and factual 
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independence. The problem with the latter view of course is that there 
is no State that possesses absolute independence in that sense—not even 
nuclear super powers—and that there was none in the past.
As regards the alleged waning of monetary sovereignty, the usual sus-
pects are the “global capital markets” that have taken control and can 
bring down currencies, financial centers, and governments. Indeed, 
capital markets have a great influence on domestic economic policies. 
However, they operate only within a legal framework established and 
upheld by States. Free movement of capital is nothing that markets have 
imposed, but something that has been made possible by States because it 
is seen as economically beneficial. It is for every State to decide whether 
it wants to benefit from or engage in economic globalization including 
foreign capital investments or whether it wants to take the “Cuban” or 
“North Korean” road to the detriment of its people. Sometimes it seems 
that those who bemoan an alleged inability of political actors rather feel 
dissatisfaction about the substantive outcome of the political process, 
since it does not concur with their view of “good policies.”
At this point, one factual limitation of all monetary sovereignty choices 
should not be overlooked: According to what economic theory commonly 
calls the “impossible trinity,” “impossible triad,” or the “trilemma,” it is 
impossible in the long run to combine free movement of capital, fixed 
exchange rates, and an independent monetary policy (Bernanke 2005, 
1–12).19 One must always be sacrificed. The problem described by the tri-
lemma in my view is not a question of sovereignty. It is simply a matter 
of factual limits to State power as they have always existed. States have at 
all times been unable to provide certain goods to their people, be it secu-
rity, economic welfare, health, and so on and the more they tried to pro-
vide, the less they delivered. It is a mere truth of life that one has to make 
choices between different opportunities all the time, and it holds true for 
States—even the most “Hobbesian” ones—as well. As long as they still 
exercise effective control over their territory and the people living there, 
they remain free to make such choices as they deem appropriate, but they 
have to live with the consequences.
Monetary Sovereignty “Games”
States can use their power over the currency in many different ways. 
Money can be and has been used as a coercive means of politics in the past 
(Kirschner 1995). Monetary policy can allegedly also be the trigger of mili-
tary conflicts. So it has been argued that the 2003 War on Iraq was mainly 
owing to Iraq’s decision to switch from US Dollar to Euro in its oil trade 
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(Clark 2005). These matters fall of course into the sphere of International 
Relations theory and International Political Economy. However, they are 
not subject of the present contribution, which is focused on “sovereignty 
games” as referring to a less aggressive, lighter behavior of States regard-
ing their sovereignty, including States’ decisions not to make use of what 
is considered to be their lawful sovereign right.
Every State, in principle, is free not to accede to or withdraw from the 
IMF. However, given the large number of members and the relatively low 
level of commitments resulting from membership in the IMF, I will con-
fine the following submissions to strategic options that can be pursued 
notwithstanding IMF membership, since they do not conflict with its 
legal rules.
As pointed out earlier, a member of the IMF is free to choose between 
a floating and a fixed exchange rate arrangement and is only obliged to 
ensure the convertibility of its currency for payments for current account 
transactions. In fact, this leaves quite some leeway for policy choices and 
the States widely use them. Given the obligation to allow convertibility at 
least for current account transactions, the key element of every monetary 
strategy is the exchange rate arrangement a country chooses. According 
to the degree of flexibility, the possible options embrace a freely or man-
aged floating currency, a (crawling) currency peg (against one other 
currency or a basket of currencies), a currency board or a fully fledged 
“dollarization,” or a monetary union with other countries (Proctor 2005, 
794–816).20
As of July 200621, of the member countries of the IMF:
● 25 countries let their currency float,
● 50 countries had a floating exchange rate without a specific exchange 
value target,
● 5 countries had installed a crawling peg system,
● 10 countries (mainly European Union [EU] Member States not [yet] 
participating in Stage 3 of European Monetary Union [EMU]) were 
involved in a system of fixed exchange rates with a narrow band of 
floating (ERM II22),
● 51 countries had another conventional fixed exchange rate,
● 5 countries had a currency board in operation,
● 33 countries were member of a currency union, and
●  9 countries were using another country’s currency (to this, coun-
tries such as Andorra,23 Liechtenstein,24 Vatican City,25 or the 
Principality of Monaco26 must be added, which also have no cur-
rency of their own, but use either de jure or de facto the Euro or the 
Swiss Franc).
Nissen_Ch05.indd   70 8/22/2008   9:39:21 AM
PERSPECTIVES ON MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY   71
The most liberal regime of course is that of f loating exchange 
regimes, where the determination of a currency’s exchange value is 
left to the market and interventions of public authorities are rare. This 
approach is mainly found in major industrial countries (e.g., the United 
States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom) and countries already very well integrated 
in the world economy (e.g., Brazil, Chile, Israel, Mexico, and Southern 
Africa). Of course, the Euro as the common currency of the 13 countries 
already participating in stage 3 of EMU is a f loating currency as well.27 
Needless to say that for an exchange rate to be really f loating both cur-
rencies must be f loating.
A pegged currency is characterized by a fixed exchange rate against 
either—far more frequently—one specific currency (e.g., the US Dollar or 
the Euro) or against a basket consisting of different currencies (only five 
countries as of July 2006). A variation of a pegged currency is a “crawl-
ing peg,” that is, the currency is pegged against another one, but the 
exchange rate is adjusted according to a previously announced scheme.28 
In these cases, the internal money supply is not contingent on the foreign 
anchor currency nor is the balance-of-payments equilibrium automatic. 
Moreover, the monetary policy must be pursued according to the princi-
ple of exchange rate targeting. It is this aspect in which a currency board 
deviates significantly from a mere pegged currency. A currency board is 
a monetary authority that issues a domestic currency that is backed up by 
a foreign reserve currency, normally with a backing of at least 100 per-
cent, and that is legally obliged to exchange the domestic currency against 
the reserve currency on demand (Chown 2003, 16; Ize 2003, 645; Proctor 
2005; 801). Contrary to a central bank, a currency board does not pursue 
any kind of “monetary policy” since it has no policy choices to make as 
regards the money supply. The significant impact on monetary policy 
independence is quite clear in such a case, but it becomes literally much 
more visible for everybody in case of a complete29 “dollarization,” that is, 
a substitution of the domestic currency with a foreign currency, which 
may take place officially as an exercise of monetary sovereignty. In such 
case, the foreign currency would be made either sole legal tender or cir-
culate alongside the persisting domestic currency. The degree of dollar-
ization will also depend on the policy chosen by the issuing country, 
which may passively accept, actively encourage, or actively resist the use 
of its currency by another country,30 even though there are no legal rules 
contained in the IMF Articles that prohibit a dollarization.31 An active 
support would, for example, include the conclusion of an international 
agreement granting the adopting country coinage rights, access to pay-
ment systems and central bank credit.
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A dollarization can of course also take place unofficially as a conse-
quence of behavior of private individuals.32 In the latter case the domestic 
currency—if one ever existed—may in analogy to the notion of a “failing 
state” be described as a “failing currency,” since it remains legal tender 
but is not used anymore in daily life, even though the respective State 
may try to suppress the dollarization.33 The foreign currency does not 
necessarily need to be the US Dollar. In fact it may indeed be the Euro, in 
which case it becomes more and more common to speak of “euroisation” 
(cf. Gruson 2003, 629–640).
An equally extensive but still quite different restriction (or surrender) 
of monetary sovereignty is associated with the establishment of a currency 
union. Besides the Euro Area, two of them are found in Africa,34 another 
one in the Eastern Caribbean,35 and the Golf Cooperation Council plans 
to establish a customs union.36 Also in that case, the institutional design 
can be quite different.
The Logic of Monetary Sovereignty “Games”
For many centuries, the main purpose of the State monopoly over money 
was to raise revenues for the government through seignorage profits 
on coinage and through inflation taxes, thereby protecting the finan-
cial power of rulers necessary to finance war against foreign enemies. 
Regarding the exchange regime, the maximization of gold or silver accu-
mulation corresponds to this role of money.
With the emergence of managed paper currencies without any metal 
base restricting the money supply, more effective taxation systems and 
other fundamental changes brought about by the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries, however, the goals of monetary policy shifted. Keynes (1935) 
General Theory suggested that governments could use cheap-money 
monetary policy and deficit-spending to stabilize economic activity and 
to actively fight unemployment if they accepted some inflation that was 
seen as a necessary instrument to overcome nominal wage rigidities that 
prevented a downward real-wage adjustment in economic downswings 
and therefore caused huge unemployment. It also accepted a consequen-
tial decline of the external value of the currency because of its additional 
price-effect on real wages.
However, the ideology of intervention did not survive for more than 
30 years and with the monetarist counter-revolution led by Milton 
Friedman, a policy preference for stable currencies has become almost 
unanimously supported around the globe (see Helleiner 2003, 230). 
The benefits ascribed to a stable currency are pretty well-known: they 
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are the preconditions for money to fulfill its fundamental functions of 
unit of account, means of payment, and store of value. Inflation leads to 
intransparent prices, misallocation of resources, and disguised property 
transfers from creditors to debtors. Furthermore, a constantly inflating 
currency will be under constant pressure to devaluate externally, and it 
will become increasingly difficult to attract foreign capital investment. 
Generally speaking, a stable currency has a major overall economic wel-
fare impact in the long-term perspective (cf. Ferguson 2006, 223–230; 
Levy 2006, 231–242). It is against this backdrop only that the different 
ways in which States exercise their monetary sovereignty can be under-
stood. To achieve economic growth and welfare, States will nowadays 
normally try to integrate into the world economy by encouraging cross-
border trade and investment. To do so, they have to provide
●  a stable economic environment including a stable currency, that is, 
one which is not inflating at high speed and whose exchange rate is 
not under constant pressure to devaluate;
●  (more or less) free convertibility of the currency not only for current 
account transactions, but also for capital account transactions.
“Monetary sovereignty games” can only be understood against this 
backdrop. As pointed out earlier, the key decision for the monetary sov-
ereign to take concerns the exchange rate arrangement it wants to follow. 
All of the options described have advantages and disadvantages and to 
choose between them will depend on a great deal of different economic 
and social circumstances prevailing in the country making the choice.37
The main advantage of f loating exchange rates is seen in the relative 
gain in internal monetary policy independence, which enables the com-
petent authority (i.e., normally the respective central bank), to focus on 
the control of inflation and economic growth inside the country.38 At 
the same time, a f loating exchange rate will always ensure an equalized 
balance-of-payments, however at the cost of private businesses that have 
to live with changes in their international competitiveness and transac-
tion costs caused by the need to hedge the inherent exchange rate risks. 
Furthermore, f loating exchange rates do not attract speculation against 
the currency as may happen in case of a currency that is pegged against 
another one at an exchange rate higher or lower than the market rates 
and the central bank is consequentially under no pressure to intervene. 
This policy choice, as pointed out earlier, is prevalent in industrial coun-
tries and there is no obvious reason to abandon it within the foreseeable 
future, especially for the “Big Three” United States of America, Japan, 
and the Euro Area (Corden 2002, 255). They have established credible 
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commitments to low inflation, large open economies and only little to 
gain from more exchange rate stability, since the existing exchange risks 
are hedged by functioning financial markets (Eichengreen 1994, 134).
For the rest of the world, matters are by far not as straightforward. 
For most of these countries, a stable currency is still a rather difficult 
goal to achieve. The reasons for inflation are still very poorly known, 
even though some key factors have been identified: an independent cen-
tral bank, low level of conflict between capital and labor, and decentral-
ized forms of governments in federal systems (Busch 2003, 234).39 For 
the last decades, the increasing integration of low-cost producer coun-
tries such as China and India into global markets and the general com-
petitive pressures deriving from the opening-up of national markets are 
also deemed to have contributed to the lower inflation over the last 25 
to 30 years (Levy 2006, 234).
Whatever the reasons of inflation are, once an economy has been 
infected, it becomes very difficult and economically very costly to get rid 
of the disease. The weaker the State and its government in general are the 
less likely a successful reconstruction of a sound monetary system with a 
stable currency is. In such a situation, it may be the most promising way 
to “import monetary stability” by surrendering political monetary sover-
eignty, which in itself is an exercise of legal monetary sovereignty. The key 
options then are a pegged currency, a currency board, or a complete dol-
larization. However, these options have quite different impacts and the 
conditions that must be fulfilled to maintain them vary. Generally speak-
ing, a simple currency peg, that is, a fixed but adjustable exchange rate 
will be difficult to operate without capital controls and its likely break-
down creates huge political and social costs as demonstrated by Britain’s 
exit from the ERM I and the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. This is why this 
kind of exchange rate regime is frequently ruled out as a policy option 
in economic literature. The remaining choice between a more flexible 
exchange rate and a more credible commitment to exchange rate stability 
(i.e., nonadjustable) will consider the following arguments that are put 
forward in favor of and against flexible exchange rates or currency board 
or dollarization solutions (Eichengreen 1994; IMF 1999; Corden 2002; cf. 
Baliño 2003, 613–628; Schuler 2005)
●  Proponents of flexible exchange rates usually put forward the greater 
domestic macroeconomic policy flexibility that remains under a flex-
ible exchange regime as well as the shock-absorber function of flexible 
exchange rates that allow for easier and less burdensome adjustments 
than a deflationary domestic policy in case of economic shocks.
Nissen_Ch05.indd   74 8/22/2008   9:39:22 AM
PERSPECTIVES ON MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY   75
●  Proponents of currency boards and dollarization emphasize the 
credibility-import that is associated with currency boards and dol-
larization and the desired consequential loss in domestic policy dis-
cretion, but point also to the reduction of transaction costs and the 
likely stimulation of trade and investment.
Which of these arguments are more convincing in a given situation 
will depend on circumstances such as the size of the economy, the cred-
ibility of the political institutions involved in monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, the development and regulation of the financial sector, the degree 
of openness of the economy, and so on. Furthermore, the loss of seignor-
age profits in case of a fully fledged dollarization may play a role as may 
the need to have a national currency for symbolic integrative purposes, 
for example, for newly independent states. States having gone through 
a conflict of a military kind may need a complete reconstruction of the 
monetary and financial system in which a currency board may be a quick 
solution to establish credibility.40 What decision is being taken will of 
course also depend on policy preferences of domestic politicians, possible 
alliances between major political groups, and long-term strategic mone-
tary goals such as accession to the Euro Area.
The creation of a monetary union such as the Euro Area seems to 
have rather different reasons. Of course, the whole scale of arguments 
against and in favor of fixed exchange rates also applies to a monetary 
union, but to reap its benefits, it suffices to fix the exchange rates of the 
participating countries irrevocably. A common currency is not a nec-
essary element of a monetary union, as was made clear by the Delors 
Report that outlined the way to EMU and it also imposes costs on pri-
vate individuals, for example, in connection with the change of the unit 
of account. However, it is equally clear that a common currency further 
reduces transaction costs, bolsters the credibility of the commitment to 
“exchange rate” stability, and has a significant symbolic meaning for the 
creation of a common identity among the citizens of the participating 
countries.41 In the case of EMU, it is also commonly asserted that the 
other European countries intended to benefit from the credibility of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and import the stability of the Deutsche Mark. 
In addition, as it has been pointed out, the introduction of the Euro has 
the potential to challenge the role of the US dollar as the predominant 
international currency (for payments as well as reserve purposes), a role 
that is accompanied by significant economic benefits such as seignorage 
profits from the currency circulating abroad or the benefit of borrowing 
in domestic currency (see Wegner 1998).
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Conclusions
What is left then of “monetary sovereignty” at the beginning of the 
 twenty-first century and how do States use it strategically in their “sov-
ereignty games”? This chapter has tried to demonstrate that monetary 
sovereignty is a generally accepted element of State sovereignty and that it 
consists of a number of different sovereign rights including the definition 
of a unit of account, the issuing of banknotes and coins, and the estab-
lishment of an exchange rate arrangement. The most important inter-
national monetary agreement, the IMF Articles of Agreement do hardly 
confine the rights of its members to opt for the monetary regime they 
deem appropriate, except for the obligation to guarantee the convertibil-
ity of their currency for current account transactions. In fact, there are 
numerous options from which States can “choose.”
However, in making their sovereign choice, States are confronted with a 
practical “trilemma” according to which exchange rate stability, domestic 
macroeconomic policy discretion and free movement of capital cannot coex-
ist for a long time. Whereas in the past monetary sovereignty was mainly 
used for raising revenue (seignorage and inflation tax), the emergence of 
irredeemable paper currencies brought about new perspectives. During the 
reign of Keynesian macroeconomic policies, efforts were made to use loose 
monetary policies and public deficit spending to fight unemployment and 
economic stagnation. When the outcome after first successes was inflation 
plus stagnation and unemployment (“stagflation”), the monetarist coun-
ter-revolution struck back. As a result, stable noninflationary currencies 
are nowadays universally considered the primary goal of monetary policy. 
However, stable money has a lot to do with credibility of policy and with 
trust into institutions and society, something not all governments are able 
to generate and to build upon. In such situations, a deliberate restriction of 
domestic macroeconomic policy discretion by means of a credible exchange 
arrangement or a complete dollarization may be the most effective and effi-
cient way to restore a sound monetary system and may generate further 
benefits such as the stimulation of trade and foreign investment. Further 
reaching restrictions of monetary sovereignty such as they are conjoint with 
the creation of a monetary union will normally have a rationale that goes 
beyond pure economic reasons, but will also rest upon political goals, in 
particular the creation of an identity beyond the Nation State.
Whatever decision a State may take, the implications for its econ-
omy, society and political system will be significant and failure may be 
extremely costly in economic as well as in political terms. In this sense, 
there is no such thing as a “monetary sovereignty game,” since the conse-
quences are normally too serious, the stakes too high.
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Notes
 1. See also Marx’s reference to a statement made by Gladstone in a parliamen-
tary debate on Peel’s Bank Act of 1844, who observed that “not even love has 
turned more men into fools than has meditation on the nature of money” 
(Marx 1970, 64).
 2. According to a common mistranslation of the principle iudex non calculat, 
lawyers are not able to calculate. The original meaning was that arguments, 
evidence, and witnesses are not simply counted, but considered according to 
their merits.
 3. For a geographical approach to the study of money see Cohen (1999, 121) 
with further references.
 4. For an account of the different positions see Ingham (2004).
 5. For sociological perspectives on money see Simmel (1930); Ingham (2004, 
59–68); Zelizer (1994).
 6. For a legal definition of money see Proctor (2005, 5–70).
 7. The authors own translation of “Geld ist ein Geschöpf der Rechtsordnung.”
 8. For an account of this “mainstream” economic view see Ingham (2004, 
15–22).
 9. Probably, the practical value of paper money is exhaustively described by the 
following usages: sniffing cocaine through it, accelerating a fire with it, and 
using it as wallpaper or toilet paper.
10. For a definition of Electronic Money in European Law see Directive 2000/46/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of September 18, 2000 on 
the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of elec-
tronic money institutions, OJ 2000 No. L 271/39.
11. In such a case, foreign courts must apply the changeover from the national 
currencies to the Euro when claims denominated in those currencies are 
brought before them, see Lenihan (1998).
12. On these elements see Gianviti (2005a, 1); Lastra (2006, 22–23); Proctor 
(2005, 500–501).
13. On the law of the IMF in general see Lastra (2006, 371–445); Lowenfeld 
(2002, 529–564); Proctor (2005, 557–581).
14. A list of the members can be consulted at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
sec/memdir/members.htm.
15. See Art. XXVI Sec. 1 IMF.
16. See Decision of the IMF Executive Board of June 15, 2007 on Bilateral 
Surveillance of Members’ Exchange Rate Policies, available at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm (July 10, 2007).
17. The term “Payments for current transactions” is defined in Art. XXX (d) 
IMF. On this topic see Elizalde (2005, 20–22).
18. On this topic see Fischer (1999); Gianviti (1999); Hagan (1999); Gianviti 
(2003).
19. It may be possible in a case like China’s Yuan, which is under constant pres-
sure to appreciate. In theory, it would be possible for the Bank of China to 
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meet any demand of its currency. At a certain point, however, the increased 
amount of money in China would lead to increased inflation and the central 
bank would have to change its policies.
20. These categories are also used in practice, see for example, IMF (1999, 23); 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Devisenkursstatistik Februar 2007, p. 50–51 (acces-
sible at http://www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/devisenkurs 
statistik/2007/devisenkursstatistik022007.pdf).
21. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Devisenkursstatistik Februar 2007, p. 50–51 
 (accessible at http://www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/
devisenkursstatistik/2007/devisenkursstatistik022007.pdf). Data for 2007 
may be found in IMF (2007, xxv–xxvii).
22. Agreement of March 16, 2006 between the European Central Bank and the 
national central banks of the Member States outside the euro area laying 
down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage 
three of Economic and Monetary Union, OJ 2006 No. C 73/21.
23. Andorra has no currency of its own. Nowadays, the Euro is used, but on an 
unofficial basis. Negotiations between the EC and Andorra with a view to 
entering into an exchange agreement similar to those entered into with the 
Principality of Monaco, the Vatican City, and the Republic of San Marino 
have not led to any outcome so far.
24. See Monetary Agreement of June 19,1980 between Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland, Liechtensteinisches Landesgesetzblatt (1981 No. 52), pp. 1 et seq. 
Liechtenstein had already been using the Swiss Franc for more than 50 years 
before the agreement was entered into.
25. Monetary Agreement between the Italian Republic, on behalf of the European 
Community, and the Vatican City State and, on its behalf, the Holy See, OJ 
2001 No. C 299/1.
26. Monetary Agreement between the Government of the French Republic, on 
behalf of the European Community, and the Government of His Serene 
Highness the Prince of Monaco, OJ 2002 No. L 142/59.
27. However, the Council could enact guidelines for the conduct of monetary 
policy that the European Central Bank would have to take into account in 
the day-to-day operation of the Community’s external monetary policy, cf. 
Art. 111 (2) EC Treaty.
28. Normally, a regular devaluation occurs to accommodate for differences 
in the targeted or real inflation rate between the anchor currency and the 
pegged currency.
29. A currency board is sometimes referred to as “quasi-dollarisation,” see Altig 
and Nosal (2005, 807).
30. For a discussion of the perspective of the issuing country see Altig and Nosal 
(2005, 807).
31. For a discussion of this point, see Gianviti (2005b, 817). The situation is dif-
ferent regarding the EU Member States that not yet participate in stage three 
of EMU. They are under an obligation to stay in the ERM II to fulfill the 
Maastricht Criteria on the basis of which the ultimate decision about their 
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accession to the Euro Area will be taken. That is one of the reasons why the 
ECB has shown resistance to the idea of an accession country’s unilateral 
euroisation.
32. The degree of an unofficial dollarization may vary in different countries, 
depending on whether the foreign currency is used only as unit of account 
and store of value or also for (large or even smaller) daily payments, see 
Baliño, “Dollarization: A Primer” in IMF (ed.), Current Developments in 
Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 2 (Washington 2003).
33. That is, for example, the case in Cuba, where the use of US Dollar was legally 
prohibited in November 2004.
34. West African Economic and Monetary Union. (UEMOA from its name 
in French, Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine; Member 
States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and 
Guinea-Bissau) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (or CEMAC from its name in French, Communauté Économique et 
Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale; Member States: Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and 
Gabon).
35. Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, part of the Eastern Caribbean Common 
Market (Member States: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the 
two British overseas territories: Anguilla and Montserrat).
36. The following quote has been taken from the official Web site of the GCC: 
“[The cooperation] is also designed to unify banking and monetary regu-
lations and laws, as well as increase coordination between monetary agen-
cies and central banks, including the initiation of one currency in order to 
 further economic integration.” (available at http://www.gcc-sg.org/coopera-
tion.html#coop5).
37. Of the abundant literature on different exchange rate policies and their pros 
and cons see Corden (2002); Eichengreen (1994); Sweeney, Wihlborg and 
Willett (1999).
38. If, however, monetary has only very limited effects on real economies, mon-
etary sovereignty (understood as policy sovereignty) is indeed “useless,” cf. 
Schwartz (2004, 107–121).
39. Busch, “Die politische Ökonomie der Inflation” in Obinger/Wagschal/Kittel 
(eds.), Politische Ökonomie (Opladen 2003), pp. 175–197.
40. On this particular problem, see Lönnberg, “Restoring and Transforming 
Payment and Banking Systems in Postconflict Economies,” in IMF (eds.), 
Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3 (Washington 
2005), pp. 725–753.
41. On the costs and benefits of currency unions see Tavlas (2004, 89–106); 
Yeager (2004). See also Jonung (2004, 123–149).
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6Organized Duplicity? When 
States Opt Out of the 
European Union
Rebecca Adler-Nissen
Introduction
As part of a grand plan to make the European Union (EU) more pop-
ular, Margot Wallström, Commissioner for Institutional Relations and 
Communication Strategy, posted a short video on the Web site YouTube 
showing eighteen couples having sex. The conspicuous video (which pro-
motes EU support for European films) ends with the couples’ orgasms 
and the double entendre “Let’s come together.” Untraditional methods 
to convert the skeptical European publics into convinced Europeans are 
invented as the EU faces various forms of contestations of its supremacy 
from the member states. In the last decades, doubts over the benefits 
of Union membership have given rise to controversial national opt-outs 
(exemptions) from EU and EC treaties, which indicate that selected “out-
siderness” may be preferred to being a full member of the Union. Opt-outs 
are interesting because they postulate that it is possible to reconstitute 
the boundary of the state in face of European integration. Opt-outs draw 
a line in the sand, as it were, and establish an area where the state is to 
remain sovereign. To the degree that statehood is fundamentally chang-
ing because of international and regional integration, national opt-outs 
will be a good indicator of how far this process has gone.
Existing research has largely interpreted opt-outs from the EU Treaties 
as safeguards of national sovereignty (Pilkington 1995, 109; Wallace 
1997; Hedetoft 2000, 300; Padoa-Schioppa 2006, 86–87). In this chapter, 
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I propose an alternative interpretation: opt-outs demonstrate the diffi-
cult mediation between the domestic and the international sphere in the 
context of regional integration. When the other member states accepted 
to grant Untied Kingdom and Denmark opt-outs to avoid a stalemate in 
treaty negotiations, they were opening what I will call a “two-dimensional 
sovereignty game.” Although opt-outs may help preserve the symbolic 
 figure of an autonomous state to the domestic audience, in Brussels the 
opt-out protocols are translated into temporary measures and are politi-
cally circumvented to fit the European context. This “organized duplicity” 
is becoming increasingly more awkward as two different understandings 
of sovereignty—the national and the international—collide openly and 
question the value and effect of opting out. The clashes between domestic 
and European discourses surrounding the opt-outs unsettle the idea of 
a sovereign state protecting itself from outside interference and demon-
strate how both the national and the international concept of sovereignty 
is changing with the constitutionalization of the EU.
The Two-Dimensional Sovereignty Game
The dynamic of opting out reveals the Janus-face of sovereignty in the 
sense that it demonstrates that claims to sovereignty in the context of 
international cooperation are often made before two different audiences 
at the same time—the national and the international. To understand this 
two-dimensional sovereignty game, I propose to explore the roles of the 
two audiences and the players who mediate between them.
Sovereignty as a Claim to Authority
Sovereignty is a discourse, which promotes a certain political order as 
the authoritative and prescribes certain actions and rights as legitimate 
(Biersteker and Weber 1996b; N. Walker 2003). By emphasizing sover-
eignty as a claim, the emphasis is placed on how it is used, or being played 
out, in legal and political practices. This approach implies an important 
difference between claim and control. The discourse of sovereignty can 
be an effective way to produce “ordering power,” but only if the relevant 
audience accepts this claim (N. Walker 2003, 6–7). Following this line of 
thought, state sovereignty is produced through sovereignty practices. To 
be a state you need to fabricate effective symbols of legitimacy and rep-
resentations of sovereignty. In a Foucauldian perspective, that is, a logic 
of representation, sovereign foundations are symbolic signs that make 
representational projects possible and allow sovereignty to refer to some 
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original source of truth (Delcourt 2006, 49). The foundation of sover-
eignty changes over time and from place to place. Hence, for instance, “the 
people” is a sign, which does not exist naturally, or objectively, it has to be 
produced as the foundation of sovereignty to be politically represented. 
The main idea advanced here is that the two-dimensional sovereignty 
game is constituted by the increasingly problematic relationship between 
the national and the international. Neither side may be able or willing 
to understand how sovereignty is conceived by the other. This increases 
the pressure on the mediators who have to come up with  legitimate and 
acceptable ways to bridge the tension.
The Internal and the External Audience
At the outset, the concept of sovereignty builds on a division between 
an internal and an external dimension. Internally, sovereignty is usu-
ally taken to mean the ultimate or highest authority within a political 
order and often it indicates that a government is the ultimate or exclusive 
authority within specified borders. In turn, sovereignty implies a hierar-
chic relationship between the sovereign and the subordinates, whoever 
they may be (Lake 2003, 304). Popular sovereignty represents one vision 
of this relationship, where the social contract binds the political author-
ity and holds it accountable to the people who are the original sovereign 
(Besson 2004, 11). Externally sovereignty implies that the authority of the 
state is recognized as such by other legally equal entities (Hobson and 
Sharman 2005, 65) and that they respect claims to freedom from exter-
nal interference. The two dimensions fit like a glove and one can argue 
that a “sovereign state is all of a piece” (James 1999, 464). In short, this 
division constitutes two different audiences for sovereignty claims—the 
internal audience (to whom the claim to sovereignty is a claim to supreme 
or ultimate authority) and the external audience (to whom a claim to 
 sovereignty is a claim to independence and freedom from external inter-
ference) (Werner and de Wilde 2001).
However, in a “late sovereign” context of European integration, both 
the idea of national and international sovereignty is under pressure 
(N. Walker 2003). Domestically, it has become difficult to preserve the 
image of the autonomous “people” as the foundation of ultimate sov-
ereignty because of transferral of competences away from national 
 parliaments and governments to international organizations. States have 
accepted dramatic limits on their authority in return for the develop-
ment of regional organizations. Also international sovereign claims are 
modified. Externally, the sovereign claim to independence is increasingly 
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contested and reconfigured to a right to influence, an entitlement to 
participate or even intervene in the affairs of others (see also Sørensen 
1999, 602–603). Through the very process, which limits national sover-
eignty, states may regain actual control of the policy areas where they 
have handed over competences and gain the possibility to influence the 
internal affairs of other states (Werner and de Wilde 2001, 295). So the 
“speech act” of sovereignty, be it national or international, is more com-
plex to perform when conflicting claims to authority from states as well 
as nonstate polities such as the EU are the dish of the day.
Mediating between Two Spheres
It is safe to argue, without reifying a flawed picture of the state, that a par-
ticular group of people still enjoys a special status as mediators between 
the domestic and the international sphere. Governments and diplomats 
are the main players in the two-dimensional sovereignty game, because 
they have been granted formal authority to represent and manage the state 
politically and legally when it engages with inter and supranational orga-
nizations such as the EU. While companies, interest groups, and local and 
regional actors have contributed to turning the EU into a system of “multi-
level governance” in which the state is only one actor among many others, 
for governments, the EU represents a clearly different level of negotiation, 
demarcated from the domestic. British officials still have to take the train 
or flight to Brussels for working group meetings and they do not come 
empty-handed (or –headed), but they bring instructions from London 
about specific objectives and national interests that they are expected to 
defend during the meetings. In Brussels, the EU appears of course not 
as an ordinary international setting, but more as a quasi-federal system, 
where supranational actors such as the European Commission and the 
European Parliament play an important role in changing the intergovern-
mental logic of cooperation (Forster 2000, 57). Nevertheless, ministers and 
diplomats are still the key mediators in the two-dimensional sovereignty 
game. Their task of mediation is further complicated by the fact that the 
national and international audiences are not homogenous entities; they 
rather consist of different sub-audiences. The domestic audience in dem-
ocratic states includes not only parliament, but also the broader public 
and media, which perceive national sovereignty in sometimes markedly 
 different ways. The international audience does not merely assemble other 
states, but increasingly also international and supranational organizations 
and courts.1 This diversity makes mediation more difficult, but it also 
opens up a strategic room for discursive maneuvers.
Nissen_Ch06.indd   84 8/22/2008   11:45:48 AM
ORGANIZED DUPLICITY?   85
Picking and Choosing from the European Buffet
In international and supranational organizations, states opt out of certain 
policy areas and functions, be it a common currency or common immigra-
tion policies, not out of territorial demarcated areas. In this sense, opt-outs 
represent an era of constitutional pluralism where boundaries of legitimate 
political authority are no longer solely understood in territorial terms, 
but also in a functional language. However, this has not made traditional 
understandings of sovereignty obsolete, indeed, opt-outs are domestically 
seen as symbols of national sovereignty and hence democracy reflecting 
what Neil Walker refers to as an ideological assumption of ultimate author-
ity over the internal operation of the polity (Neil Walker 2003).
With the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the United Kingdom was accorded 
an opt-out clause, meaning that it would not be required to adopt the sin-
gle currency.2 Furthermore, the United Kingdom negotiated an opt-out 
from the so-called Social Chapter.3 These opt-out clauses were one of the 
conditions to be met if the British government were to give its approval to 
the treaty as a whole.4 The opt-outs were drafted to assure that the treaty 
was in line with a British conception of Europe, not challenging its consti-
tutional institutions and conventions such as parliamentary sovereignty 
(Hansen and Scholl 2002, 4). A few years later, the United Kingdom was 
granted an opt-out from the Schengen agreement (abolishing controls 
and checks at national borders between EU member states) and the new 
Title IV TEC dealing with “visas, asylum, immigration and other policies 
related to free movement of persons.”
Denmark was also a reluctant negotiator in Maastricht, but having 
being granted a protocol on the European Monetary Union (EMU), the 
government had accepted the treaty when it was unexpectedly rejected 
in a dramatic referendum held in June 1992. Following the referendum, 
the Danish Parliament drafted a common negotiation position for the 
government. It focused on the most dominant issue in the Danish refer-
endum debate—the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU (Hansen 
2002).5 The Danish “no” led to four key reserves attached to the treaties, 
which imply that Denmark has not adopted the euro, will not accept to 
replace national citizenship with EU citizenship; cannot participate in the 
development of a common European defence; and cannot participate in 
supranational cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. In 
this chapter, I focus particularly on the controversial British and Danish 
protocols on the euro, common borders, and Justice and Home Affairs.
Domestically, the opt-outs have two functions. First, they produce a 
fiction of national unity and fabricate a united domestic audience despite 
apparent political disagreements over the EU issue. As such, the  opt-outs 
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are not defining a relation between the state and the EU, but also medi-
ating between the different sub-audiences. Second, opt-outs present 
sovereignty as a fixed capital, given and known, and all it takes to rees-
tablish it is to annul those decisions that have led to its careless dissipa-
tion (Rosanvallon 2000, 427–428; Morefield 2005). Seen from the United 
Kingdom and Denmark, opt-outs constitute bulwarks against European 
integration; underpinning an image of the state with full political and 
legal authority over people, territory, and money. This gives them an 
almost sacred character. During the negotiations on the Constitutional 
Treaty, the UK government continuously spoke of how the opt-outs 
would not be touched by what former State Secretary Jack Straw called 
a “simple tidying-up exercise” (Church and Phinnemore 2006, 8). The 
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen likewise promised that 
the opt-outs would be safeguarded and that the Danish people would 
remain in full control,
There will be no trickery. There will be no cherry picking. The opt-outs 
will stand clear and clean in the new treaty. And the Danish people shall 
decide on this treaty including the opt-outs [ . . . ]6
Things look differently from the perspective of the European audi-
ence. Opt-outs threaten the uniform application of EU law and thus 
the coherence of the Union’s legal order (Curtin 1993). In the quest for 
European unity and constitution-building, differentiated integration is 
an unwanted obstacle (de Witte 2002, 236).7 The most engaged actors 
in the European audience in relation to handling the opt-outs are the 
European Council secretariat, the European Commission, and the 
Council Presidency. In particular, the European Commission, acting as 
“guardian of the Treaties and defender of the general interests,” is hostile 
toward the idea of opting outs.8
To conform to the contradictory expectations of the national and the 
international audiences, the mediators (governments and diplomats) 
advance two different images of state authority, playing a double game. 
Mediation between the domestic and the international is not a neutral 
exercise; mediation is translation and hence modification of meaning. 
On the domestic scene, the players try to uphold a representation of opt-
outs as legal and political safeguards of an independent national democ-
racy. On the European scene, they negotiate with the other member states 
and EU institutions to reduce the exclusionary effects of the opt-outs and 
ensure that United Kingdom and Denmark act as credible partners and 
gain influence on the European decision-making process. In doing so, 
they articulate exemptions as temporary measures that are not aimed at 
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reducing the consistency of the EU acquis as a whole.9 In this way, the 
players try to make sure that the domestic and European understandings 
of the opt-outs (and sovereignty) are kept separated. They work hard, on 
the one hand to ensure they are never accused by the domestic audience 
of manipulating while on the other hand struggling not to be seen as dis-
loyal by the European audience. From this perspective, the British and 
Danish experiences of opting out give flesh to Steven Krasner’s proposi-
tion that state sovereignty is “organised hypocrisy” (Krasner 1999). The 
game is illustrated in figure 6.1 and in the following, I will explore how it 
played out in relation to the euro and Justice and Home Affairs. Building 
on this analysis, the chapter moves on to explore the dynamic nature of 
this game; as control of the mediation process is close to impossible, we 
see constant reinterpretations of the sovereignty, which the opt-outs were 
meant to protect.
Monetary Sovereignty?
Constitutional bodies of any kind, whether governments or central banks, 
have very limited influence in a world of deregulated currency markets and 
global financial movements. Monetary autonomy has clearly diminished 
because of the integration of the world’s capital markets (Goodman 1992, 5). 
Nonetheless, widespread slogans such as “keep the pound” or “bevar kro-
nen” reveal that in the United Kingdom and Denmark money is closely 
associated with sovereignty. In both countries, the minting of coins and 
printing of chapter money is (still) regarded as “sovereignty-producing 
practices” (Doty 1996, 143). Despite continued attempts by both British and 
Danish governments to “de-sovereignize” the euro, and regardless of the 
increasing difficulties of imagining and practicing monetary autonomy in 
a globalizing world, both the UK and the Danish euro protocols represent 
symbolic contracts between government and people; the latter is prom-
ised an ultimate (and sovereign) decision qua the referendum guarantee. 
Because the opt-outs represent what monetary sovereignty can mean today: 
a symbolic manifestation of statehood, it is very difficult to abolish them.
International sovereignty
National sovereignty
International audience
Mediators
Domestic audience
Figure 6.1 The two-dimensional sovereignty game
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United Kingdom
A particular doctrine of national sovereignty in monetary affairs thrives 
in the United Kingdom; it is centered on ideas of a domestic political 
control with the monetary instrument (Gamble and Kelly 2002). In a 
speech to the House of Commons in January 1991, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer explained that safeguarding the “sovereign right of 
Parliament” would be one of his four priorities in the forthcoming inter-
governmental conference on the EMU.10 Indeed, the United Kingdom 
has been granted a protocol on the single currency, which guarantees 
that it is for the UK government and parliament alone to initiate proce-
dures for adopting the euro. Furthermore, the United Kingdom is not 
subject to the provisions on excessive deficits and it is not part of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central 
Bank (ECB). With the election of a pro-euro Labour in government from 
1997, this firm position was forged into a “prepare and decide” policy. 
This attempt to push the United Kingdom closer to joining the euro 
was welcomed by the European audience (Miles and Doherty 2005), 
but domestically, it was a tricky move, because it questioned the domes-
tic understanding of sovereignty over monetary affairs. To resolve this 
problem, the Labour government presented the choice to change from 
pound to euro as a purely economic decision with no political implica-
tions (Hughes and Smith 1998; Miles and Doherty 2005, 101). In October 
1997, it announced five economic tests, which must be met before any 
decision to join can be made,
1. Sustainable convergence between United Kingdom and the econo-
mies in the euro area;
2. Whether there is sufficient flexibility to cope with economic change;
3. The effect on investment;
4. The impact on British financial services industry; and
5. Whether it is good for growth and employment.11
To label these checks “economic” demands stretching the meaning of the 
word “economy,” but it is a necessary linguistic exercise because it allows for 
the view that British sovereign status is safeguarded despite flirting with the 
idea of replacing the pound with euro. In the two-dimensional sovereignty 
game, the tests serve a double purpose: to the European audience they dem-
onstrate British commitment to joining the single currency (when it is in the 
United Kingdom’s interests). To the domestic audience the tests contribute 
to the idea of a sovereign choice and underlines that in questions related to 
the euro the United Kingdom acts under instructions of no other nation 
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or international actor. However, the “tests” are so elastic that anyone could 
claim that they have not been met.12 Not surprisingly, when the government 
completed its initial assessment of the tests on June 9, 2003, it concluded that 
at this time the euro did not pass.13 This almost ritual process of evaluation 
has been repeated in the subsequent years.
The attempt to present the euro as merely a question of economic 
calculations has not proved to be effective. The domestic audience (in 
particular parliament and the Euroskeptic media) has established a dis-
cursive consensus that the euro is one of the major political questions 
related to the fate of the United Kingdom as a sovereign state (Risse 2003; 
Howarth 2007). Consequently, to further assure the anxious public, both 
Labour and opposition have promised that a decision to recommend 
joining the euro zone should not only be put to a vote in parliament, 
but also a referendum (Miles and Doherty 2005, 104). In this way, the 
attempts to convince the predominantly euro-skeptic domestic audience 
to surrender the opt-out has contributed to a significant (if only partial) 
change in the political discourse and practices on monetary sovereignty 
in the United Kingdom, locating ultimate sovereign decisions (qua the 
referendum guarantee) with the British people rather than parliament 
and government. This change illustrates that opting out is not a one shot 
affair, the players continuously adapt to the audiences, thereby reveal-
ing that the exact meaning of a sovereignty claim such as an opt-out is 
negotiable.
Meanwhile on the European scene, the United Kingdom has followed 
a strategy of “economic and political hitchhiking” (Miles 2005, 16). This 
means that the British political and administrative elites have actively 
followed the developments of the monetary policy development in the 
EU despite the British opt-out (Miles and Doherty 2005, 201). The trea-
sury has established a Euro Preparations Unit to work out a National 
Changeover Plan to prepare the different parts of the UK economy to man-
age a changeover to the euro. The Euro Preparations Unit also publishes 
guides for business managers, develops frameworks to protect  consumers 
in the event of a changeover, and hosts a Web site to inform the public. 
Although treasury officials admit that this work is about sending the right 
signals to Brussels and building up credibility around the government’s 
“prepare and decide” policy, substantial institutional reforms have also 
been initiated.14 The decision over monetary sovereignty has been shared 
with the population through the promise to hold a referendum, but par-
allel to this development, the Bank of England has gained its formal inde-
pendence from the parliament with the Bank of England Act (1998). This 
institutional change brought the United Kingdom more or less into line 
with the practice of those states, which were planning to adopt the euro at 
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the outset (Schmidt 1997, 35). This change primarily reflected an adjust-
ment in the conception of how monetary matters should be governed and 
was less due to preparations for joining the euro. However, by removing 
monetary policy from the competences of parliament, the act challenges 
elements of the ideological foundation of the euro opt-out. In the light of 
these contradictory moves, one could argue that the UK euro opt-out has 
not guaranteed the continuation—but has played a part in the transfor-
mation—of the domestic doctrine on monetary sovereignty.
Denmark
The Danish exemption from the euro formally locates the choice to join 
the euro zone with the Danish people because it guarantees the population 
a referendum. At the end of the 1990s, a clear majority among Denmark’s 
mainstream political parties favored euro adoption and began to prepare 
the Danes for the single currency. The domestic audience was divided, 
but less euro-skeptic than the British. During the campaign leading up to 
the referendum of September 28, 2000, the government followed the same 
rhetorical strategy as the U K government, articulating the “yes” as sound 
business spirit and stressing the importance of “a place at the table” at the 
Governing Council of the ECB (see Marcussen and Zølner 2001). In May 
2000, as opinion polls began to show falling support for the euro, Prime 
Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen desperately attempted to appease doubt-
ers by asserting that Denmark could join the euro zone and withdraw at 
a later date if it wanted, thus arguing that Danish sovereignty would be 
fundamentally untouched by the decision to surrender the opt-out, sover-
eignty could be taken back, so to speak. This followed the domestic logic 
behind the opt-outs. However, Nyrup Rasmussen’s statement gave rise to 
confusion when it was contradicted by Commission President Romano 
Prodi who said that joining the EMU was “by definition permanent,” 
thereby articulating the constitutional character of the EU treaties and 
the principle of solidarity. Mr. Prodi later suggested that from a political 
point of view Mr. Rasmussen was correct, although there were no treaty 
provisions for joining and leaving the EMU (Miller 2002, 15). The gov-
ernment’s appeasement strategy was a flop, 53.1 percent of the Danish 
voters rejected the euro against 46.9 percent voting “yes.” Together with 
the booming Danish economy, the 2000 referendum put a lid on the 
domestic debate on the euro.
To the European audience, however, Denmark has since long been a 
quasi-euro member. The Danish Central Bank follows the ECB’s “sound 
policy” strictly with the acceptance of great majority of the domestic 
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audience (Marcussen 2005).15 Indeed, the Danish krone has been tied to 
the D-mark at a fixed rate since 1987. Denmark has remained well within 
the constraints implied by the Stability and Growth Pact. Furthermore, 
Danish officials from the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Finance 
attempt to play an active part in the ECOFIN Council and hope to com-
pensate for their “outsiderness” by being extra constructive. Danish dip-
lomats are proud that president of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, had 
argued that Denmark should count as a member of the eurozone in future 
statistics.16 From a European perspective, there is not much national sov-
ereignty in Danish euro-outsiderness.
Protecting National Orders and Borders
Although the discussion on whether to join the euro has cooled off in both 
the United Kingdom and Denmark, the debate on the opt-outs related 
to Justice and Home Affairs and Schengen has become heated during 
the last decade. United Kingdom and Danish ministers and officials are 
generally enthusiastic to cooperate with their European counterparts on 
these issues, but the domestic audience is hostile to handing over ques-
tions of national security to supranational institutions.
United Kingdom
The negative British stance toward the Schengen border free zone has 
been relatively stable since the 1980s where Margaret Thatcher refused to 
remove the border controls toward other member states. However, today 
the domestic audience is divided in their assessment of the Schengen 
cooperation on common borders. On the one hand, the House of Lords 
criticizes the government for being unable to provide evidence that 
British border control is the most effective way to control immigration 
and fight illegal immigration. Furthermore, it finds it “politically unwise” 
for the United Kingdom to isolate itself from the continuing development 
of EU-wide policies in such sensitive areas and argues that the United 
Kingdom has much to contribute regarding the preservation of civil lib-
erties17. On the other hand, a significant majority of the domestic audi-
ence, led by Conservatives and other Euroskeptics, have “securitized” 
the British Schengen protocol, to the extent that it seems to constitute 
a guarantee of the survival of British nation (Wiener 1999). Hence, the 
Schengen protocol is likely to remain in place for many years.
The “un-European” Schengen exemption is presented differently to 
the European audience. The main argument put forward to justify the 
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protocol is that it is only due to particular practical (not political) prob-
lems linked to the United Kingdom’s status as an island country, and 
British diplomats and ministers make sure to underline that the protocols 
should not block further integration.18 In day-to-day politics, there are 
no watertight shutters between British and EU policy in the development 
of common border policies. Despite the Schengen protocol, the United 
Kingdom has adapted its national legislation regarding for instance bio-
metrics in passports to conform to EU standards. Furthermore, it has 
contributed in quite significant ways to the development of the EU secu-
rity paradigm and sought to influence the development of the opera-
tional cooperation at the external borders.
On “visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the 
free movement of persons” (former Title IV TEC), the United Kingdom 
has a very f lexible protocol allowing it to opt-in on a case-by-case basis 
both before and after a measure has been adopted. Former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair has claimed that the opt-in possibility means that 
“[ . . . ] unless we opt in we are not affected by it and this actually gives 
us is the best of both worlds.”19 The act of opting in and out perfor-
matively enacts the sovereignty of the United Kingdom; it is because 
it is sovereign that it is able to perform the act of opting in and out as 
it pleases. The British government has chosen to opt into those areas 
that curtail the ability of migrants to enter the EU, but it has opted out 
of protective measures such as the Directive of family reunification 
and the Directive on the rights of long-term residents (see also Geddes 
2005). Existing research argues that the British use of the opt-in possi-
bility related to Title IV TEC is driven by the intent to shape EU policy 
in ways congenial to “domestic interests” (Ladrech 2004, 57). However, 
it is necessary to nuance the concept of “domestic interests.” The 
domestic audience is split on this issue. Conservative members of the 
House of Commons often criticize the executive decisions to opt into 
new measures, claiming that the opt-in decisions represent a one-way 
transfer of sovereignty on immigration policy away from parliament 
to the supranational authorities in Brussels. Generally, the House of 
Lords is more positive toward harmonization of immigration policies 
(see also Givens and Luedkte 2004), and many of the opt-in/opt-out 
decisions have therefore not had the blessing of the Lords. The players 
(government and officials) react to this criticism of being at the same 
time too europhile and too Euroskeptic, by discursively confusing the 
ability to opt-in and right to independence. The following response 
from Tony Blair, to the criticism of his choice to opt into a measure 
illustrates how decisions to opt-in mix up two different understandings 
of sovereignty,
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But it is our complete choice as to whether to opt in; we might as well say 
that about any measure in Europe [ . . . ]. Obviously, once we opt in, that 
is presumably because we have decided that it is in our interests to do so. 
Only the Conservative party could say that a decision whether to opt in is 
somehow a negation of our sovereignty; surely, it is the expression of it.20
This choice of words is revealing in two ways. First, national sovereignty 
and integration have ceased to be oppositional terms in Blair’s defense 
speech; it is by opting in that the United Kingdom secures not only its 
international sovereignty, but also its national sovereignty. Second, Blair 
claims to speak on behalf of a domestic audience, a “we,” but in practice, 
the British government autonomously selects when it wants to participate 
in a given measure under Title IV TEC. “The people” need not be the 
foundational figure of sovereignty, in the case of the United Kingdom, the 
exemptions drift between different foundations, “government,” “parlia-
ment,” “people,” “nation,” and an abstract “we.” Blair discursively invokes 
the sovereign people of the United Kingdom to justify decisions to opt-in 
and out, but it is a black hole, an artificial referent, parliamentary and 
popular protests against specific opt-in and opt-out decisions have not 
had any considerable effect on the government’s decisions. In this way, 
international sovereignty as the right to enter into treaty agreements and 
the idea of national sovereignty are discursively muddled. Hence, while 
the decision to hand over monetary sovereignty has symbolically moved 
from government and parliament to “the people” qua the referendum 
guarantee, in Justice and Home Affairs authority and control resides 
strictly with the British government.
Denmark
Although the British opt-out from Title IV TEC on asylum, immigra-
tion, and civil law provides its government with a favorable à la carte 
menu with surprisingly few domestic and legal restrictions, the Danish 
opt-outs are constructed to tie the hands of the players and does not pro-
vide Denmark with an opt-in possibility. One of the great paradoxes of 
the Danish JHA protocol is the striking discrepancy between the origi-
nal motivation behind the Danish reluctance toward community compe-
tence within the area of asylum and immigration policy, and its current 
motivation to keep its opt-outs. In the beginning of the 1990s, Denmark, 
together with the Netherlands, was among the most liberal countries and 
feared that community competence within asylum and immigration pol-
icy would threaten the high level of protection given to asylum seekers in 
Denmark (Manners 2000, 98). But from the late 1990s, and in particular 
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with the election of the Liberal-Conservative government in 2001, Danish 
asylum and refugee policy is stricter than that of the rest of the EU con-
cerning rules on family reunification and requirements of attachment 
to Denmark.21 To the right-wing politicians currently in power and the 
parts of the Danish domestic audience supporting them, Danish rules on 
asylum and immigration constitute important barriers to the perceived 
inflow of immigrants, asylum seekers, criminals, and terrorists. If the 
opt-outs are surrendered, these barriers will be removed according to the 
influential right-wing Danish People’s Party,
No supranational or international body should impose a particular refu-
gee and immigration policy on Denmark. Who and how many we wish to 
let into our country are to be entirely the internal affairs of Denmark. The 
Danish People’s Party will fight to ensure that refugee and immigration 
policy remains an area where Parliament is sovereign.22
This quote illustrates a domestic debate where the opt-out reaffirms the 
boundary between inside and the outside of the state and locates national 
sovereignty with parliament. Adapting to (and perhaps contributing to) 
this conception, Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen has stressed that,
A significant majority of the Danes wish to maintain the current Danish 
immigration policy. Therefore, they would also not support an abolition 
of the legal opt-out if there were a risk that it would undermine Danish 
immigration policy.23
However, serving the symbolic purpose of legitimizing Danish EU 
membership to the domestic audience, the exemption from coopera-
tion on immigration, asylum and civil law is presented differently to the 
European audience. On a day-to-day basis, the opt-out has very little 
to do with grandiose symbols of national autonomy. Just as the United 
Kingdom, Denmark is far from a reluctant player in this important pol-
icy area despite its opt-out. Danish officials are extremely careful not to 
provoke the European audience and refer to the opt-outs as “temporary 
measures” or “minor technical problems” to allow for an engagement 
in policies covered by the opt-outs. A Danish official expresses a stra-
tegic concern for “the European cause” even in the areas covered by the 
protocol,
We follow the unwavering principle that we participate in entirely the 
same manner as we would have done if we did not have an opt-out. This 
may also contribute to strengthen the impression that we are serious and 
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have an interest in the cause, which means that the other member states 
will not hold the opt-outs against us in the day-to-day management.24
The players do not only adapt informally, they also seek formal adap-
tation to the EU. As Denmark does not have an opt-in possibility, the 
Danish government has applied to the European Commission for inter-
governmental parallel agreements associating Denmark with legisla-
tive measures under Title IV TEC (asylum, immigration, and civil law) 
where the Danish opt-out applies. This strategy is unknown to most of 
the public and while it is a legally defensible practice, one could argue that 
it represents a political bypassing of the protocol (Adler-Nissen, 2008b). 
Concretely, Denmark adjusts its domestic legislation via parallel agree-
ments “[ . . . ] which are considered as being a vital interest to the country” 
(Vedsted-Hansen 2004, 67). The Danish government decides that mea-
sures represent “a vital interest.” By practicing its right as an international 
sovereign to enter into parallel agreements with other entities, Denmark 
accepts to implement the same rules as the other member states, but it 
has formally declined the opportunity to influence the design of the 
rules in the first place. So far, Denmark has applied for six parallel agree-
ments, but the commission has only granted four.25 According to the 
Commission, the following conditions apply if Denmark is to be granted 
a parallel agreement,
● Parallel agreements could only be of an exceptional and transitional 
nature.
● Such an interim solution should also only be accepted if the partic-
ipation of Denmark is fully in the interest of the community and its 
citizens.
● The solution on a longer term is that Denmark gives up its protocol 
on Justice and Home Affairs.
The conditionality built into the parallel agreements function as a 
disciplining mechanism where Denmark promises one day to get rid 
of its disputed exemptions. To be granted parallel agreements, Danish 
officials must behave as representatives from applicant countries who 
argue that their country is making progress, that it is Europeanizing 
and moving closer to the European core (cf. Wæver 2000, 262–263).26 
By signing the parallel agreements, the players agree to the temporal-
ity of the exemptions and accept that Denmark eventually will have to 
give up authority on the areas where it has opted out. In this sense, the 
opt-out no longer guarantees autonomy, because it is transformed into a 
sort of delay-action device. During negotiations on parallel agreements, 
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Danish ministers and officials simultaneously articulate two different 
understandings of the situation; to the domestic audience, the opt-outs 
guarantee Danish sovereignty on Justice and Home Affairs as long as 
the population wish. On the European scene, however, the Danish polit-
ical and administrative elites promise to work actively toward lifting 
the opt-outs “in a few years” and continuously assert that they are just 
waiting for the right moment to call a referendum.27 Furthermore, as the 
decision to apply for parallel agreements is taken by government—not 
“the sovereign people”—the players must invent an alternative founda-
tion for their decision to apply for parallel agreements. Danish Minister 
of Justice Lene Espersen recently argued to the Danish Parliament that 
the agreements were concluded to secure “[ . . . ] the common interest of 
the EU and Denmark.”28 In Espersen’s exposition, the foundation of the 
sovereign choice to conclude parallel agreements is both domestic and 
European; it transgresses the boundary and nullifies the distinction 
between the national and the European sphere. In other words, while 
national protocols at the outset drew a clear division between national 
and EU competencies, the division is blurred in practice. In this sense, 
the players resemble a married man or woman having an affair. The dan-
ger in living a double life, however, is well known, one can easily make 
the mistake to disclose the “secret,” or others who know of the “secret” 
may disclose it to the “wrong” audience.
Disclosing Duplicity
In a short-term perspective, the strategy of opting out was a smart move to 
convince reluctant domestic audiences that important elements of national 
sovereignty would be untouched by future European integration. In a 
longer time perspective, opt-outs handcuff the players and constrain their 
room of maneuver because they have to preserve two different ideals of 
the state. The players loose their grip on the two-dimensional sovereignty 
game when the domestic and European discourses on sovereignty and 
opt-outs openly clash. A disclosure of the duplicitous game may be trig-
gered by pressure from the European sphere, the domestic sphere, or from 
the players themselves. When the EU makes its claims to supreme author-
ity, criticizing the opt-outs for being undermining solidarity, democracy, 
and legitimacy it draws on a constitutional ideology, which is closer to 
the national than international sovereignty discourse. However, when the 
British and Danish governments articulate opt-outs on at home, they draw 
on the international law discourse, not the constitutional discourse, which 
has driven the European integration project forward. Figure 6.2 illustrates 
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when the two different conceptions of opt-outs collide resulting in con-
flicting claims to sovereignty.
Challenges from the European Audience
The most apparent threat to the “organized duplicity” is related to the 
structural pressure that the United Kingdom and Denmark, as all other 
member states, face to adapt to European rules, norms, and institutions—a 
pressure generally known as Europeanization. Because national opt-outs 
do not stop the European integration process, their consequences are 
also growing in sometimes unpredictable ways. In 1993 for instance, the 
Danish opt-out from Justice and Home Affairs was purely hypothetical, 
or symbolic, and had no concrete implications for Danish participation, 
but the opt-out is today excluding Denmark from an increasing number 
of legal measures.
The pressure from Europeanization shows its face even directly to 
the domestic audience when a European “reality” intervenes in the 
domestic sphere. Then the players’ monopoly of communication breaks 
down. Increasingly, the EU challenges the idea of opting out and the 
clear division between the national and the international sphere, which 
the opt-outs were meant to uphold, is disputed. When both the EU and 
the member states claim ultimate authority, there is a risk of “mutually 
assured destruction” (N. Walker 2003: 29). An example of such interven-
tion is the recent ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which 
establishes that the European Community and not just the EU, has the 
power to require the member states to lay down criminal penalties for 
protecting the environment. This decision constituted a bombshell in the 
Danish EU debate, because despite the opt-out from supranational coop-
eration in Justice and Home Affairs (including criminal law), Denmark 
will be forced to apply to this.29 Thus, the idea that the opt-outs protect 
Denmark’s sovereignty was threatened. The Euroskeptics argued furi-
ously that the ruling constituted a “breach of the Danish opt-out” and 
requested that the Danish government informed the EU that the ruling 
International sovereigntyInternational audience
Players
National sovereigntyNational audience
Figure 6.2 The entangled two-dimensional sovereignty game
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would not apply in Denmark.30 As the ability of the opt-out to protect 
national sovereignty was questioned, the EU spokesperson from the major 
government party, Charlotte Antonsen, had to be creative in her response. 
She refrained from referring to the fear of harmonization of criminal law 
and argued instead that the original intention behind the opt-out from 
Justice and Home Affairs was not to protect Denmark against a common 
environmental policy, which had in fact always been a Danish priority 
in the EU. Defending the ruling, Ms. Antonsen said, “We have a clear 
interest that the other member states implement criminal penalties for 
harming the environment.”31 Instead of referring to the original mean-
ing of the opt-out, the protection of national sovereignty, she referred to 
a Danish “we” with a “clear interest” in high environmental standards. 
Thus, she openly articulated the EU as an organization where states inter-
vene in each other’s domestic affairs. Hence, the international sovereignty 
is modified from a right to enter into treaties to the call for a common and 
legally binding political polity. However, Ms. Antonsen cleverly avoided 
the question of whether the opt-out was actually breached or not, instead, 
progress in environmental policy was used as a sign that the ECJ ruling is 
not undermining Danish sovereignty and the opt-out. This constitutes an 
innovative form of sovereignty production.
Challenges from the Domestic Audience
It is also possible to imagine that the domestic audience wants to be 
“fooled”. What happens if the domestic audience becomes increasingly 
aware of, and or identifies with the European discourse? In the course of a 
couple of decades, the domestic discourse on sovereignty can go through 
a process of Europeanization. Important parts of the domestic audience, 
in particular parliamentarians and media, in the United Kingdom and 
Denmark are aware of the increasing problems posed by the opt-outs to 
the players on the European arena and some of them are less attached to 
particular symbols of national sovereignty. Originally, it might have been 
more comfortable for them not to address the ambiguity of opting out. 
The political and legal adjustments of the state vis-à-vis the European 
order only challenges the domestic “truth” about uncontested national 
and international sovereignty, if it is openly addressed. Today, however, 
it is difficult for the players to ignore the challenges from the national 
audience.
In the United Kingdom, it is well-known that the House of Lords is 
more pro-European than the Commons and is increasingly critical of the 
British strategy of opting out.32 It is still a minority in the United Kingdom 
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who openly call for a surrender of the British protocols, while in Denmark, 
the population and parliamentarians have become increasingly more pro-
European and concerned about the exclusionary effects of the opt-outs. 
The Danish Parliament has urged the government to seek to participate 
and influence as much as possible on the areas where Denmark has opted 
out. Moreover, in 2007, it also requested an independent research inves-
tigation on the consequences of the Danish opt-outs to prepare for a new 
referendum to give up the protocols, with only the two anti-EU parties 
voting against the motion (see Danish Institute for International Studies 
2008). In this sense, the “organized duplicity” has just as much to do with 
the handling of changing ideological schisms on the domestic scene as it 
represents a permanent tension between the state and the EU.
Challenges from the Players
As a last option, the players may also have an interest in disclosing the 
duplicity, as it were, to question the established domestic truth that the 
opt-outs should remain in place to legitimize continued EU member-
ship. When United Kingdom or Danish governments and officials are 
excluded from an increasing number of policy measures that they would 
like to participate in, when they lose on the European scene, they may 
be appealed to present the European understanding of the opt-outs to 
move the domestic discourse and prepare for a referendum. This is what 
has happened in Denmark, where the prime minister in November 2007 
announced a referendum to surrender the four opt-outs within his cur-
rent four-year terms, arguing that the national protocols are outdated and 
detrimental to Danish influence. However, this discursive move neces-
sarily brings a lot of uncertainty about motives and strategies into the 
domestic debate, as suggested by the Danish experience with a confusing 
debate before the euro referendum in 2000. Discussing the problems in 
relation to safeguarding state independence in the Union is risky busi-
ness because it implies questioning the very rationale behind opting 
out: protecting national sovereignty. Hence, with the introduction of the 
European discourse on international sovereignty into the domestic arena, 
the very fundamental on which continued EU membership is justified 
is questioned. To make the argument that sovereignty is not threatened 
despite surrendering the opt-outs requires that the government presents a 
claim about the nature of the European integration process, that “we” are 
de facto dependent on each other, that “we” loose influence when “we” 
are not in the European core, and that “we” should be solitary and cannot 
stand alone. By addressing the EU as more than an intergovernmental 
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organization and openly articulating the constitutional character of the 
European legal order, which goes beyond traditional international law, 
the original domestic meaning of the opt-outs as guarantees of national 
sovereignty is questioned. Such attempts of discursive modifications, 
which redefine what a state can claim absolute authority over, will imme-
diately be contested by the Euroskeptic parts of the domestic audience, 
who will argue that national sovereignty can, and should, still be effec-
tively claimed. Any referendum on opt-outs will therefore at the same 
time set the scene for a sovereign choice for the people and question the 
long-term viability of the sovereign nation-state, as we know, it in context 
of European integration.
Conclusion
Representatives of the United Kingdom and Denmark have developed 
sophisticated means of “circumventing” the opt-outs to reduce their 
exclusionary effects, so the figure of an autonomous state is preserved 
at home despite its entanglement in the European integration process. 
On the European scene, the opt-outs change meaning from a principled 
stance against more integration to a more flexible position, which allows 
ministers and diplomats to pick and choose from the buffet of new EU 
initiatives.
This dynamic is accentuated differently in the United Kingdom 
and Denmark. In the United Kingdom, the government invented the 
opt-outs and the foundation of sovereign choices regarding the EU is 
traditionally linked to parliament and government, not the people. 
However, through the complex discursive battles, the possible surren-
der of the opt-outs is rendered a sovereign choice for the British people. 
In Denmark, the discursive change is almost the opposite, here the opt-
outs were invented on the basis of a negative result of popular referen-
dum, and they cannot be surrendered without hearing the people again. 
Meanwhile, the daily attempts to circumvent the opt-outs are justified 
with reference not to the people, but the government’s understanding of 
“national interests.”
State sovereignty is mediated before two different audiences and ideally, 
it has two different meanings. To the domestic audience, sovereignty is 
about ultimate authority and popular democracy and to the international 
audience it means state independence. However, it has become increas-
ingly difficult for the state representatives to uphold the idea of two dif-
ferent spheres of sovereignty, the national and the international. As states 
integrate deeper into international organizations, the two conceptions of 
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sovereignty get mixed up. This also implies that the internal and exter-
nal images of the opt-outs compete openly. The problems with success-
fully claiming sovereignty through the instrument of protocols in the EU 
reveal that when international sovereignty is no longer only claimed in 
terms of right to independence, but also as a right to influence, national 
sovereignty is under pressure. In practice, opt-outs do not provide strong 
bulwarks against Europeanization and push governments to reconfig-
ure the meaning of sovereignty both domestically and on the European 
scene. Although this dynamic does not fundamentally challenge the idea 
of a sovereign state, it indicates a changing and more taxing relationship 
between international and national order in the context of European inte-
gration. In this sense, Margot Wallström’s provocative promotion of EU 
support for European films is illustrative of a deeper process of entangle-
ment: the relation between the state and the EU is no longer as innocent 
as it used to be.
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7Federalism, Confederalism, 
and Sovereignty Claims: 
Understanding the Democracy 
Game in the European Union
Andrew Glencross
Sovereignty is about a claimed status but not about the problems these 
claims raise.
Werner and de Wilde 2001, 296
Introduction: EU Democracy and 
the Tension between Federalism and Confederalism
It is commonly assumed that sovereignty is indivisible and hence that 
in any polity there has to be an institution able to claim ultimate politi-
cal authority. By implication, indivisibility also means that confederation 
(a union of states) and federation (one state with more or less autonomous 
units) are mutually exclusive categories: “there can be nothing in between.” 
(Onuf 1991, 432). Nevertheless, the European Union (EU) seems to be 
precisely the “in between order” (cf. Sørensen 1999; Wind 2001, 103) that 
undermines such peremptory statements about the nature of sovereignty. 
The complicated story of sovereignty within the EU is accompanied by 
an equally unusual and problematic system of democratic accountabil-
ity. Whereas other chapters in this volume emphasize the way states play 
games with sovereignty for manifold ends, this contribution examines 
the manner in which EU member states’ sovereignty claims constitute 
playing a game with democracy itself. Whilst EU democracy has often 
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been seen as etiolated, this chapter argues that—unlike many democra-
tizing proposals that seek to overcome or bury member state sovereignty 
claims—such claims should in fact be understood as an essential feature 
of the complex art of negotiating the relationship between integration 
and EU democracy.
It is important, for the purposes of the argument, to recognize that 
there is a fundamental tension between federal and confederal principles 
of organizing political authority (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 2003). In a 
pure confederation, the unit of political representation is solely a collec-
tive one (a people, a state) and legal acts fall on states in their “corporate 
or collective capacities” (ibid. 67). Thus a confederal political order is 
“a contractual union of states” (Forsyth 1981, 3). Conversely, in a fed-
eral order, individuals are represented alongside territorial units for the 
purposes of decision making and legislation touches citizens directly 
(Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 2003). The representation of individu-
als thus circumscribes the autonomy of constituent units—it may also 
potentially alter their sovereign equality by giving more influence to the 
most populous units. The existence of federally guaranteed individual 
rights constitutes another major potential restriction on the sovereign 
capacities of units within a federal system. The EU’s hybrid system of 
federalism and confederalism is thus characterized by the creation of 
an autonomous, constitutionalized legal order consisting of individual 
rights (Weiler 1999) beside a political order in which major decisions are 
taken by member states, often as (supposedly) equal participants.
This chapter rests on the supposition that the antagonism between these 
two, federal and confederal, principles is at the heart of the sovereignty 
game of integration and has important consequences for the functioning 
of democracy in Europe. The intention is less to make a point about the 
nature of sovereignty than to demonstrate the use to which sovereignty 
is put in the process of integration and to consider the  consequences this 
has for democratic theory and practice. Interpreting the balance of con-
federalism and federalism as a sovereignty game, the argument traces the 
evolution of this central integrationist tension to show that the amalgam-
ation of both principles is a very taxing game. This game is both ideolog-
ical (based on national or supranational attachment) and rational (actors’ 
preferences often depend on perceived interests). However, given that 
sovereignty is a claimed status that is most asserted precisely when that 
status is challenged (Werner and de Wilde 2001),1 this chapter focuses in 
particular on the moments when member states have used sovereignty 
claims either to try to limit the supranational character of integration or 
to establish special rights for certain states.
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The sovereignty game of integration has a profound impact on democ-
racy since changes to a state’s claimed status of sovereignty invariably 
affect democratic processes (Bartolini 2005; Bickerton, Cunliffe, and 
Gourevitch 2006). This is because state sovereignty and popular sover-
eignty in the democratic era are mutually constitutive and cannot be easily 
disentangled (N. Walker 2007). Thus, the mixture of confederalism and 
federalism in the EU system is the key to understanding the democracy 
game of European integration.
The purpose of this contribution is threefold, as reflected in the tripar-
tite division of the chapter. The first objective is to describe and explain 
the sovereignty game of integration by reference to how sovereignty claims 
have produced the unusual mixture of federal and confederal principles 
of representation. The second goal is to show that this sovereignty game 
is also a democracy game and analyze accordingly the problematic con-
sequences this second game has had on the member states and the EU 
alike. The third and final ambition is to explore how adequately various 
proposals regarding how to respond to these changes in the nature and 
practice of democracy deal with the problem of sovereignty claims.
Assertions of Sovereignty and 
the Combination of Confederalism and 
Federalism in the Sovereignty Game of Integration
European integration’s impact on the Westphalian notion of the state is 
often understood in dichotomous terms (Jackson 1999). For some, the EU 
is no threat to state sovereignty (Moravcsik 1993; Keohane 2002); others 
regard the EU as the symbol of a fundamentally changed, post-sovereign 
order (MacCormick 1999; Weiler 1999). Typically, this polarized debate 
has recourse to some form of quantification of the extent to which sov-
ereignty has been pooled (Donahue and Pollack 2001; McKay 2001) and 
tracing the motives for this common undertaking (Moravcsik 1998). 
However, such a debate does not necessarily tell us much about sover-
eignty since the arguments largely revolve around questions of substan-
tial statehood as a capacity for certain actions (Sørensen 1999) rather than 
sovereignty as a claimed status. An alternative conceptual framework 
has tried to bypass these antinomies by using the notion of “interdepen-
dence sovereignty” (Krasner 1999) to explain the somewhat perplexing 
situation whereby states are losing individual control over certain trans-
national interactions while gaining a collective capacity to deal with 
them. Yet Jackson (1999) maintains that conceptualizing sovereignty as 
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a resource that can be transferred, as Keohane (2002) does for instance, 
is a solecism.2
The intention here is to sidestep these controversies about the era of 
sovereignty in which we live. Instead, this section focuses on identifying 
assertions of sovereignty by member states as responses to the process 
of integration. These assertions are understood as essential to the main-
tenance of confederal principles within the hybrid system of political 
representation described earlier. The argument thus conceptualizes sov-
ereignty not as a set of rights—easily identifiable, like the fasces carried by 
the Roman lictors—but as a claimed status that is then used “to legitimize 
certain rights, duties and competences” (Werner and de Wilde 2001, 297). 
Hence the analysis presents sovereignty claims as crucial instruments in 
constituting the EU political system.
As befits a complex concept like sovereignty, these assertions take var-
ious forms. However, not included within this category are instances of 
attempted legal resistance to EU supremacy (Goldstein 2001) or simple 
noncompliance (Falkner, Hartlapp, Leiber, and Treib 2004), because nei-
ther is part of the formal sovereignty game of delimiting the scope of the 
integration process and defining the status of member state sovereignty 
within this process. Rather, the term assertion refers here to those actions 
that either serve to establish a special status or rights for a certain state (or 
several) or else those that try to set boundaries to the scope of suprana-
tionalism, thereby protecting the sovereignty claims of all. Among the lat-
ter figure the remaining unanimity requirement in certain policy areas, 
the creation, in foreign policy as well as judicial and police cooperation, of 
a separate decision-making system with a separate legal basis attenuating 
the supervisory power of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the 
treaty-based prohibition of legal harmonization in certain policy areas. 
As regards the former type of sovereignty assertion, the measures include 
treaty protocols, opt-outs, and national referendums on EU matters, 
although this is not an exhaustive list. What follows is a brief description 
of these two types of sovereignty assertion and an explanation of how 
they have produced a dual system of political representation.
Sovereignty Assertions as Barriers to Supranationalism
As a hybrid polity the EU walks a tightrope between intergovernmen-
talism and supranationalism. From the outset, integration entrenched 
the “community method,” incorporating the supranational principle, 
rather than the historically plausible alternative of a purely confederal 
institutional model (Parsons 2003). In fact, the first manifestation of a 
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sovereignty assertion within the integration framework was an assault 
on the supranational principle itself: the “empty chair crisis” of 1965–66. 
Although de Gaulle’s diplomatic struggle took the form of an institu-
tional conflict—France’s refusal to participate in meetings of the Council 
of Ministers, the senior legislative body representing states’ interests—it 
was largely a debate over norms and expectations as de Gaulle refused 
to accept European Economic Community (EEC) competency except 
through unanimity.
Having briefly toyed with renegotiating the EEC Treaty, de Gaulle 
eventually “committed to the Community track but refused new progress 
along it” (ibid. 126) by forcing the “Luxembourg Compromise” on the 
other member states. Hence the solution was not to redesign institutions 
but to establish a new norm: “when very important issues are at stake, 
discussions must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.” 
Thus what was secured was not the sovereign status or prerogatives of 
a particular member state; unanimity preserves the formal equal status 
of all. Although informal, the Luxembourg compromise had long-lasting 
effects on integration (Garrett 1995). Yet supranationalism did not fall by 
the wayside. Subsequent battles between unanimity and qualified major-
ity voting (QMV), however, gave rise to more formal attempts to use the 
confederal principle to limit the reach of supranationalism.
Several attempts to counterbalance the deepening of integration with 
a renewed commitment to intergovernmentalism are worthy of mention 
here. The first concerns the remnants of the Luxembourg compromise 
in what is now termed the first policy “pillar.” In this pillar, where QMV 
has become the norm, treaty reform, the accession of new member states 
and taxation remain subject to unanimous decision making (Magnette 
2005). The veto on treaty amendment, in particular, ensures that the EU 
appears a strictly voluntary association of sovereign states for the pur-
suit of mutual advantage (Boucher 2005, 103). Unanimous treaty amend-
ment—in effect the process by which the units may alter the purposes 
for which they associate (ibid.)—is fully in keeping with international 
law. Under Article 40.4 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(1969), states cannot be forced to become parties to amended multilateral 
treaties to which they have not consented (de Witte 2004b).
The confederal character of such an arrangement is pellucid. The 
EU treaty amendment procedure establishes a unity constituted by all 
states as equals—it is “a contract between equals to act henceforth as one” 
(Forysth 1981, 16)—rather than the federal alternative of a unity formed 
from a majority of citizens and/or a qualified majority of states (Trechsel 
2005; Auer 2007). In this way, first pillar vetoes are part of the reason why 
member states can still successfully claim sovereign status and “enjoy the 
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rights and powers related to that status” (Werner and de Wilde 2001, 304). 
Moreover, the unanimity requirement for admitting new members, which 
accords with the definition of sovereignty as the exclusive “ability to make 
authoritative political decisions” (Thompson 1995, 216), further underlines 
the equality of states. The corollary of having the authority to determine 
membership expansion is the member states’ prerogative to determine 
their continued adherence to the EU. The EU Lisbon Treaty now outlines 
the terms for voluntary withdrawal (art. 35), which for some is definitive 
proof of member states’ retention of sovereignty (Sørensen 1999; Boucher 
2005).3 Whatever the precise implication for state sovereignty, the right 
of withdrawal certainly means that there cannot be the same agonizing 
over whether the EU is a perpetual union as there was in the antebellum 
United States (Stampp 1978). In the pro- and anti-integration cleavage, 
this unambiguous confederal element—even if no mainstream party in 
Europe advocates quitting the union—thus serves to reassure the constit-
uency of voters attached to the shibboleth of sovereignty.
The hybrid nature of representation was further complicated by the 
creation of the so-called second and third policy “pillars” at Maastricht, 
which added a new confederal element. Unanimous decision making in 
these sensitive policy areas, foreign policy and judicial and police cooper-
ation respectively, was obviously in large part motivated by member states’ 
understanding of sovereignty as both authority and control (Thompson 
1995). However, the member states were not simply protecting their com-
petences; they were also defending the right of states to represent their 
citizens. Thus what is especially interesting about this sovereignty game 
is the way in which both these intergovernmental pillars were insulated, 
to varying degrees, from the institutions of supranational representation, 
namely the Commission, the European Parliament, and the ECJ (Börzel 
2005). In particular, by restricting the jurisdiction of the ECJ over these 
policy areas, the states ensured that legal acts bind states in their corpo-
rate or collective capacities and do not create rights for individuals. Even 
though the Lisbon Treaty abolishes the pillar system, the circumscription 
of ECJ jurisdiction is maintained. A precedent for such a move can be 
found in the Amsterdam Treaty, where elements of the former Justice and 
Home Affairs pillar were integrated into the first pillar although the pro-
cedures for legislating in this area did not follow orthodox community 
law (Hanf 2001). The insistence on unanimity, member state co-power 
of initiative and reduced ECJ jurisdiction, has resulted in what has been 
described as the creation of a new hybrid, “intergovernmentalised EC 
law” (ibid. 17). Indeed, this move has given rise to a new interinstitutional 
sovereignty game as the Commission and Council of Ministers clash over 
which legal regime relevant legislation should fall under.4
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There were other attempts at Maastricht to delimit the potential expan-
sion of supranationalism. One such was the introduction of the subsidiarity 
principle, which defined efficiency as the deciding principle for the level at 
which power will be exercised so that the EU can legislate “if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community” (art. 3b). This was 
supposed to “enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of 
the institutions” (Preamble) by ensuring that political decisions “are taken 
as closely as possible to the citizen” (Preamble). Subsidiarity was pushed 
by the most adamantine champion of sovereignty, the United Kingdom, 
to establish that “member states are not prepared to accept an unlimited 
extension of Community competences” (Dehousse 1994, 125).
However, the subsidiarity principle has not established the boundar-
ies of national and European competences respectively. This is because 
it employs the criterion of effectiveness for defining the applicable level 
of government action. This means that the ECJ is not called upon to rule 
on Kompetenz-Kompetenz directly, rather the court is to rule “on the 
compared efficiency of both [national and European] types of measure” 
(ibid. 110). Even at the time of introduction, a leading EU lawyer declared 
that it would prove a stillborn clause (ibid. 124) and time has proved this 
claim correct as the ECJ has only made two explicit subsidiarity rulings 
(Magnette 2005, 54). The initial failure of subsidiarity illustrates the dif-
ficulty of specifying exactly how sovereignty claims fit into the EU sys-
tem. Yet the desire to allow states to use sovereignty claims to establish 
the division of competences continues. Hence the new role for national 
parliaments envisaged by the Reform Treaty, including both the “early 
warning” procedure (Protocol 2, art. 7) that forces a legislative draft to be 
reviewed if a third of national parliaments declare it to violate the subsidi-
arity principle and the attribution of veto power over unanimous Council 
of Ministers decisions to move to QMV in certain policy areas. Moreover 
a further declaration on the delimitation of competences for the first time 
specifies that in revising the treaties member states can choose to “reduce 
the competences conferred on the Union.”
The second method of limiting the transfer of competences for the 
foreseeable future was the introduction into the amended treaty of Rome 
of specific clauses prohibiting harmonization in certain policy areas. In 
the fields of education (art. 126), vocational training (127), culture (128), 
and public health (129) (now 149–152 EC) the EU was only permitted to 
“adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States.” Moreover, the tension between diver-
sity and uniformity has also given rise to the development of “flexibility” 
Nissen_Ch07.indd   111 8/21/2008   6:18:01 PM
112   ANDREW GLENCROSS
within the single market framework by adopting the principle of min-
imum standard harmonization (Barnard 2000). Minimal standards do 
not, in areas such as consumer protection (art. 153 (5) EC) or public 
health (art. 152 (4a) EC), prevent member states imposing higher national 
standards provided they meet certain justifiable conditions (Hanf 2001).
Sovereignty assertions as barriers to supranationalism, therefore, 
have played a key role in the construction of the political constitution of 
Europe. This sovereignty game has been played to limit the supranational 
ambitions of the European project by devising rules and procedures that 
protect the sovereignty claims of all states. However, there is another cat-
egory of sovereignty assertion that needs to be explored: when individual 
states affirm their right to a special status thereby creating rules of their 
own making.
Sovereignty Assertions as a State’s Right to a Special Status
This second type of sovereignty claim is perhaps most visible in various 
treaty protocols that mention the specific treatment reserved for certain 
states.5 For instance, both Ireland (Protocol 17, Maastricht Treaty) and Malta 
(Protocol 7, Accession Treaty) are guaranteed the autonomy to legislate on 
abortion, although the EU has never tried to do so and lacks the necessary 
competences. However, protocols need not be merely symbolic statements 
destined to reassure states and their citizens about what the EU cannot do. 
Since entry into the EEC in 1972, Denmark has restricted nonresidents’ 
right to buy second homes, especially in coastal areas. Its right to do so is a 
protocol privilege that goes directly against the single market’s principle of 
free movement of capital. Other countries, with the exception of Malta, have 
not been permitted to restrict home ownership in this fashion.
The 2004 candidate countries—even though in areas with large prewar 
German populations foreign home ownership was controversial—were 
allowed to place merely transitional restrictions on EU nationals’ owner-
ship of real estate (Mihaljek 2005). Only tiny Malta was granted a per-
manent derogation, as already mentioned. Thus, when viewed from the 
perspective of sovereignty as “meta-political authority” (Thompson 1995, 
214), the Danish state has kept its ability to treat foreign home ownership 
as a domestic political issue. Even though property speculation on the basis 
of capital inflows can have a serious effect on housing affordability for the 
local population, potentially causing other socioeconomic problems, EU 
member states (with the two exceptions mentioned earlier) have effectively 
agreed to depoliticize this issue since they no longer individually wield 
authority in this area.
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Akin to the above protocol guarantees are policy opt-outs. The latter 
are ex ante treaty agreements allowing member states not to participate 
in a new community policy. Opt-outs are a practical tool for enabling 
the inclusion of new political objectives within the treaty framework 
despite the opposition of certain states (Hanf 2001). Recalcitrant mem-
ber states agree not to block treaty reform on condition that they will not 
be bound by these new arrangements. The first opt-outs were brokered 
at Maastricht. The United Kingdom opted out of the third stage of eco-
nomic and monetary union, the single currency, as well as spurning the 
Protocol on Social Policy (Raepenbusch and Hanf 2001).6 Denmark sim-
ilarly refused to convert to the euro and also turned its back on defense 
cooperation in the nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy (Hansen 
2002).7 Later rounds of treaty amendment continued the opt-out trend 
favored by these same protagonists. The United Kingdom and Ireland 
(bundled together because of their Common Travel Area) opted out of 
the communitarization of visas, asylum, and immigration (Shaw 1998). 
Denmark did likewise but its opt-out is legally and practically different 
since, unlike the United Kingdom and Ireland, the country is part of the 
Schengen free travel area (ibid.; Adler-Nissen, this volume).
The opt-outs on the single currency were initially considered to be 
merely temporary derogations. However, more than a decade later, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom still remain beyond the euro pale while 
Sweden, not a member at the time of Maastricht, unilaterally refused to 
join (Lindahl and Naurin 2005). As concessions to confederalism, these 
assertions of sovereignty are practically, but above all symbolically, sig-
nificant. In particular, they reveal certain countries’ ability to define a 
special status for themselves within the EU. Arguably, certain nonmem-
bers have likewise negotiated their relationship with the EU on the basis 
of identity-based sovereignty claims that privilege the symbolic value of 
staying outside the fold above having a say in a process of integration 
into which they are inexorably drawn. Thus nonmembership is never-
theless compatible with participation in Schengen (Iceland, Norway, and 
Switzerland), the adoption of single market legislation (Iceland, Norway, 
and Switzerland), and even financial solidarity (Switzerland awarded one 
billion francs to the 2004 accession states).
Intimately bound up with the euro opt-outs—as well as the ultimate 
opt-out of refusing membership, as occurred in the Norwegian and Swiss 
cases—is the phenomenon of the national referendum, which should be 
understood as an assertion of sovereignty. Whereas the other sovereignty 
assertions described here have been exercised by governments, acting in 
the name of a state, referendums are expressions of popular sovereignty 
even if they are often called at the discretion of the government of the day.8 
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Referendums have been held on enlargement, accession, continued mem-
bership, treaty reform, and the euro. Since this form of ratification is not 
prescribed by the EU, referendums in principle embody the autonomy 
of member states in choosing how to deal with the political challenge of 
integration. However, a government’s decision to call a referendum can 
also be influenced by domestic political considerations far-removed from 
EU constitutional politics, which makes them unpredictable and hard to 
handle. Regardless of this dark side of referendums, their increasing use 
has made it much more difficult for governments to reject out of hand 
this mode of ratification for treaty revision. This can be seen both from 
the repeated calls in several member states for the Reform Treaty to be 
put to a popular vote and the care with which certain constitutional ele-
ments (the name itself but also the EU anthem and hymn) were jettisoned 
to allow governments to tell their citizens that these revisions were not 
substantive enough to warrant a referendum.
Paradoxically, although direct democracy at the national level sym-
bolizes the confederal principle of collective representation, referendums 
can run counter to the other confederal principle of state equality. This 
is because votes in one member state may have important ramifications 
on others. Such a state of affairs is exactly what occurred in the aftermath 
of the French and Dutch popular rejections of the draft EU Constitution 
in 2005. Member states that ratified the EU Constitution—the outcome 
of a strictly confederal, that is, unanimous and equal, process—were pre-
vented from putting into operation this new treaty as a result of popular 
sovereignty in two member states. This tension is set to increase in the 
future as the French constitution has been changed to ensure that there 
is an automatic referendum on any future enlargement (art. 88.5).9 Thus 
France will have a special—hence unequal—right to decide the fate of 
membership applications twice, firstly through government representa-
tion and secondly by the people directly.
The fact that national referendums on treaties have implications 
stretching beyond the borders of the member state in question has been 
used to argue that it is simply irresponsible to subject the constitutional 
future of the EU to national votes (Auer 2007). However, to deny states 
this authority would amount to a serious restriction of the confederal 
principle of representation as the only alternative is some kind of Europe-
wide referendum based on either a majority of individuals or a double 
majority of states and citizens as happens in Switzerland. Furthermore, 
the critique of national referendums is also a denial of the national politi-
cal community as a pouvoir constituant capable of changing the very form 
of government of a state (Yack 2001). It is precisely in this constituent 
capacity that the people redeem their right to self-government—implying 
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that they are responsible to no third party— thereby constituting the 
basis for state legitimation in the modern era (Hont 1994). This explains 
why the federal alternative, a pan-European popular sovereignty, is so 
attractive. The formula sounds perfect: supranational legitimacy for a 
supranational project. Yet as the earlier discussion has shown, states have 
used sovereignty claims precisely to limit the supranational scope of the 
project and to ground— often on the basis of popular pressure—its legit-
imacy on confederal representation.
As revealed in the analysis earlier, the sovereignty game is something far 
more complex than a zero-sum game where sovereignty is imagined to be 
an indivisible capacity that is necessarily transferred from one institutional 
actor to another. If anything, the evolution of member states’ claim to sov-
ereign status as a result of integration has made their assertion of this claim 
more rather than less relevant to EU politics. Consequently, EU politics is 
now confronted with a “sovereignty surplus,” characterized by multiple 
and overlapping sovereignty claims (N. Walker 2007). Yet it remains to be 
seen what the impact of the sovereignty game—the result of compounding 
systems of political representation— has had on democracy. This is a par-
ticularly pressing question given that democracy is traditionally associated 
with an ultimately exclusive model of sovereignty (ibid.).
Hence the next section of the chapter is devoted to understanding how 
exactly the EU hybrid polity’s reworking of sovereignty challenges the 
concept and practice of democracy in Europe. Diagnoses of and remedies 
for the contemporary ailments of democracy caused by the sovereignty 
game of integration differ markedly but they seldom make reference to 
the principles of political representation structuring the EU polity. The 
fourth and final section reviews these assessments of and proposals for 
dealing with the consequences of integration from the perspective of how 
they address the problem of sovereignty claims. In this way, the ambition 
is to offer a new angle for interpreting the appropriateness of proposals 
for coming to terms with the effects of integration on democracy.
Sovereignty Games and Democracy in the EU
Federal, confederal, and compound forms of representation have long 
been thought to affect the nature of democracy (Hamilton, Jay, and 
Madison 2003). After all, the point of the American federal experiment 
was to make popular sovereignty compatible with liberty (Tocqueville 
1994). In reality, the relationship also works the other way round as 
Carl Schmitt argued that “the federal foundation and federalism itself 
are destroyed by the democratic concept of the constituent power of the 
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whole people” (1992, 55). According to Schmitt, the democratization of 
the United States in the nineteenth century resulted in “a federal state 
without a federal foundation” (ibid.). Similarly, cultural factors are also 
part of the representation and democracy equation.10 It has been shown, 
for instance, that in federal Austria and Germany, a common linguistic 
and cultural community results in a nationwide demos that discusses 
politics from a centralized rather than fragmented perspective (Erk 
2003, 2004). However, given the dual nature of the EU as both a com-
monwealth in itself and a union of commonwealths, the effect of the 
above sovereignty games is Janus-like, affecting both EU democracy and 
member-state democracy. Hence the strategic relationship between sov-
ereignty, integration, and democracy will be examined from this dual 
perspective, albeit briefly since this section is intended as a prelude to 
a discussion of the reform proposals that have arisen from the changed 
context of European democracy.
Sovereignty Games and EU Democracy
A common complaint regarding the EU polity is its complexity, aptly 
illustrated by the up to thirty different steps of the current codecision 
procedure. In fact, the problem of complexity is the defining characteris-
tic of pluralist democracies when compared with parliamentary models of 
democracy (Coultrap 1999). EU pluralism is precisely the result of adopt-
ing the dual system of representation as an alternative to an uncompli-
cated supranational majoritarian system that would ride roughshod over 
state sovereignty claims. The result is a vertical and horizontal separation 
of powers that promotes consensus through mutual checks and balances 
as well as continual institutional dialogue. This plural regime, however, is 
distinctly out of kilter with many citizens’ notions of politics on the basis 
of the operation of parliamentary democracy (Schmidt 2004). In fact, the 
alien nature of the EU’s consensus-based model of democracy has been 
used as a justification for shielding it from referendum votes in which 
citizens cannot appreciate properly the merits of the system (Dehousse 
2006; Moravcsik 2006).
Regardless of the more subjective issue of whether the EU system is 
beyond the ken of most ordinary citizens, political scientists have iden-
tified a host of other problems resulting from Europe’s peculiar dual 
representation that vexes democracy. Notable among these is the lack 
of transparent decision making arising from the closed meetings of the 
Council of Ministers—secrecy being the cloak behind which diplomatic 
maneuverings between states try to reach consensus positions (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 342). In addition, the low salience of many 
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problems of regulatory policy within the compass of EU authority in tan-
dem with the opaqueness and technocratic element of decision making 
favors the access of corporate interest groups to the detriment of civil 
society (Streeck and Schmitter 1991).
Moreover, the treaty bargains struck over the size of each member 
state’s cohort of representatives in the European Parliament have produced 
a serious imbalance of representation, with the small countries well over-
represented in terms of citizens per Member of the European Parliament 
(MEP) (Rodden 2002). Of course, federal systems almost universally con-
tain some form of unequal representation to prevent simple majoritarian-
ism (Dahl 2001, 47). However, the peculiarity of the EU is that, besides the 
evident antimajoritarian devices of unanimity and QMV in the Council 
of Ministers, the institution supposed to embody the principle of popular 
sovereignty, the European Parliament, is also seriously malapportioned. 
Owing precisely to the need to respect the status of member states, small 
countries have obtained a highly generous overrepresentation of MEPs per 
capita—so much so that the EU’s directly elected legislature is the world’s 
second most malapportioned lower house (Rodden 2002, 155).
Yet the most important democratic consequence of the sovereignty 
game of integration for the EU has been the hollowness of European pub-
lic participation, debate, and accountability (Schmidt 2004). The abstruse, 
consensus-building model of politics dominated by national executives 
rather than European political parties has combined with a variety of other 
factors, including public indifference to hamper electoral contestation of 
leadership and policy (Follesdal and Hix 2005). The low salience of the 
business of the European Parliament is not surprising given that the mem-
ber states have tried to prevent this supranational body from diminishing 
the importance of the confederal principle of representation. This effort 
has also drawn succor from national parties’ disinclination to politicize 
the integration cleavage within the domestic arena (Mair 2005), a cleavage 
that is in any case not isomorphic with the traditional left/right dimension 
of European politics (Bartolini 2005). The net result, therefore, is a polity 
that, unlike European nation-states, is not based on government by the 
people through active popular participation nor does it follow the logic of 
a government of the people through elected representatives and neither is 
it really government for the people because its effectiveness is easy to call 
into question (Schmidt 2004, 977).
Sovereignty Games and Democracy in the Member States
Since the impact of the sovereignty game of integration on democracy 
in the EU’s member states is an equally familiar part of the EU studies 
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literature only a brief exposition is necessary. Domestic politics has been 
adversely affected by more than simply the growth of supranationalism, 
which challenges claims to domestic autonomy. The way in which the 
sovereignty game of integration is played—national governments are 
key actors in this process—has also proved significant, with the need to 
maintain a complex hybrid polity with the problems this has posed for 
democracy.
First, there has been the augmentation in the discretionary power 
of national executives as a result of their participation in transnational 
governance structures that are more isolated from the gaze of national 
parliamentary scrutiny (Anderson and Burns, 1996; Raunio 1999).
Second, the creation of a new institutional level for policymaking has 
also allowed executives to “venue shop” to find a more favorable arena 
for implementing their preferences (Guiraudon 2000). Venue shopping, 
alongside the secrecy of the Council of Ministers, also profits govern-
ments by facilitating the blame avoidance potential that exists where there 
is a two-level game of international bargaining (Vaubel 1994; Rotte and 
Zimmerman 1998). Both these changes in national democratic practices, 
therefore, relate to the powers member states derive from the confederal 
element of the EU.
Third, and perhaps most important, the sovereignty game has pro-
foundly affected democracy by altering member states’ ability to define 
the political, what Thompson (1995) calls “meta-political authority.” As 
described earlier, integration has in many policy areas diminished states’ 
capacity to define an issue as a political problem requiring a domestic solu-
tion. This is a recurrent trend in everyday EU politics. It is well illustrated 
by the recent conflict between the Commission and Austria as a result of 
the latter’s attempt to restrict the number of German students studying in 
its medical and dental faculties because Austria does not use a numerus 
clausus (i.e., restricted, grade-based) entry system. In this example, follow-
ing a 2005 ECJ ruling,11 (a similar problem has arisen in Belgium following 
an influx of French students), the Austrian government stands accused 
of breaching the principle of free movement of students, meaning that it 
is unable to define—and thus settle—a question of education policy as a 
domestic affair (Anderson and Glencross 2007).
Moreover, since member states are locked in to the sovereignty game it 
appears impossible for them to redefine an issue as one of domestic pol-
itics, even in the case of policy failure. Thus despite the dubious record 
of the Common Fisheries Policy in terms of stock conservation (Payne 
2000), member states cannot try to remedy this failure on their own by 
opting out ex post, as shown by the Factortame case (MacCormick 1999). 
Hence national governments’ ability to respond to policy problems or 
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public concerns is now far more constrained than according to the simple 
domestic model of lex posterior derogat legi priori. (a later law overrules 
an earlier law).
Since these changes in national democracy have also coincided with 
the democratic woes of the EU system as a whole, the net result has been 
the “depoliticization” of European public life (Mair 2005, 2007; Schmidt 
2006). Indeed, it appears that the thinness of EU democratic life has had a 
deleterious effect on national politics (Mair 2007, 8). Besides the circum-
scription of states’ metapolitical authority and their ability to respond 
to their citizens’ concerns, the European project has seen the growing 
use of nonmajoritarian institutions “from which politics and parties are 
deliberately excluded” (Mair 2005, 12). Given this reconfiguration of 
European democracy, it is no surprise that manifold proposals have been 
put forward to come to terms with the impact of the sovereignty game on 
democracy. In particular, given that the causality behind this relationship 
seems to stem from the EU level downward, the mooted reforms invari-
ably have EU democracy as their starting point. The following section 
analyzes the arguments that dominate this debate by looking at whether 
their attempts to respond to the democracy game consider how the sover-
eignty game has reconfigured democracy.
Reconciling Integration with Democracy: 
The Problematic Role of Sovereignty Claims
Participants in the debate about how to reconcile European integra-
tion with democracy can be separated into two main camps. Whereas 
some propose a more or less radical restructuring of the EU to breathe 
new democratic life into its institutions, others believe it is more ger-
mane to use this opportunity to reconsider the nature of contempo-
rary democratic practices. It would be histrionic to say that there is an 
enormous gulf between these two visions of the state of democracy in 
Europe. Nevertheless, there is a clear line of separation demarcating 
those who fret not about the health of EU democracy, like Coultrap 
(1999), Moravcsik (2006), and Majone (2006) and those who recommend 
immediate action to improve its democratic legitimacy (Schmitter 2000; 
Hix 2007). However, on closer scrutiny, both these perspectives seem 
problematic when it comes to appreciating the crucial role of sovereignty 
claims in the construction of the EU. Changing the democracy game of 
the EU polity will significantly affect the sovereignty game—just as the 
latter has reconfigured the former. Hence proposals for reforming the 
EU in the name of democracy, if they are to be convincing, have to take 
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seriously the sovereignty game. In particular, if the intention is to find an 
alternative to sovereignty claims because they have proved problematic 
for democracy, these proposals have to give a convincing account of what 
will replace or abolish the instrumental use of sovereignty claims.
Democratizing the EU: Overcoming Sovereignty 
Claims through Supranationalism?
Democratizing the EU is synonymous with increasing the importance 
of supranational representation at the expense of confederalism. Hence 
the usual suggestions are threefold: beef up the powers of the European 
Parliament (Andersen and Burns 1996), turn the Council of Ministers 
into an upper house alone (Habermas 2001), and find new ways of engen-
dering the transnational representation of citizens, either through pan-
European referendums (Auer 2007) or the promotion of supranational 
citizen associations (Schmitter 2000). In every case, the intention is to 
reduce the veto power of the member states thereby interfering with their 
claims to sovereign status as embodied by unanimity in the Council of 
Ministers or the right to reject treaty change, including via referendum. 
The inevitable result of these proposals, therefore, is the reduction of the 
autonomy of the member states by curtailing their confederal capacity 
to reject EU treaty amendment or negotiate consensus compromises by 
wielding the veto threat.
Other institutional reforms seek to enhance supranational represen-
tation for the sake of greater efficiency, which, it is thought, will in turn 
lead to greater output legitimacy. This is the case for the establishment 
of the new president of the European Council, the highest political body 
comprising heads of state or governments of the member states meeting 
four times a year, and the eventual abolition of the one state one commis-
sioner rule contained in the Reform Treaty. In fact, both these reforms 
would constitute a new departure in the sovereignty game as they clearly 
go against the principle of state equality that is fundamental in confederal 
representation. By abolishing the rotating European Council presidency 
and the automatic award of a commissioner, the sovereignty claims of 
small countries—sometimes the only asset they have left (Werner and de 
Wilde 2001, 304)—will no longer prove so useful or satisfying.
When viewed from a certain angle, of course, the notion of state equal-
ity appears dubious. The contrast, for instance, between the fallout from 
the French “no” to the EU Constitution that the EU political elite has still 
barely digested and previous referendum rejections that led immediately 
to new votes is striking. However, reform of the presidency and the college 
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of commissioners means that the confederal principle of state equal-
ity founded on states’ sovereignty claims would be greatly attenuated. In 
particular, substantial and very visible changes to state equality, such as 
the loss of a commissioner, will greatly affect the element of majesty that 
underlies successful sovereignty claims (Onuf 1991). The importance of 
this aspect of sovereignty should not be underestimated, especially insofar 
as the majesty stemming from equal treatment sustains the state’s rela-
tionship with what has been called the domestic audience for sovereignty 
claims (Werner and de Wilde 2001, 290). Hence the majesty stemming 
from state equality is not simply a question of respect from other states; 
it is also a feature of self-respect. In a reconfigured EU, nation-state maj-
esty would, in all likelihood, have to be maintained or reinvented—which 
explains why the TEC fudged this matter.
All the above proposals for democratic EU reform thus represent 
an attempt to transform its hybrid nature of political representation by 
diluting the principle of confederalism that tries to uphold both mem-
ber state equality and liberty. This suggests that the often-asserted claim 
that the equation between federalism and centralization so feared by 
the United Kingdom is “an ahistorical reading” (Dehousse 2005, 116) 
is misleading. The attenuation of the confederal principle of represen-
tation may not automatically equate to a more overweening center, but 
it would produce a concentration of political representation around that 
center. Furthermore, by breaking down confederalism’s antimajoritarian 
bulwarks, such as vetoes and unanimous treaty revision, member states 
would find serious obstacles to sovereignty assertions, whether to limit 
supranationalism for all or to individually assert special claims.
In other words, the instrumental uses to which sovereignty claims 
could be put would simply diminish once it became harder to use them 
in practice. Such proposals rest on blatantly blithe assumptions, namely 
that not only will institutional arrangements render sovereignty claims 
unproblematic but that member states will accept such reforms in the 
first place. Yet the troubling feature of these proposals is less the latter 
assumption than the former, which fails to recognize the dynamic use 
to which sovereignty claims have been put in the course of integration as 
discussed earlier. By recognizing this feature of integration, it is possible 
to draw an entirely different conclusion than the prescription that sov-
ereignty claims are simply a bother that have to be overcome. Given that 
sovereignty claims arise most when the claimed status of sovereignty is 
challenged (Werner and de Wilde 2001), it seems likely that further suc-
cessful integration—at least according to the official motto of “united in 
diversity”—would require a new way of instrumentalizing sovereignty. 
Here is not the place to put forward detailed proposals on this subject. 
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But it is relatively easy to single out new ways of articulating sovereignty 
claims perhaps consisting of a revamped subsidiarity system on the basis 
of the criterion of diversity rather than effectiveness, a reconfigured 
interinstitutional relationship allowing the Council of Ministers greater 
scope for amending legislation proposed by the Commission and the 
ability to reassess ECJ rulings (both tabled by the UK government at the 
Amsterdam IGC), or even a version of the American constitutional doc-
trine of nullification (Tipton 1969) operating via national parliaments or 
direct democracy.
The analysis of the reciprocal relationship between democracy and 
the sovereignty game of integration revealed the ongoing problem of 
incorporating the autonomy and equality of states within a demo-
cratic, partly supranational polity. Nevertheless, some of the literature 
on the EU’s democratic deficit assumes—explicitly (Moravcsik 2006) 
or implicitly (Coultrap 1999; Follesdal and Hix 2005; Hix 2007)—the 
relative stability of the EU constitutional settlement. When this is the 
case, rather than requiring a democratization of the EU, the impact of 
the sovereignty game of integration on democracy is thought to demand 
above all a new understanding of democratic governance and how best 
it functions. Yet the question still remains as to what this means for 
sovereignty claims.
Democratic Governance: Can Sovereignty Claims be Buried?
Two strands of thought can be distinguished within the literature on 
democratic governance in the EU. The first tries to dispel fears about the 
hollowness of EU democracy; the second believes that within the existing 
system a dose of “limited democratic politics” (Hix 2007), on the basis 
of the left/right dimension, needs to be injected to reconnect the polity 
with its citizens. Common to both is once again a sidelining of the prob-
lem of sovereignty claims within the delicate and, as seen earlier, highly 
contested system of EU competences and institutions.
Essentially, the first school is that of pluralist democracy. According to 
this model, whatever the alien nature of the mixed system in comparison 
with parliamentary regimes, the EU remains democratically legitimate 
thanks to its highly institutionalized checks and balances (Coultrap 1999; 
Majone 2006). Nonmajoritarian institutions, it is insisted, are potentially 
just as legitimate as majoritarian ones. However, what matters in this 
case is institutional design and the nature of the objectives to be pursued 
(Majone 2005). Hence if the EU is to be faulted it is not for its democratic 
deficit but for unsound institutional design and inappropriate policy 
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objectives (ibid.). Paradoxically, the solution mooted for both these short-
comings is precisely a new constitutional settlement that would strengthen 
the confederal principle at the expense of the supranational, “community 
method” (ibid.). So it seems that after first dismissing the link between 
the sovereignty game of integration and the problem of democratic legit-
imacy, sovereignty claims reappear. Not for the sake of legitimacy but to 
make the system function better in terms of outputs. This only goes to 
show that there is good reason to believe that sovereignty claims, rather 
than having to be buried, can be used to tackle the problematic demo-
cratic consequences of the sovereignty game of integration.
The second way of understanding democratic governance is to assume 
that the current integration status quo is too entrenched to be reformed 
substantively, yet still amenable to the injection of left/right politics over 
policy choice (Follesdal and Hix 2005; Hix 2006, 2007). This politiciza-
tion approach believes that a minimal majoritarian element is possible 
thanks to the QMV-elected president of the Commission, which allows a 
more partisan college (Hix 2006, 19). What is surprising about this argu-
ment, as Bartolini (2006) points out, is the fact that the left/right cleav-
age is bound to raise fundamental, if not disquieting, questions about the 
constitution of the EU system itself, notably its competences and decision-
making rules. Indeed, the cleavage over integration itself within member 
states has become more noticeable. Research on the recent referendums 
in the four countries that submitted the EU Constitution to a popular 
vote, which produced two ratifications and two rejections, emphasizes the 
essential “first order,” that is, European element, of the results (Glencross 
and Trechsel 2007). Thus it is not at all clear why a limited democratic 
politics of left/right policy choices in a polity that has little redistributive 
capacity should be a priority over the debate regarding the future shape 
of integration.
Attempts to reconcile integration with democracy, whether from the 
supranational perspective or the governance approach, thus stumble pre-
cisely over the question of sovereignty claims. This is because neither 
treats member states’ assertions of sovereignty as an integral part of how 
to respond to the intermeshed sovereignty and democracy games. Yet the 
uncanny feature of democratic legitimacy in the EU is the fact that this 
compound polity also rests on a compounded legitimacy: it “depends 
on both EU and national levels” (Schmidt 2004, 982). Since sovereignty 
claims are aimed at both external and internal audiences, they seem 
uniquely capable of finding if not a solution then at least a modus vivendi 
for democracy and sovereignty games played out at two levels. As pre-
sented in section one, the current EU system demonstrates the creative 
use to which sovereignty assertions have been used in the construction of 
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this hybrid polity. It is therefore odd to discover that such an instrument 
does not play a more prominent—as well as innovative—role in attempts 
to reconfigure the EU system.
Conclusions
By examining the contested principles of representation structuring the 
EU polity, this chapter tried to shed some new light on the strategic rela-
tionship between sovereignty, integration, and democracy. European 
integration poses manifold challenges to sovereignty and democracy. The 
result is a certain “deficit anxiety,”12 prompting attempts to show that 
democracy can be reconciled with what is often called “post-sovereignty” 
but that is perhaps better captured by N. Walker’s notion of a “sovereignty 
surplus” (2007, 5). No such guarantees or reassurances were offered here. 
Rather, the chapter demonstrated how the problem of reconciling sover-
eignty claims with democracy has become marginalized when it comes 
to finding solutions to the adverse effects of integration on democracy in 
Europe.
Current proposals to overcome or bury member states’ sovereignty 
were shown to suffer from serious shortcomings. As a result, the analysis 
suggests that member state assertions of sovereignty ought to be consid-
ered as a means of negotiating the relationship between integration, sov-
ereignty, and democracy. However, the recent experience of the Reform 
Treaty points to a continued failure to take sovereignty claims seriously. 
Most egregiously, the treaty was pruned of the rhetoric of its constitutional 
forebearer so as to give member states a ready excuse not to ratify it by 
referendum—despite retaining the vast majority of the institutional and 
decision-making changes contained in the EU Constitution. Obviously, 
this state of affairs is the product of member state collusion. Still under 
the shock of the referendum rejections of the EU Constitution in France 
and the Netherlands, Europe’s political elite has opted to elide the sover-
eignty issue. Disingenuously, these elites portray the Reform Treaty as a 
tidying-up exercise without sovereignty implications, thereby rendering 
referendums redundant.
In this way the whole gamut of sovereignty claims—as barrier to 
supranationalism, as a state’s right to a special status, and as expression 
of popular sovereignty through referendums—has for the moment been 
buried. Yet the experience of integration is one of a welter of contesta-
tion and renegotiation over the rules of the game of integration politics, 
interspersed only briefly with moments of calm. With several impor-
tant changes scheduled for future implementation, such as the eventual 
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abolition of the one commissioner per country rule or the move toward 
a new system of QMV, and with the detail of others—notably the United 
Kingdom opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights—unspecified, 
there are many looming complication. Perhaps it will be necessary for 
this new political settlement to be called into question before a collec-
tive epiphany about the role of sovereignty claims in the EU system is 
possible. Whatever the timing, this awakening will probably consist of 
the realization that the continuation of integration in a way acceptable to 
states and their citizens requires the juxtaposition of contradictory prin-
ciples of representation that results from the use of sovereignty claims.
Notes
1. Jackson (1999, 433) goes further in claiming that sovereignty is “an institution 
which is periodically renovated to respond to new historical circumstances.”
2. MacCormick (1999), famously, has taken a more nuanced view by likening 
sovereignty to virginity, viz. something that is lost but not gained by another 
party.
3. The absence of a specific withdrawal clause did not prevent Greenland, 
which joined as part of the Kingdom of Denmark but obtained home rule in 
1979, from seceding from the EEC in 1985 with the consent of the European 
Council. Witte (2004a) argues that a right of withdrawal under the EEC treaty 
can be implied from state practice in the EEC treaty given that the United 
Kingdom called a referendum in 1975 on continued membership of the 
European Communities.
4. Such a conflict arose over the question of harmonizing criminal sanctions in 
the field of environmental protection. The commission argued this should 
occur under the Community regime whilst the Council of Ministers sought 
to implement legislation as an EU framework decision. The ECJ ruled in favor 
of the Commission in Case C-176/03 Commission v Council.
5. For reasons of conceptual clarity I do not dwell on the German Constitutional 
Court’s notorious decision on the constitutional validity of the Maastricht 
Treaty. This seems to represent an assertion of sovereignty to limit suprana-
tionalism but articulated in the name of an individual state, thereby blurring 
the conceptual framework adopted in this section.
6. The United Kingdom subsequently signed up to the Social Protocol in 1997 
following a change of government (Shaw 1998, 68).
7. Denmark also obtained a specific guarantee that EU citizenship would not 
jeopardize Danish sovereignty on deciding matters of citizenship. In addi-
tion, Denmark was also exempted from supranational cooperation on asy-
lum, immigration, and judicial cooperation.
8. Ireland, following a Supreme Court decision on the Single European Act, is 
the only member state constitutionally obliged to hold a referendum on EU 
treaty revision.
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 9. The European precedent for holding a national vote on enlargement was 
France’s 1972 vote on EEC expansion.
10. Schmitt probably overstates the importance of democratization as the post 
civil war era was notable for the construction of a national sense of political 
community (Greenfeld 1992). In fact, the relationship between democrati-
zation and nationalism is highly complex, as Yack (2001) has argued very 
powerfully that popular sovereignty as a modern phenomenon unintention-
ally fostered the assumption that political organization supposed a national 
community.
11. C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969.
12. I credit this expression to Cormac Mac Amhlaigh of the European University 
Institute.
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8Sovereignty beyond Borders: 
Sovereignty, Self-Defense, and 
the Disciplining of States
Tanja E. Aalberts and Wouter G. Werner
Originally, the right to self-defense was included in the UN Charter as a limited and temporary exception to the prohibition on the use 
of force. In that way, it underscored the fundamental transformation in 
the reading of sovereignty and war that emerged in the twentieth cen-
tury. Where in the Jus Publicum Europaeum sovereignty entailed the 
right to determine the ways to fight a public enemy, including war, the 
UN Charter linked sovereignty to the protection against acts of aggres-
sion. Paradoxically, the attempts to outlaw the use of force resulted 
in the creation of several new discursive spaces to legitimize the use 
of force: armed force could (and should) now be justified in terms of 
exceptions, as exceptional measures aimed at restoring normalcy. This 
discursive practice already started in the late 1940s but gained new 
momentum after the 9/11 attacks. This chapter focuses on the recent 
attempts to further stretch the limits of self-defense and to link this 
right to large-scale reconstructions of domestic societies through the 
alleged connection between State failure and terrorism.
The terrors of lawlessness must be responded to . . . if need be, by the 
terrors of the law
—Lorimer 1883, 93
Does this morality [that the strong are best at proving they’re right] 
teach us, as is often believed, that force “trumps” law? Or else, something 
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quite different, that the very concept of law, that juridical reason itself, 
includes a priori a possible recourse to constraint or coercion and, thus, 
to a certain violence?
—Derrida 2005, xi
Introduction
This chapter examines how the concept of sovereignty is linked to justifi-
cations of foreign intervention, especially when the use of force is involved. 
At first sight, this might seem counterintuitive. In many writings, the con-
cept of sovereignty is understood as the logical corollary of the principle 
of nonintervention. Already in the sixteenth to eighteenth century natural 
law school, the principle of nonintervention was understood as an a priori, 
a dictate of reason without which a community of sovereign, independent 
States would be impossible (see Winfield 1922; Vincent 1974). In similar 
fashion, Vattel argued that “it clearly follows the liberty and independence 
of Nations that each has the right to govern itself as it thinks proper, and 
that no one of them has the least right to interfere in the government of 
another . . .” (Vattel 1758, Book II, iv, para 54). In the post-1945 interna-
tional legal order, the link between sovereignty and nonintervention 
became even closer, tight up as it was with the prohibition on the use of 
force as a peremptory norm of international relations.1
Yet, international practice shows many examples where States have 
sought to justify foreign interventions in terms of the protection of sover-
eignty, that is, as a matter of self-defense.2 To understand these argumen-
tative practices, it is necessary to take a closer look at State sovereignty as 
a fundamental principle of international law and politics. This will be dis-
cussed in the first section of this chapter. It will be argued that sovereignty 
is to be understood as an “interpretive concept.” In this way, it is possible 
to understand both the evolution of sovereignty and the way in which 
its function has remained stable in the last few centuries. Subsequently, 
the next section will explicate the function of sovereignty as an ordering 
principle, that established a link between rights and freedoms on the one 
hand and responsibility on the other. In turn, it will be argued that this 
sovereignty/responsibility link enables the disciplining of the primary 
subjects of international law. The third section will take a closer look at 
this disciplinary potential via the relation between sovereignty and the 
use of force. It will set out how sovereignty evolved from a concept that left 
States free to determine their public enemies and the ways to fight them, 
to a concept that forced States to rely on exceptionalism to justify their 
foreign interventions. This practice, as will be demonstrated in the final 
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section, has been furthered in the recent “war on terror,” by stretching the 
principle of self-defense on the one hand and the link between  terrorism 
and State failure on the other hand. Thus sovereignty has become bound 
up with large-scale interventions and attempts to recreate and discipline 
former enemy States.
Sovereignty as an Interpretive Concept
To be able to understand the resilience of State sovereignty—that is, its 
combined endurance and flexibility—it is necessary to prevent two fal-
lacies. The first is the “descriptivistic fallacy,” the idea that sovereignty 
must necessarily represent a corresponding state of affairs in empirical 
reality (the signified). The second is the “normativistic fallacy”: the idea 
that the meaning of sovereignty, as a normative concept, merely repre-
sents a bundle of rights, duties, and competencies. Although the descrip-
tivistic and normativistic fallacy are fundamentally different, they share 
the idea that, to make sense of “sovereignty,” it must represent something 
else (either a state of affairs or a bundle of rights, duties, and competen-
cies). This chapter takes a different perspective, emphasizing not primar-
ily what sovereignty represents, but rather what it presents, what it brings 
about (for this argument see also Werner 2001).
To capture its constitutive function, we understand sovereignty as 
an interpretive concept. The term “interpretive concept” was coined by 
Ronald Dworkin in his critique of positivist legal theories and his attempts 
to make sense of US constitutional practice (Dworkin 1986, 45–86). An 
interpretive concept is a normative institution that (1) ascribes social 
status and (2) contains a set of norms of conduct. Characteristic of an 
interpretive concept, moreover, is that the members of a society do not 
treat the rules of the institution as a taboo that cannot be questioned or 
changed. On the contrary, the members of the society take a so called 
“interpretive attitude” toward the institution; an attitude that has two 
components (Dworkin 1986, 47):
● The first is that the members act on the believe that the institu-
tion “does not simply exist but as value, that it serves some interest 
or purpose or enforces some principle—in short, that is has some 
point—that can be stated independently of just describing the rules 
that make up the practice”
● The second is that the rules of the institution, what the institution 
requires, “are not necessarily or exclusively what they have always 
been taken to be but are instead sensitive to its point, so that the 
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strict rules must be understood or applied or modified or qualified 
or limited by that point.”
From this conceptualization of institutions as interpretive concepts 
follows that they are dynamic concepts too: agents consider the institu-
tion in the context of its point or purpose and restructure the rules of the 
institution in the light of that function. This means that—as has been the 
case with sovereignty—an institution can survive fundamental changes 
in a society. An example of this is the survival of the concept of State sov-
ereignty in international society despite the fundamental transformation 
from dynastical legitimacy to self-determination as one of the guiding 
principles of international legitimacy.
Whereas an interpretive concept is an intersubjective institution, 
shared by members of a community, it is not necessary that they all 
agree on the application of such a concept to an individual case. They 
might very well disagree on what the institution requires in a particu-
lar situation—in fact, that is what an interpretive concept is about. As 
long as the “international community” (implicitly or explicitly) agrees 
on the most general and abstract propositions about the institution, they 
share a background that makes genuine disagreement on the require-
ments and scope of an institution meaningful. In this context, it is help-
ful to recall Dworkin’s distinction between “concept” and “conception.” 
To illustrate the distinction between concepts and conceptions, Dworkin 
uses the example of the institution of courtesy in an imaginary commu-
nity (Dworkin 1986, 90–96). In this community, people share the con-
cept of courtesy and agree, at the most general level, that courtesy stands 
for “respect.” However, there are major differences of opinion about the 
correct interpretation of what respect requires in different circumstances 
(does it mean showing respect to people of a higher rank or does it require 
a more egalitarian interpretation, does it require a different treatment 
of man and women or does it require an equal treatment of both? etc.). 
There are, in other words, different conceptions of the institution or con-
cept of courtesy. The parallels between Dworkins’s example and the con-
cept of sovereignty are clear: there is, at the most general level, agreement 
that sovereignty stands for “freedom,” “equality,” and “independence.”3 
However, what these abstract notions consist of in practice is less unam-
biguous. That is to say, from the status of sovereignty itself no “given, 
determinate, normative implications” follow (Koskenniemi 1991, 408). 
This leads to competing conceptions of sovereignty and disputes where 
both parties appeal to the sovereignty principle to support their respec-
tive claims. It also enables the aforementioned practice of justifying inter-
vention practices on the basis of sovereignty.4
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To decide which of the competing conceptions of sovereignty is legally 
correct in a concrete case, it is necessary to rely on specific rules and 
principles valid under international law at the time of the dispute. This 
does not mean, however, that sovereignty is thereby reduced to these 
rules and principles. It remains relevant as a general concept (or insti-
tution in Dworkinian sense) that structures legal and political discourse 
and that, in turn, is kept alive by the enduring disputes about its proper 
meaning. The current discussion hence is akin to insights from the lin-
guistic turn in both legal thought and International Relations theory, 
inspired by Wittgensteinian conceptions of language games, notably in 
their rejection of a given referent (signified), and the ensuing move from 
a correspondence notion to the constitutive role of language. Taking an 
“interpretive” stance to sovereignty, such post-positivist approaches focus 
on its changing meaning and historical contingency instead.5 However, by 
addressing in more detail the function of institutions, Dworkin’s notion 
of the “interpretive concept” enables us to scrutinize what sovereignty 
does beyond its, by now widely accepted, disposition as a social construct 
or discursive fact. Thus, our perspective moves beyond the contingency 
notion by elaborating meaning in relation to the dual function of insti-
tutions, and by distinguishing two uses of sovereignty (as status and as 
rights/duties) to analyse its resilience. To understand how it operates as a 
general concept it is necessary to further elaborate the “point” of sover-
eignty within the legal order.
Sovereignty as a Way of Organizing Responsibility
Within the framework of international law, the concept of State sov-
ereignty is used in at least two interrelated ways, running parallel to 
Dworkin’s interpretive concept. First, sovereignty is used to describe the 
status of a political community (the status of “sovereign” or “indepen-
dent” statehood). Second, the concept of sovereignty is used to endow 
States with certain fundamental rights, powers, and duties (their sover-
eign rights), establishing norms of conduct. State sovereignty in interna-
tional life, therefore, performs functions that are akin to those performed 
by the concept of individual liberty in the national context. Both the indi-
vidual liberty and the State sovereignty argument take as their starting 
point the existence of independent (“free” or “sovereign”) agents who are 
equal by “nature,” endowed with a minimum core of fundamental rights 
and whose freely expressed consent forms the basis order and society.6 As 
Koskenniemi has summarized this analogy between individual liberalism 
and state sovereignty: “Both characterize the social world in descriptive 
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and normative terms. They describe social life in terms of the activities 
of individual agents (‘legal subjects’, citizens, States) and set down the 
basic conditions within which the relations between these agents should 
be conducted” (Koskenniemi 1989, 192).
The notions of State sovereignty and individual liberty are easily mis-
understood as being purely individualistic and antisocial. The institution 
of sovereignty is then construed as a variant of “possessive individualism” 
(Ruggie 1983), whereas sovereign States have been presented as essentially 
outside international society (Patomäki 2002). This reading of sover-
eignty can be found within the traditional body of International Relations 
writings, as well as political discourse, on sovereignty. Conceiving of 
sovereignty notably in terms of “freedoms, rights, immunities,” that is, 
autonomy and independence from outside interference, this basically 
takes an individualistic stance on sovereignty, whilst concomitantly link-
ing it to notions of power and control. This is reflected most clearly in 
light of the debates on globalization, regional integration, and the ero-
sion of sovereignty.7 It also materializes in the discussion of international 
law as impinging sovereignty by limiting the freedom of maneuver—in 
particular through the development of the human rights regime that is 
central to the intervention debate. In other words, sovereignty and sov-
ereign Statehood are presented as given entities, which exist independent 
from their international environment, in a vacuum. Any international 
development (including integration, globalization, and international law) 
then necessary reduces this freedom and hence erode sovereignty as a 
zero-sum game (the more globalized, Europeanized and/or “legalized,” 
the less sovereignty is left).
Such readings of sovereignty, however, fail to grasp one of the essential 
features of the (legal) institution of sovereignty: that is, the specific way it 
orders international life by linking freedom and responsibility. Through 
the notion of sovereignty, international law not only presents States as 
free and equal, but also creates subjects (legal persons) that, by virtue of 
their privileged status, are held to respect an extensive set of obligations. 
The freedom and equality of States exists within an (international) nor-
mative order that dictates the scope and content of this room to maneuver 
(Shaw 2003, 190). Within this order “sovereignty” hence entails not only 
the capacity to make legal claims on the basis of possessed rights, but also 
the possibility of being held accountable for one’s acts.
From its inception in modern international law, the idea of the State 
as a sovereign legal person has been linked to attempts to civilize power. 
Thus, when the term “international legal personality” was coined, the 
aim was not to create a normatively free sphere in which States could 
operate. On the contrary: the concept of international legal personality 
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was advocated as a way to recognize the new power configurations in 
Europe, to bring the newly arising powers within an overarching nor-
mative structure. Through the assignment of a specific, privileged status, 
the normative order constituted its own sovereign subjects and presented 
them as the principal bearers of international responsibility.8 As Nijman 
has argued: “. . . the concept of international legal personality functioned 
to legitimise the participation of the German Princes in international life, 
but by the same legal move established their responsibility to conform to 
the justice-based rules of the law of nations” (Nijman 2004, 499, emphasis 
added).
The elements of recognition, legitimation, and responsibility also come 
together in the very term “international legal personality.” Etymologically 
speaking, “personality” does not stem from the idea of a self-contained, 
free individual, but from the term persona—that signified a theatrical 
mask in classical antiquity plays (Nijman 2004, chapter 6). The mask of 
sovereignty is best understood as a way of presentation in a play that (re)
defines one’s identity and role. Just like in a play, it does not make much 
sense to “unmask” the actor to see what “really” goes on: the reality is 
given, or rather: constituted within the play itself. In that sense, it is not 
so much the States that play sovereignty games, it is the sovereignty play 
that constitutes those who are in the game, and are granted a “voice” in 
the first place.9 Thus it is the game itself that creates the conditions of pos-
sibility of sovereign “being” at all (Aalberts 2004).10
The relation between sovereignty and responsibility is not just a theo-
retical invention. In international legal and diplomatic practice, the abil-
ity and willingness to live up to international obligations has long been 
recognized as one of the core elements of what it is to be a sovereign State. 
In the Island of Palmas case (1928), for example, arbiter Huber argued 
that territorial sovereignty not only gives States the right to exercise juris-
diction over their territories, but it also puts them under an obligation to 
respect the rights of other states:
Territorial sovereignty . . . involves the exclusive right to display the activ-
ities of a State. This right has as a corollary a duty: the obligation to pro-
tect within the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right 
to integrity and inviolability in peace and war, together with the rights 
which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory. Without 
manifesting its territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding to the 
circumstances, the State cannot fulfil this duty.11
The logic underpinning the Island of Palmas case is echoed in the mod-
ern criteria for Statehood. According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention 
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the existence of a “government” is one of the criteria for Statehood in mod-
ern international law.12 Under customary international law, this criterion 
is usually interpreted in terms of “effective and independent government,” 
precisely in light of the obligations of Statehood under international law 
(Crawford 2006). In similar fashion, the 1949 Draft Declaration on Rights 
and Duties of States reconfirms the relation between sovereignty and 
responsibility by emphasizing the need for self-discipline and the obli-
gations that come with sovereign Statehood. The Declaration contains 
10 articles defining duties, whereas only 4 formulate rights that are related 
to the status of sovereign Statehood.13 One of the core articles lays down 
that “Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations aris-
ing from treaties and other sources of international law.”14 By extension it 
can be conceived as rights as obligations, as has been explicitly formulated 
by the International Law Commission: “If it is the prerogative of sover-
eignty to be able to assert its rights, the counterpart of that prerogative is 
the duty to discharge its obligations.”15 This reverses the widespread con-
ception of sovereignty as legitimizing a sphere of freedom to sovereignty 
as a specific way of organizing international responsibility. More specifi-
cally, as a normative institution it assigns a social status (legal personal-
ity as sovereigns), and contains norms of conduct (sovereign rights and 
duties) with the function (“point”) to hold agents accountable. Sovereignty 
then entails a task to fulfill, rather than a freedom to indulge.
In international relations practice, one can detect a political transla-
tion of this logic in the Responsibility to Protect report by the International 
Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). As a rejoin-
der to the sovereignty/intervention dilemma formulated in the Secretary 
General’s Millennium Report, the report reformulates sovereignty. By 
the example of the UN Charter, it pinpoints both the agency and the 
responsibility that follow from a sovereign status: “There is no transfer 
or dilution of state sovereignty. But there is a necessary recharacteriza-
tion involved: from sovereignty as control [sic] to sovereignty as respon-
sibility in both internal functions and external duties” (ICISS 2001). 
Moreover, the report also testifies a shift from sovereign duties in relation 
to the rights of fellow- sovereigns (such as their territorial integrity and 
the rights of their nationals, as formulated in the Island of Palmas case), 
toward duties as concomitant to sovereignty rights in relation to one’s 
own population, which in addition are increasingly conceived as interna-
tional responsibilities.16
The intrinsic relation between sovereignty and responsibility has 
important implications for the topic of this chapter. It implies that inter-
national law can be used to identify irresponsible States and accordingly to 
legitimize measures aimed at disciplining such States. If the obligations of 
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States are primarily limited to the protection of narrowly defined interests 
of fellow sovereigns, such disciplining acts have a fairly limited character 
as well. However, if international law is deployed for the protection of uni-
versal values and the interests of the international community as a whole, 
irresponsible behavior calls for a much stronger response. As will be set 
out in the next sections, this logic has been mobilized in the recent “war on 
terror” to legitimize interventionist strategies against the most irresponsi-
ble sovereigns: the rogue States and the failed States.
Stretching Sovereign Space: 
The Fluid Limits on the Use of Force
In Jus Publicum Europaeum, the right to use force was considered to be 
an attribute of State sovereignty; a right that is inherent to the concept of 
sovereignty (see Schmitt 1974; Grewe 2000). This not only meant that the 
determination of the ways to fight a public enemy was left to the State, 
but also that acquisition of territory by means of conquest constituted a 
valid title to territory in international law (Brownlie 1991, 14–51; see also 
Malanczuk 1993).
With the decline of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, the relation between 
sovereignty and the use of force changed drastically. As was set out in the 
introduction, in the course of the twentieth century, sovereignty became 
linked up with a more radical prohibition of intervention, including the 
prohibition on the use of force as a peremptory norm of international 
law. This further materialized in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which 
also formulated the only exceptions to this rule: “threats to international 
peace and security” (art. 39 and 42) and “self defense” against armed 
attacks (art. 51) and/or imminent threats.17 Documents like the Charter 
or the 1970 Resolution 2625 (reflecting customary law) not only for-
mulate the prohibition on the use of force, but also stress that the basis 
of this norm is the principle of sovereign equality. GA Resolution 2625 
explicitly states that the inviolability of the territorial integrity and the 
political independence (and thus the right to be free from outside armed 
intervention) is included in the notion of State sovereignty.18 In light of 
the foregoing, it is noteworthy that rather than formulated as a nega-
tive right, the Resolution also refers to inter alia “the obligation not to 
intervene” and the “duty of States to refrain from . . . any form of coer-
cion aimed against the political independence or the territorial integrity 
of any State.” Thus parallel to the 1949 Draft Declaration on Rights and 
Duties, the resolution emphasizes negative rights in terms of positive 
duties. Moreover, an explicit link is made between equality as a matter 
Nissen_Ch08.indd   137 8/22/2008   1:01:39 PM
138   TANJA E. AALBERTS AND WOUTER G. WERNER
of status as well as a right and duty: “All States enjoy sovereign equality. 
They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the interna-
tional community.”
As exception to the egalitarian foundation of the UN, the Security 
Council was established to replace traditional war by collective 
enforcement mechanisms in the name of community values such as 
international peace and security, and the fight against aggression. Strictly 
speaking, such a collectivization implies the elimination of the traditional 
concept of war as an armed struggle between equal States (and thus equal 
enemies). However, the prohibition on the use of force did not imply a 
decline in the actual use of force in (international) society. Although 
“war” was officially banned from post-1945 international legal discourse, 
in practice the use of force remained. As was predicted by critics like 
Carl Schmitt, the prohibition on the use of force would not do away with 
enmity and war, but rather lead to new discursive possibilities to legit-
imize the use of force. The notion of war as a matter between formally 
equal enemies was thus replaced by the idea that force was used against 
a law-breaker or a threat against international peace and security. As a 
consequence, it would become difficult to distinguish between a justus 
hostis and criminals or elements that need to be dealt with in the name of 
humanity (Schmitt 1974, 112–183).
In this context, it is important to recall that the cold war environment 
of the East-West rivalries generally precluded the operation of the collec-
tive security arrangements in post-1945 practice. This meant that States, 
when resorting to the use of force, had to rely on the only legal justifica-
tion left: individual self-defense. While the right of self-defense was orig-
inally incorporated in the Charter as a limited and temporary measure 
(“. . . until the Security Council has taken measures . . .”), in international 
practice it turned out to be the major justification invoked by States 
using force against other States. This was also the practice in cases where 
humanitarian emergencies took place, such as with the intervention in 
Pakistan in 1971 and the interventions in Cambodia and Uganda in 1978 
(Wheeler 2000). In this context, Neff has spoken of the “self- defense rev-
olution”: “. . . the full emergence of self-defence to the front and centre of 
the international stage, as a kind of all-purpose justification for unilat-
eral resorts to armed force” (Neff 2005, 315). Post-1945 self-defense has 
been stretched as to include the rescue of nationals abroad, the anticipa-
tory use of force, and actions against serious foreign subversion. In effect, 
it meant that self-defense moved to the center of a neo just war doc-
trine, whose core consists of the protection of State sovereignty against 
armed intervention, with the use of force as an exceptional mechanism 
to ensure the sovereignty of States. This trend of the deployment of the 
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right to self-defense as an all-purpose justification for the use of force is 
buttressed by the framing of the recent “war on terror.”
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council affirmed the right 
of self-defense.19 Although the Security Council only referred to the right 
to self-defense in general terms (“Recognizing the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter . . .”), in 
light of the above the symbolic meaning of this recognition immediately 
after the 9/11 attacks was clear and compelling. Equally clear was the sup-
port from the NATO member states, who for the first time in the history 
of the alliance invoked article 5 of the NATO Charter (defining an attack 
to one member as an attack to the whole alliance). On September 12, 
NATO decided that, if it is determined that the attack against the United 
States was directed from abroad, it shall be regarded as an action covered 
by the right to collective self-defense.20 After the member states were con-
vinced, the 9/11 attacks were conducted by Al-Qaeda, they accepted the 
applicability of article 5 of the NATO Charter.21
The effects of accepting such a collective and/or individual right to 
self-defense in response to terrorist attacks are far-reaching. Self-defense 
now not only covers immediate responses to attacks by identifiable actors, 
but also open-ended operations against an amorphous enemy. The invo-
cation of “self-defense” in response to attacks by terrorist networks raises 
questions as to the boundaries of the right to self-defense in at least three 
respects: temporal, spatial, and qua object. The temporal limits of self-
 defense are put into question, because it can become unclear when the 
attack that triggered the right of self-defense took place. The right of self-
defense against terrorist attacks can follow from a “consistent pattern of 
violent terrorist action” against a State (see also Cassesse 1989). It is dif-
ficult to tell when such a consistent pattern exists and it is possible that 
a State can conclude that, in hindsight, it had already been at war with a 
terrorist organization for a considerable time.22 Moreover, it is indetermi-
nate when the war on terrorism will stop. The war on terrorism is, after 
all, not only a self-defense operation designed to do away with a specific 
attack, but an open-ended operation that will only end when “every terror-
ist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”23 Such a 
sustained operation knows no spatial limits either. Terrorists are, after all, 
spread out throughout the world and could, as both the 9/11 attacks and 
the 7/7 London bombings have shown, even hide in the homeland. Thus, 
after the 9/11 attacks, the United States (and their allies) not only empha-
sized the need to deal with States harboring terrorists, but also engaged in 
extraterritorial operations such as targeted killing of suspected Al-Qaeda 
members abroad. Finally, as the war against Afghanistan has shown, 
the object of self-defense is broadened considerably. Here, a self-defense 
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operation was used to realize a regime change (the Security Council 
expressed its “strong support for the efforts of the Afghan people to estab-
lish a new and transitional administration leading to the formation of a 
government”),24 and thus went beyond an operation aimed at repelling 
an armed attack. The operation rather aimed at incapacitating the enemy 
in very broad terms, that is, to take away “safe havens” for terrorists. This 
was emphasized in Resolution 1368 through the notion of State respon-
sibility: “. . .  stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or har-
bouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these [terrorist] acts 
will be held accountable.”25 Whereas the claim regarding the extension of 
self-defense and State responsibility for harboring terrorism was already 
formulated in the so-called Shultz Doctrine in the 1980s,26 in light of the 
“war on terrorism” self-defense arguments are more explicitly linked to 
the struggle for a world without rogue regimes and failed States, that is, to 
restore normalcy; and more widely accepted as such by the international 
community at large.27
Sovereign Equality as a Ground for Making Distinctions
From the preceding section, it can be inferred that the “war on terror” is 
on the basis of a specific reading of sovereignty: the notion of sovereign 
equality, which underpins both the right to self-defense and to noninter-
vention, is used to make a distinction between different types of States. 
Decent or responsible States are set apart from irresponsible States; from 
unwilling, rogue States and unable, failed States. The net result is that the 
right to self-defense, while formally still equally applicable to all States, is 
applied in a discriminatory fashion. What was at stake in the war against 
Afghanistan, for example, was not just the protection of one State (the 
United States) against a formally equal State (Afghanistan). The wide-
spread support for the US-led coalition cannot be isolated from the way in 
which Afghanistan had been branded as an irresponsible, undisciplined 
State since the 1990s. In a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, 
Afghanistan was condemned for the manifold ways in which it violated 
fundamental norms of international law and put under scrutiny of UN 
sanctions committees.28 Especially if such an “irresponsible State” con-
fronts a hegemonic State with special legal powers (as a permanent mem-
bership of the Security Council), the boundaries of the prohibition of 
intervention become more fluid. As Simpson has argued,
[C]ertain States, pre-designated as outlaws [i.e. Afghanistan under the 
Taliban regime, Iraq and Libya], lack the immunities available to other 
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States in warding off the possibility of armed intervention. So regardless of 
any evidence showing links between, say, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia and the 
attacks on Western interests, it is improbable that these [reputed lawful] 
States find themselves on the peripheries and subject to attack in the near 
future ( . . . ). The distinction is not simply one of politics. The breaches of 
international law committed by [Afghanistan] contribute to outlaw status 
and the outlaw status determines the legality of the measures taken against 
these states . . . . (Simpson 2004, 340)
Whereas Simpson emphasizes that this sets the irresponsible states 
outside the legal order (as literally outlaws), we want to emphasize that the 
disciplinary element is provided by the sovereignty status within the legal 
order itself. The State in question is not disciplined because it is outside 
the law, but exactly because it is constituted and regulated by law; because 
it wears the legal persona of sovereignty. The link between sovereignty 
and responsibility is thus used to justify intervention in States that lack 
the discipline to grasp the relation between freedom and self-constraint. 
In this sense, the term “outlaw” is a bit of a misnomer, insofar as it lays 
emphasis on exclusion, ignoring the more nuanced inclusion/exclusion 
logic at play. Discipline is not exercised through exclusive membership 
rules and gatekeeping, but through the subsequent imposition of a norm 
of appropriate and responsible being for all equal members included in 
the international society (Aalberts 2006).29 Thus, irresponsible states, be 
they rogue or failed states, are outlaws within the law of nations.30
Indeed, the relation between sovereignty and responsibility, coupled 
to conceptions of outlawry also figures prominently in the discourse of 
failed States within the “war on terrorism.” To be sure, state failure (in 
rudimentary terms being States lacking empirical capacities of effective 
control and monopoly of force) is not a new phenomenon. As a politi-
cal issue it has been on the agenda since the end of the cold war, but as 
an empirical phenomenon it arguably dates at least back to the Concert 
of Europe (Grovogui 2002).31 Moreover, nineteenth-century interna-
tional lawyers already distinguished between “civilized,” “barbarian,” 
and “savage” communities, thus foreshadowing the discourse on failed 
States (Koskenniemi 2002). There are, however, at least two essential dif-
ferences between nineteenth-century discourses on “civilization” and 
post-cold war discourse on “failed States.” First, the notion of “tribes” or 
“uncivilized societies” that were excluded from international society is 
now replaced by the notion of equal, sovereign States that fail to perform 
their duties. Thus the logic of difference and exclusion that characterized 
the nineteenth-century international society is now integrated into the 
sovereignty discourse. Disciplining measures, therefore, must be justified 
within the sovereignty discourse, too.
Nissen_Ch08.indd   141 8/22/2008   1:01:39 PM
142   TANJA E. AALBERTS AND WOUTER G. WERNER
In this context, it is important to note that the breakdown of gov-
ernmental authority within a State does not automatically imply that 
such a State ceases to exist as an international legal person. Although 
effective government is one of the criteria relevant for the emergence of 
statehood,32 its endurance is on the basis of the presentation (not repre-
sentation) of an entity as State—thus taking transient eruptions in case 
of civil war, foreign occupation, collapse of central government, or even 
government in exile into account in accordance with the principle of 
continuity: “[T]emporary absence [of government] (which may last for 
years) [ . . . ] does not affect the identity [i.e., international personality] of 
the State concerned” (Fastenrath 1995, 670, emphasis added). In these 
situations the concept of State sovereignty is used to uphold the status 
quo and to prevent the termination of one of the members of interna-
tional society. Metaphorically speaking, the failed State is like a mask, 
a sovereign persona, without an actor that effectively performs the cor-
responding role. However, given the relation between State sovereignty 
and responsibility, especially if it comes to fundamental obligations of 
States, State failure constitutes a major problem for international law 
(Thürer 1996; Wallace-Bruce 2000; Kreijen 2004; Koskenmäki 2004). 
It is, therefore, not surprising to find that failed states are presented 
as legal anomalies or even “impossibilities” (Herdegen 1996, 77). It is 
through the newly imputed link with terrorism that allegedly renders 
them a dangerous political anomaly, too. This constitutes the second 
difference with nineteenth-century discourse. In light of their poten-
tiality as breeding ground for terrorism,33 failed States have gained 
renewed prominence as a security issue in the “war on terrorism.”
In the recent war on terror, at least two routes have been followed to 
deal with the anomaly of state failure. The first follows the logic of the 
law of State responsibility by linking the question of responsibility to 
the question who exercises control over (unlawful) conduct. Article 9 of 
the Articles on the Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts, for example, provides that in cases where governmental authority 
is absent or default, the conduct of a person or group shall be considered 
an act of a State if the person or group is in fact exercising elements of the 
governmental authority.34 This provision echoes the rationale of article 8, 
which holds that the conduct of a person or group shall be regarded an 
act of a State if that person or group is in fact acting under instructions 
of or under the direction or control of the State concerned. In the legal 
justifications offered for the attack on Afghanistan, this logic played an 
important role. It was argued that the relations between the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda were so close that it was difficult to tell who was acting under 
whose instruction, control, or direction. On the basis of a relatively liberal 
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reading of the test of “control,”35 it was argued that the 9/11 attacks could 
be attributed to the (failed) State of Afghanistan, thus legitimizing acts 
of self-defense against this State.36 Such acts, as we set out in the previ-
ous section, were not limited to repelling an immediate attack, but cov-
ered attempts at a whole-scale reconstruction of the State and society in 
question.
The second route goes beyond the confines of positive international 
law. It is on the basis of the argument that, since failed states are incapable 
of meeting their duties as sovereigns, it is the responsibility of the inter-
national community to step in and take action. In this context, it is not 
always clear who may take such action on behalf of the international com-
munity. While the UN Security Council has a clear legal mandate, some 
States who claim to represent the international community can offer only 
more shaky legal and moral foundations for their actions. In this con-
text, an interesting merger of self-defense and humanitarian intervention 
is taking place. Whereas the notion of “secondary responsibility” in the 
Responsibility to Protect report related to human rights, and arguably 
testifies a move beyond Hobbesian international politics in the post-cold 
war period, with the “war on terror” it is conceived in terms of high poli-
tics of security again—this time mixed with a muscular humanitarianism 
(Orford 1999; see also Orford 2003). Failed States, in other words, are por-
trayed as dangerous to citizens, fellow sovereigns, and the international 
community and/or humanity at large alike. Moreover, assistance or har-
boring terrorism is conceived not only as an “internationally wrongful 
act” in itself, but in particular in relation to the right to territorial integ-
rity of fellow-sovereigns.
This move also clarifies how in political discourse failing states and 
“rogues” are increasingly coupled, whereas allegedly they occupy extreme 
positions on a scale of statehood—lacking effective control in the one 
case, displaying an abundance of control in the other: “From one perspec-
tive, totalitarian regimes and failed or failing states are at opposite ends 
of the spectrum. But there are similarities: one is unable to avoid sub-
verting international law; the other is only too willing to flout it”37—that 
is, neither is living up to its international responsibilities of the interna-
tional community. Both then are designated as outlaws (or even criminal 
elements within the international order), forfeiting by extension in both 
cases their sovereign rights within the community:38 “Whether the dan-
gers to international order come from totalitarianism or chaos, all coun-
tries have the right to respond.”39 Accordingly, one can detect three shifts 
relating to state failure as a political issue: from a humanitarian to a secu-
rity issue, from a domestic to an international responsibility, and from a 
 multilateral to a unilateral issue (a matter of individual self-defense).
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As an illustration to this shift of the sovereignty game within political 
discourse, and in particular our argument regarding the link between 
sovereignty and responsibility, it is worthwhile to quote a US govern-
mental official, Richard Haass (Director Policy Planning of the State 
Department) at length:
What you’re seeing from this Administration is the emergence of a new 
principle or body of ideas—I’m not sure it constitutes a doctrine—about 
what you might call the limits of sovereignty. Sovereignty entails obliga-
tions. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not to support 
terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then 
it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the 
right to be left alone inside your own territory. Other governments, includ-
ing the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, 
this can even lead to a right of preventive, or peremptory, self-defense. You 
essentially can act in anticipation if you have grounds to think it’s a ques-
tion of when, and not if, you’re going to be attacked.40
A similar emphasis on rights and responsibilities as structuring the 
international order is central to Blair’s “doctrine of the international 
community,” which was first formulated in the 1990s but also became 
a prominent wager in the “war on terrorism.” Explaining its principles, 
then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is even more explicit: “The rights of 
members of the global community depend exclusively on their readi-
ness to meet their global responsibilities”—and this means, according to 
the Blair administration, that the principle of noninterference requires 
qualification in certain respects.41 Whilst taking a more multilateral 
route than the Bush administration, it still remains unclear who has the 
authority to speak and act on behalf of the international community. In 
an imprecise way it appears to be linked to responsible behavior again. 
Thus the relationship of sovereignty and responsibility is turned around 
in political discourse—it is not just that sovereignty via legal personal-
ity relates to State responsibility and legal accountability, but vice versa 
that “responsible” behavior identifies the “true sovereigns,” whereas 
irresponsible behavior requires a qualification of that sovereign status. 
Responsibility subsequently easily slips from a legal-procedural matter 
into a political-substantive issue. Whereas Blair makes a reservation 
regarding regime change in 1999, three years later Jack Straw is more 
obtrusive in his definition of modern global community, linking terror-
ism with state failure with the lack of democracy, and subsequently with 
a call for early intervention.42 Taking it a step further, some have indeed 
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defended regime change in the context of (the broadening of) the right to 
self-defense: “A war of self-defense may be fought in an offensive mode 
to the last bunker of the enemy dictator, with a view to the total collapse 
of the belligerent State (including, as a by-product, a regime change)” 
(Dinstein 2003, 20).43
In this way, the concept of sovereignty thus underpins an exceptional 
right of self-defense that goes well beyond a limited, temporary right to 
ward off an armed attack. Through the linkage between sovereignty and 
responsibility, it becomes possible to use an egalitarian principle par excel-
lence as a basis for making distinctions between States. Within the sover-
eignty game, the right to sovereign equality then translates into a duty to 
be “equally sovereign” in terms of performing the same rights and duties 
in a similarly responsible manner (i.e., to be sovereign of a certain kind 
and/or certain manner). It is the (self-assigned) task of responsible sov-
ereigns to take action against irresponsible States and restore normalcy. 
Such action might require the stretching of legal boundaries, or paradoxi-
cally, even require the violation of international norms to protect them.
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9Securing Sovereignty by 
Governing Security 
through Markets
Anna Leander
On September 16, 2007 the employees of the US security firm Blackwater became involved in a shooting incidence in the Nisour 
Square in Baghdad. They were escorting a US State Department dele-
gation, which according to the firm, came under attack. According to 
bystanders, the Blackwater employees opened fire unprovoked, shoot-
ing in all directions and seemingly at anyone moving, including those 
trying to f lee or help those wounded. Seventeen Iraqi civilians died 
in the incidence and at least twice as many were wounded. President 
Al-Maliki immediately came out to “revoke Blackwater’s license” for 
operating in Iraq and Iraqi authorities engaged the process of ending 
contractor impunity in their country. However, it soon became clear 
that there was no license to revoke and that the Iraqi government may 
not have the authority to deny Blackwater the right to operate in Iraq, 
let alone decide the fate of private contractors more generally. On their 
part, the US authorities promised to open their own investigation and 
expressed regret at the civilian casualties but did not end their contracts 
with Blackwater in Iraq or elsewhere.1 The incapacity of the Iraqi gov-
ernment to impose its authority and right to control the use of force 
on its territory, to hold Blackwater and/or its employees accountable 
for the incidence, made Jeremy Scahill2 conclude that “nothing gives 
a more clear indication to the Iraqis that they don’t have a sovereign 
 government” (2007b). Scahill is right in pointing to the limitations of 
the Iraqi government’s role as the ultimate authority deciding on laws 
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on Iraqi territory. However, it does not follow that the Mansour inci-
dence is illustrative of the extent to which the private markets for force 
have undermined sovereignty generally.
The Blackwater incidence usefully highlights the complex ways in 
which sovereignty has been both transformed and secured through the 
extensive privatization of the use of force. This chapter discusses this 
dual process of transformation and securing. It does so departing from 
the notion of a sovereignty game introduced by the editors that it gives 
a Foucauldian twist. Sovereignty in this chapter is thought of as spe-
cific form of governance, organizing politics around a central authority 
and working through a hierarchical and unitary system of law (Foucault 
2004, 92–113; Dean 1999, 103–110). In this context, the sovereignty game 
is a rather specific game: it is a game organized around states’ claims to 
ultimate authority in politics. However, at the same time both sover-
eignty and the sovereignty game are highly variable. Politics can be (and 
has been) ordered around states in very many different ways. The ques-
tion at the heart of this chapter is how sovereignty and the sovereignty 
game are rearticulated as other forms of governance develop. The answer 
departs from Foucault’s hunch that ordering principles for politics do not 
replace each other but coexist historically.3 The aim is to give substance 
to this hunch by looking at how the coexistence of neoliberal4 and sover-
eign forms of governance functions in the field of security. The chapter 
does this by looking at how visible and widely agreed upon changes have 
combined with dissimulated and denied ones to produce both profound 
alterations and continuity in the sovereignty game. It begins with a dis-
cussion of the rules of the sovereignty game in security and then proceeds 
to look at its players.5
The Rules of the Game
To talk about the “rules of the game” when it comes to sovereignty in the 
field of security—or anywhere for that matter—is a bit misleading. It sug-
gests an inexistent precision. As Stephen Krasner has rightly insisted and 
repeated in all his publications: “the rules of sovereignty were not explic-
itly formulated in one organic package by any political leader or theorist” 
(2001a, 249). Rather the “rules of sovereignty” are a perennial object of 
struggle and disagreements. However, anything does not go in the sover-
eignty game. At any given time those engaged in the game have an under-
standing of what is generally admissible or not in the game. This is why it 
makes sense to talk about sovereignty as an exercise in “organized hypoc-
risy” (Krasner 1999). Hypocrisy is only possible because there are (vague, 
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malleable, evolving, and contested) rules to be hypocritical about. The 
current privatization of the use of force has profoundly reshaped these 
rules while ensuring that the sovereignty game in the field of security can 
be continued.
Visible Change: Governing Security through Markets
The presence of private actors is no novelty for the sovereignty game in 
the security field. On the contrary, throughout the modern era states have 
relied on private actors when skills or men have been short in supply, 
or when they have had to “do dirty work” from which the state wanted 
to distance itself. The novelty is that markets in military services, where 
private actors operate independently of states, have again become accept-
able. Since the end of the cold war, states have fostered markets and tried 
to govern security through them. They have introduced “neoliberal” 
government techniques in the security sector. Decentralization, state-
withdrawal, quasi-markets, and the responsibilization of individuals 
increasingly stand in the center of security governance. This creation of 
markets is a substantial change in the rules of the sovereignty game. From 
the mid-nineteenth century onward, the game was premised on the state 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Thomson 1994; Leander 2006, 
chap. 4) and on the outlawing mercenaries6 (Percy 2007). It is now pre-
mised on the existence of markets. Lest we want to move into a brave 
new world lingo where monopoly and market are equivalents we need to 
acknowledge that this is a change. This section underscores its broad and 
general nature.
That markets have become central in the US context is news to no one 
as there has been a highly public and politicized discussion around the 
trend. Extensive outsourcing has resulted in a situation where contractors 
have become indispensable to the armed forces. They provide essential 
logistical backup. Contractors take over “noncore tasks”—such as cook-
ing, construction of barracks, or coordination of transports—that are 
nonetheless vital (Rasor and Bauman 2007). But also undisputedly cen-
tral tasks are outsourced. This is true of intelligence (Tigner 2007; Fainaru 
and Klein 2007) and of an array of tasks linked to the technological “revo-
lution in military affairs”. Contractors operate unmanned  (aerial, surface, 
or sub/surface marine) vehicles that are used in combat and intelligence 
gathering (Zamparelli 1999; Guillory 2001; Heaton 2005). But perhaps 
most important for the United States, outsourcing makes the permanent 
“overstretching of the armed forces” politically viable. The market is the 
alternative to a draft. The Pentagon official estimate is that the Armed 
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Forces employ some 20,000–30,000 contractors in Iraq for 160,000 
troops (Fainaru 2007c). However, this underestimates the extent to which 
outsourcing eases the burden on the armed forces. A Department of 
Defense survey estimated that some 180,000 contractors work in Iraq 
(Singer 2007, 2).7 Many of them work for US public agencies, filling func-
tions the public armed forces would formerly have filled themselves. The 
armed forces are also increasingly dependent on the international market 
for filling their own ranks. They hire internationally sometimes offering 
citizenship and/or Green Cards in exchange (Madigan 2007).
The extent to which neoliberal forms of governance are significant 
outside the United States is likely to be less well known. In the European 
Union (EU), the introduction of neoliberal governance forms in the 
security sector may have been slower and more discrete, but should not 
be underestimated. Markets govern the defense industry: “the leading 
European defence companies no longer operate as passive executors of 
government instructions.[ . . . ] As corporations seeking to survive in 
dynamic markets, they cannot wait until groups of politicians and mili-
tary committees have deliberated over a ‘Grand Plan’. In some respects, 
the organizational structures of European defence, and the associated 
attitudes, are out of line with the new corporate realities of the defence 
business” (Lovering 1998, 227). Similarly, just as in the United States, the 
outsourcing of intelligence, the revolution in military affairs, and the reli-
ance on “dual use” and “off the shelf” technologies is placing contrac-
tors in the battlefield (Assemblée Nationale 2003). The United Kingdom 
created a “sponsored reserves” status for these contractors: “sponsored” 
by the firms who pay their salary but “reserves” within the ranks of the 
armed forces (Krahmann 2005). Last but not least, also the EU has a 
booming, private security sector whose marketization has been encour-
aged by the commission.8 Part of this sector holds a strong position on the 
international market. The most prominent firms are UK based, including 
firms such as Aegis or Erinys that hold major contracts in Iraq.9 But the 
Scandinavian countries, France and Germany also have significant pri-
vate security sectors (Kaldor 1998).
Finally, in the developing world outsourcing and privatization have 
become central government strategies. To some extent, this is so because 
it makes defense spending invisible and/or more legitimate to outside 
creditors (Rufin 1993). But relying on markets is also necessary to fill 
gaps in the training and equipment of public armed forces (Howe 2001). 
Moreover, the market provides what allied public armed forces and states 
are (no longer) willing to provide. Cubic, for example, trains the Georgean 
armed forces, DynCorp the Columbian, and MPRI has had a central role 
in providing military assistance and training in various frameworks in 
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Africa (Bigwood 2001; Singer 2003; Paton Walsh 2004; MPRI). Third, 
states can reduce their defense costs by making individuals, firms, and 
organizations (including NGOs) who can afford to pay for their own 
security do so. This leads to arrangements where those who need protec-
tion hire private security providers or alternatively pay the public armed 
forces, or do both at the same time. Characteristically, in Sierra Leone 
Koidu Holdings (a mining company) pays for a contingent of public offi-
cers from the operational support division (OSD), works with the inter-
national PSC SecuricorGray and has an in-house local security division 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2006b, 9–10). Fourth, many states turn their 
armed forces into commercial ventures renting them out for multilateral 
operations or using them for publicly sanctioned looting (Wulf 2005). 
Finally, outsourcing the control over the use of force to local “private” 
power holders (or warlords) may be a way of upholding sovereignty at the 
central level. It is a strategy of state survival. Powerholders inside the state 
“mimick” warlord strategies to boost their sovereign status (Reno 1998; 
see also Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1997; Chevrier 2004).
As this shows, governing security through markets has become 
widespread throughout the world. The significance of this develop-
ment for sovereignty is often minimized. In part because it is argued 
that even if there is a market, states retain the “monopoly on the legit-
imate use of force” and in part because it is suggested that the market 
is not really a market but a political creation and the firms not really 
private but the extension of the state. Although both claims have some 
merit, they severely understate the significance of the changes that 
have taken place.
Dissimulated Change: De-facto Privatizing 
the Legitimate Use of Force
The claim that security is increasingly governed through markets is 
unlikely to provoke much dissent. The same cannot be said of the claim 
that this alters the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Rather, states 
governing security through markets may face “trade-offs” (Avant 2005) 
and “new complexities” (Singer 2003). They may be losing control. They 
do not relinquish the right to define the legitimate use of force. This is 
true on the formal level no doubt. Legal systems (national and interna-
tional) continue to be premised on that assumption. But as this section 
outlines, this version underestimates the real degree of autonomy of the 
private contractors and hence masks the real degree of change in the rules 
of the sovereignty game.
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When a market for military services is created, private actors have to 
be handled a direct right to decide on the use of force for rather obvi-
ous reasons. Private actors—the firms who take on contracts and their 
employees—have to decide when and how to use force in the context 
they are employed. The private security guard has to decide when to use 
force, as illustrated in Nisour. The intelligence contractor has a legitimate 
right to interpret information and sometimes to decide whether it should 
be acted upon. For example, in Colombia the US firm AirScan directed 
the Colombian air force to drop a cluster bomb on a village of civilians 
(Miller 2003). The remote controller of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAV) is using force. Just as when public armed forces use force, rules 
(sometimes) guide the decisions of these private actors. Sometimes (but 
only sometimes) there will be some form of “rules of engagement” outlin-
ing under what kind of conditions what kinds of force may be used by the 
private actors. Often they are as vague as those specified by the Coalition 
Provisional authority for contractors in Iraq starting by declaring (in cap-
ital letters) that “nothing in these rules limits your inherent right to take 
action necessary to defend yourself” (Fainaru 2007d). But even when they 
exist and are more firm, rules must be interpreted. The creation of mar-
kets turns private actors into legitimate interpreters of rules on par with 
public security professionals.
More controversially, firms are not only interpreters of public rules but 
also coauthors—and sometimes sole authors—of the rules regulating the 
use of force. This is the case when the rules for how, when, and against 
whom force can be used are specified in a contract, as they often are. The 
centrality of contracts is linked to the contextual and varied nature of 
contractor activity that defies one size fits all formulations. For exam-
ple, the rules specifying how a firm guarding oil installations in Ecuador 
(Engström 2007) may use force are bound to vary substantially from the 
rules specified in the contract covering the use of UAVs in Afghanistan 
(Heaton 2005, 164). But the context does not dictate the rules regulat-
ing the use of force. Firms formulate and negotiate their contracts and 
the “rules of engagement” specified in these. Private security firms assess 
security needs and suggest ways they might be filled. This is what they do 
when they are hired as consultants and when they advertise themselves. 
It is therefore not surprising that even when firms work in the same con-
text, for similar institutions, their rules of engagement vary considerably. 
In Iraq, the rules of firms working in U.S state agencies may vary from 
“contract to contract, from company to company and even from team to 
team” (Fainaru 2007b). Firms are in other words coauthors of the rules 
rather than simply accepting terms imposed by their clients (who may 
just as well be private as public by the way). Even more strongly, the task 
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of formulating the rules is sometimes itself outsourced. The practice 
of security firms formulating (and evaluating) their own contracts has 
attracted substantial critical attention (Markusen 2003; Singer 2003). And 
even more generally, the formulation of overarching rules influencing the 
use of force in a given area is sometimes also outsourced to private firms. 
MPRI, for example, has considerable responsibilities for writing military 
doctrine and defining military training both in the United States and 
abroad (Leander 2005b; MPRI). Private firms in other words participate 
in the spelling out of the general rules for the legitimate use of force.
Finally, firms have a say over the legitimate use of force because they 
can decide whom they will work for. It is inherent in markets that buy-
ers and sellers have a high degree of freedom when it comes to buying 
and selling. If they do not, we are in a command economy. This is also 
true in the market for force. There are rules (formal such as export con-
trols and informal such as the normative pressure not to work for ene-
mies of ones home government) that restrict this freedom. There may also 
be cartel like arrangements shaping the sale of security services in given 
areas. But ultimately the decision of whether to sell is left up to the firm. 
Concretely translated, private firms operating in a market for force can 
chose whether to work for a client. They can in other words weigh—often 
decisively—on the decision of what kind of force will be used by whom. 
That is, private actors legitimately control what kind of force is used in 
what types of situations by whom.
The privatization of the legitimate use of force is most clearly expressed 
in the confusion and tension surfacing whenever the formal hierarchi-
cal sovereign law system crosses the multiple, decentered, and largely 
informal one of the private sector. Essentially the tension and confusion 
concern who has the last word in deciding what specific norm applies 
in the given context. This confusion is sometimes resolved at gunpoint. 
Civil wars are examples of this: the fight is (very often) about whether the 
established public authority should give up its ultimate say to a private 
one (Holsti 1996). But also in mundane everyday occurrences involving 
private and public security professionals in conflict situations the conflict 
is sometimes dealt with at gunpoint. For example, following an accident 
between a SUV full of contractors and the US armed forces in Iraq, the 
contractors imposed their view of the situation on the soldiers by disarm-
ing them and laying them on the ground while they disentangled their 
SUV (Nordland, Hosenball, and Kaplow 2007). Informal pragmatic ad 
hoc arrangements are another way of dealing with the tension. In Nigeria, 
for example, Private Security Companies manage security in the oil area 
by coordinating a combination of private and public security profession-
als. Ultimately the hierarchy between public and private norm setters 
Nissen_Ch09.indd   157 8/22/2008   12:25:19 PM
158   ANNA LEANDER
hinges on “informal arrangements and their [the PSC] capacity to develop 
well-integrated procedures, joint training, and close operations coordina-
tion” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2006a, 11). However, and finally, a very 
central way of dealing with the tensions and confusions that arise when 
the sovereign system crosses the neoliberal one may be denial and/or sup-
pression. Indeed, both firms and state officials go to considerable lengths 
to deny that there is a tension. That firms work only for “legitimate cli-
ents” and only against states when these are ostensibly illegitimate (i.e., to 
stop “the next Rwanda”) are evergreens in the business rhetoric. Similarly, 
armed forces, defense, and police administrators have a repertoire that 
invariably integrates the claim that governing through markets—at least 
in the version practiced by them—is a new (and more effective) means of 
achieving public ends.
Sticking to the claim that the basic rule of the sovereignty game, the 
state monopoly on the legitimate use of force, is intact in these conditions 
becomes a formalistic statement. What we have in the field of security 
is not fundamentally different from the situations in other areas: pub-
lic and private authorities coexist in partially overlapping, competing, 
and contradictory ways. Interesting and complex tensions are the con-
sequence as the state system based on hierarchical relations among legal 
norms de facto coexists with a multifacetted, pluricentric complex system 
of private rules defying both unity and hierarchy (Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner 2004). This said, the illusion that the rules of the sovereignty 
game remain intact, that states retain a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force is of considerable practical significance: it masks part of the fun-
damental change in the rules of the sovereignty game brought about by 
privatization. By the same token it effectively blocs broader political dis-
cussions about this change and its desirability. It is a form of “symbolic 
power” (Bourdieu 1992). The change in rules of the game can pass unno-
ticed and be presented as a mere variation on existing themes.
Securing the Sovereignty Game in Security
Securing the continued centrality of sovereignty in the field of security 
is about more than dissimulating change and preempting public debate. 
The centrality of sovereign practices in security has also been positively 
bolstered and confirmed by the introduction of markets. The transfor-
mation of governance processes in security—the shift toward neoliberal 
governance techniques where outsourcing, privatization, responsibiliza-
tion, decentralization, and state withdrawal are central—makes security 
governance congruent with governance in other spheres. Since these 
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changes are framed as changes in (rather than contra) sovereignty, they 
have helped legitimate and perpetuate the sovereignty game.
Today it is easy to forget the extent to which the sovereignty game in 
security was under pressure in the wake of the cold war. The question at the 
time was if the world was headed toward Gorbachev’s “new world order” 
where security and particularly military relations would have a far less 
central place. In sociology, authors talked about the post-military society 
(Shaw 1991). In international relations, attention was increasingly directed 
toward globalization and the retreat of the state while security discussions 
focused on the necessary transformation (and slimming) of existing state-
based defense institutions (Clark 1999). The consequence was that these 
were under very real pressure to justify their own existence and had to 
scramble with decreasing budgets expressing their low ranking on the list 
of public priorities (Schméder 1998; Bigo 2000). At the end of the cold war, 
the future prospects of the sovereignty game in security seemed dim on 
most accounts. This is no longer the case, for reasons closely tied to the 
transformations at the heart of this chapter: the introduction of governance 
through markets justified and normalized the sovereignty game. The end 
of the cold war caused the crisis of the sovereignty game and triggered the 
processes that ensured its continuation.
It did so by making the governance of security congruent with gov-
ernance in other fields. The end of the cold war signaled an end to the 
politically motivated strict state control over anything military related. 
Managing the military, the police, and the security through markets 
became imaginable. The “neoliberal revolution” with the accompanying 
new public management could be extended also to the defense sector 
(Brauer 1998; Bislev, Hansen, and Salskov-Iversen 2002; Minow 2003). 
Market competition and “post-Fordism” could be introduced. The state 
could withdraw. Firms were asked to fend for themselves, dispensing with 
subsidies and controls (Kaldor 1998). Citizens were increasingly expected 
to take responsibility for their own security. At the same time, the decreas-
ing willingness to pay for armed forces put pressure on armed forces and 
states to draw on the rapidly developing markets. As a consequences of 
these shifts in governance forms, the security field no longer appeared as 
an anachronistic field, the only one still governed by old style, top-down 
state bureaucracies. As in other fields, the expertise and knowledge of a 
wide range of autonomous private actors could now be integrated in 
the policy process. A language of market and effectiveness could make 
sense of the activities in the field. The security field could be governed 
by the same neoliberal techniques as other fields of society.
The extent to which this helped justify activity in the field is perhaps 
best seen in the willingness of security professionals, administrators, 
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and policymakers linked to defense establishments to embrace reforms. 
Indeed, the new public management reforms had the effect of increas-
ing resources. This is not primarily linked to private firms and markets 
being cheaper and more effective and hence improving the use of exist-
ing resources. The call is still out on whether privatization in the secu-
rity field actually leads to any efficiency and financial gains. Impressive 
potential gains from privatization coexist with an actual history of 
 enormous waste and ineffectiveness.10 The point rather is that for officials 
governance through markets increases the resources available. Partly, for 
banal accountancy reasons: governing through various forms of markets, 
subcontracting, and outsourcing activities diverts spending from main 
budgets. It makes the actual resources used in a field less visible and 
more difficult to scrutinize. But partly, the reason to embrace New Public 
Management in security is the political and social context: privatization 
and market creation have become policymaking priorities. Money spent 
to buy services and equipment in markets is de facto judged by different 
(more generous) criteria than money on public services. The reliance on 
private markets and firms is justified in and of itself (Markusen 2003).
The creation of private markets of security profoundly alters the rules 
of the sovereignty game: it ends the monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force on which this game rested. However, at the same time it secures the 
game. Sovereign governance forms in security are shown to be perfectly 
compatible with neoliberal forms of governance and hence to be similar 
to sovereign forms of governance in other spheres. At the same time a 
formalistic attachment to the ultimate say of the state in matters of legit-
imate use of force masks the change that is entailed. The rules of the sov-
ereignty game on this account have undergone profound change that has 
served to consolidate the centrality of sovereign practices.
The Players in the Game
Governing security through markets is also having profound effects on 
the players in the sovereignty game in security. Private actors are increas-
ingly present sometimes ostensibly on par with states. As the modern 
sovereignty game is played by states, one might have expected such chal-
lenges to their centrality to make the game meaningless and/or unimpor-
tant. Yet, nothing of the sort has happened. The reason is partly that the 
enmeshment of the private and the public spheres has made the public 
private and the private public, hence obscuring the growing centrality 
and presence of private actors. In addition to this, when private actors 
have been ostensibly visible, they have mostly not been taken to challenge 
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the sovereignty. Rather, their presence has been interpreted as illustrat-
ing the need to differentiate among states who can manage markets and 
states still having to learn. This combination of enmeshment and unequal 
status of sovereign players has distracted attention away from conflicts 
and tensions that might have arisen between public and private actors. It 
has concentrated conflicts around divisions within states and divisions 
between northern and southern states. Both forms of conflicts are com-
patible with a sovereign ordering of politics and can be read as confirm-
ing its continued centrality.
Dissimulated Change: The Enmeshment of Public and Private
In the stylized world of political and legal thought, the private/public, 
inside/outside, and state/market realms are distinct spheres with clear 
dividing lines. However, the world of political practice looks rather differ-
ent. The spheres are largely continuous realms as indicated by the omni-
present reference to “blurred” lines. But the reference to blurred lines 
assumes distinct realms whose dividing lines can blur. In the security 
field, governance through markets is making this situation increasingly 
rare. At all levels and in all kinds of functions, there are many people 
who are in both spheres at the same time. It is therefore more accurate 
to think of the spheres as enmeshed. This enmeshment is important for 
the stabilization of the sovereignty game as it bolsters the impression that 
public actors continue to rule unchallenged by private market actors. By 
dissimulating the change in the nature of the public actors, it ensures the 
continuity of the sovereignty game.
The security professionals working in the rapidly expanding market 
are mostly members of the armed forces and the police. Everyone is an 
ex-something (Singer 2003). Those with special skills, from elite troops 
of one kind or another, have been particularly sought after as the 15,000 
or so false Navy SEALs testify (Lee Lanning 2002, 176). Blackwater pays 
six times more than the US armed forces for military qualifications at 
an equivalent level. But it is not the only American firm to pay more 
than the public armed forces or the police or is the situation unique to 
the United States. Also in Nigeria, Russia, or Columbia, working for 
a private security company is an attractive way of complementing a 
low salary or pension, in addition to being an opportunity to get inter-
esting work.11 These professionals very often keep their jobs also in 
the public sector hence embodying the continuity between public and 
private spheres. Since the market is increasingly “global,” the security 
companies for whom professionals work may well take them abroad. 
Nissen_Ch09.indd   161 8/22/2008   12:25:20 PM
162   ANNA LEANDER
Hence, an unknown number of security professionals form Africa, 
Latin America, and Asia have worked on contracts in Iraq embodying 
the continuity between the national and the outside.12 Finally, private 
actors on the battlefield embody the continuity between the state and 
the market spheres. In Iraq, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
and in Afghanistan the private security professionals engaged in a con-
f lict are often undistinguishable from soldiers, for many civilians, for 
those on the opposing side and for military field commanders who 
integrate them into their understanding of the battlefield situation 
(Verkuil 2007, 27).
Also on the management side, the number of people whose existence 
is simultaneously on both sides of the public–private line is rapidly grow-
ing. Many managers work in both the public and the private sectors at 
the same time. Firms are often set up and organized by people with a 
past in the public. Sometimes they formally continue to work in the pub-
lic taking a leave while running their private firm. When this is not the 
case, they maintain close contacts to the public administration and often 
see themselves as merely continuing their (public) job from “the other 
side of the table.” To add to this, private security sector firms routinely 
hire high-ranking policymakers on their boards. Cheney epitomizes this 
trend (Didion 2006). But Cheney is no unique example. Many firms have 
board members who are at the same time active policymakers. This is 
more than a revolving-door policy. It is a simultaneous presence. It may 
be worth underlining that it is not a US specific phenomenon but one 
visible across different contexts and continents (Joly 2003; War on Want 
2006; Akeh 2007). At least as significant as the presence of public offi-
cials in the private, but far less noticed, is the presence of the private in 
the public. The markets have entered public administrations and become 
integral parts of these. The Pentagon counts the contractors in to the total 
US war effort. But it is not the only place where markets are represented 
inside states. Public officials have come to rely on market actors, work 
for them and believe in the fact that “with contractors you get more bang 
for the buck” (Whelan 2003). In many contexts, they also depend on 
the market for financing their own activities. For example, in Ecuador, 
the private security sector indirectly finances the public armed forces: 
they have to rent the police force for any operation involving the use of 
 weapons (Engström 2007).
This presence of the public in the private and the private in the public 
is really a matter of enmeshment. It does not signal the swallowing up 
or cooptation of one sphere by the other. To reduce the private firms to 
extensions of public policy is to misunderstand them. They may work for 
public agencies and authorities but their existence is not reducible to this. 
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They also have an existence as market actors striving to make money and 
capture market shares. This is why Eric Prince (the CEO) of Blackwater 
insists in his congressional hearing that “we are a private company and 
the key word is private” (2007). It is also important to realize that it is 
because they are private and autonomous that the private firms are val-
ued by public administrations. Their independent expertise is often what 
is sought. It would be equally mistaken to reduce the public to the private, 
suggesting for example that policymakers working in the private sphere 
are only private actors, following firm interests and somehow shred their 
“public” identity and values even if they continue to hold public office. 
Whether they are security professionals or policymakers they retain also 
a public identity. This is the reason enmeshment is an adequate term for 
the situation: it captures the extent to which what is happening is neither 
a blurring of lines between distinct spheres nor simply a matter of coop-
tation or corruption of one by the other but a growing presence of the two 
spheres inside each other.
Although this enmeshment signals real change both in who matters 
for security and in the nature of the public, it stabilizes the sovereignty 
game in the field of security. It obscures the extent to which states now 
share their central role in security with private market actors, that is 
the degree to which the actors of the security game have changed. It 
also obscures the extent to which the nature of the public itself has been 
altered and become enmeshed with market the private. Enmeshment 
lends credibility to the stretching of the category of the public that comes 
to cover also the activities of private firms. It is in other words essential 
for reducing the visibility of private actors in the security field.
Visible Change: From Equality to Empire
There are many situations where the centrality of private actors in the 
security field is difficult to ignore. Yet, the sovereignty game seems 
largely unaffected by this visible emergence of private actors. It proceeds 
as if public actors were still the uncontested key actors. This is intriguing. 
The drift away from the equal treatment of the players in the sovereignty 
game is the magic at work. By defining states that cannot prevent private 
actors from being visible as “failed” and by denying them the status as 
full sovereign players, the emergence of private actors can be treated as a 
marginal phenomenon to be handled by the ever more intrusive “capacity 
building” policies of fully sovereign states.
Enmeshment only works if the role of private activity can credibly be 
understood as something falling within the category of things undertaken 
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by the public. This is not the case when private actors are too sharply 
separated from and/or defined by contrast to the state. Illustrations of 
this include security provision by “war lords” or “big men” (Derlugian 
2005). More mundanely it includes the many situations where vigilantes 
(Buur 2006), hunters’ associations (Bassett 2003), or (reinvented) tribal 
protection systems (Heald 2007; Nolte 2007) are central for the provision 
of security. These private actors are often authorized and encouraged by 
states and can hence be read as expressing new forms of sovereign author-
ity. But it is not an authority that can easily be presented as “public” in 
the sense of being part of the state or drawn into an enmeshed public— 
private continuity. Enmeshment also fails when states are “privatized,” 
when public officials act ostensibly mainly for private gain and are seen 
as doing precisely that. This is the case for example when heads of states 
use their own “private” armies as commercial ventures for the exploi-
tation of private resources (UN 2001) or when members of the public 
armed forces act purely for personal gain as is the reputation of Nigeria’s 
mobile (armed) police units going under the nickname “kill and go” 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2006a, 3). These situations have in common 
that there is no public category that could credibly mask the presence and 
role of private actors.
There is good reason to think that the emergence of situations where pri-
vate actors have a visible place in the security field has much to do with the 
neoliberalization of security governance.13 However, states, not markets, 
are usually held responsible for the visibility of private security actors. They 
are differentiated according to whether they can handle the private market 
development. On this account, it is because certain states do not have the 
“capacity” to deal with their internal security situation that private actors 
are emerging as central in the security field. Echoing the focus on “capacity 
building” in other areas and its dominance in the thinking of most relevant 
(state, multilateral, and nongovernmental) institutions, building capacity 
to control security becomes essential. At the same time, the security sec-
tor is overtaking other fields as the conventional assumption that devel-
opment would create security is being replaced by the inverse assumption: 
that security is a precondition for development (Buur, Jensen, and Stepputat 
2007; Duffield 2007). Development aid is consequently channeled from tra-
ditional development areas (infrastructure, health, and education) into the 
security where it is used to facilitate capacity building in the security sector. 
Hence the rapidly growing interest in security sector reform.
For the sovereignty game, the responsibilization of states translates 
into a differentiation among the sovereign players. States are no longer just 
states. They are states with qualifiers such as quasi, failed, weak, or rogue 
underlining their incapacity to control private actors and the market for 
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force on their territories. These qualifiers have a bearing on the practi-
cal meaning of the sovereign status. Some states find themselves in an 
uphill struggle trying to defend their status as sovereign players even if 
private actors are indeed visible (e.g., Columbia, Georgia, Sudan). Others, 
deemed too failed or rogue to deserve to be recognized as sovereign 
states, may find their position and role as sovereigns players eliminated 
altogether as for example when a consortium of international donors and 
institutions take on the management of sections of the Chadian economy 
through their control over the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, when Ethiopia 
restores order in Somalia or when international supervisors are allocated 
to the key ministries in Monrovia. This relativization of the sovereign 
status is intensely contested. However, the trend is there. The qualifiers 
have made their way into the language policymaking communities, the 
media and academia alike. The same is true of the idea that in cases of 
extensive human rights violations and/or threats to international stabil-
ity “major states or regional or international organizations could assume 
some form of de facto trusteeship” (Krasner 2004a, 119; also Ehrenreich 
Brooks 2005). The idea that differentiated sovereignty justifies out-
side tutorship is not “new” on a broader historical scale (as Krasner has 
repeatedly pointed out). It has analogies in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. However, viewed from the vantage point of twentieth century 
decolonialization struggles (and achievements) it is a remarkable reversal 
to imperial argumentation (Bishai 2004).
The visible, resisted, and contested move from an egalitarian to an 
imperial understanding of the status of sovereign players has helped 
securing the central role of states in the game. It has normalized the idea 
that if and when private actors do play an ostensibly central role in the 
security field, this does not challenge the centrality of states in general. It 
merely underlines the need to distinguish among the players in the sov-
ereignty game and to support (or impose) capacity building in weaker 
states. The shift from an egalitarian to an imperial discourse on the 
nature of sovereignty has made it plausible both to acknowledge the pres-
ence of private actors in the security field and to deny their significance 
for the sovereignty game.
Securing the Centrality of Sovereign States as Players
The enmeshment of public and private and the shift from an egalitar-
ian to an imperial discourse have helped secure the sovereignty game by 
obscuring the extent to which there is change in the nature of the key 
players (they are no longer clearly public) and in their roles (they are no 
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longer formally equal). However, the two processes have also played an 
important role in another way: they have prevented conflicts and ten-
sions that stem from the emergence of the market to become crystallized 
around the public-private divide. By doing so, they have bolstered the 
impression that the market alters nothing fundamental about the public-
private divide and that markets are therefore perfectly compatible with 
sovereignty. It has confirmed the compatibility of neoliberalism and sov-
ereignty in the security sphere.
A direct consequence of placing the private in the public and the pub-
lic in the private is that conflicts and disagreements stemming from 
the rise of markets are not structured as conflicts opposing private and 
public actors. Instead conflicts are structured around divisions within 
the public and within the private. In the United States, for example, the 
issue of security privatization has to some extent opposed Democrats and 
Republicans. Although the Clinton administration endorsed the general 
outsourcing and market creating policies, the key opponents (including 
in particular Senator Jan Schakowsky14) have been Democrats and key 
proponents (including Cheney and Rumsfeld) have been Republicans. 
But divisions along party lines are too rough. The divisions run between 
public administrations and—on a more detailed level—between individ-
uals; often in rather unexpected ways. The investigation in the wake of 
the Nisour incident clearly illustrates this. In Iraq, the State Department 
had sided in with Blackwater against other authorities and in particu-
lar the Justice Department (Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform 2007). Similarly, the inspector general had obstructed the work 
of his office and refused to collaborate with the Department of Justice in 
investigations involving security contractors (Waxman 2007). Conflicts 
and tensions resulting from the creation of markets in security in other 
words do not pit private market actors against public state actors. They 
create new divisions within states. Conflicts are opposing different parts 
of states and public bureaucracies. They are not state versus market con-
flicts. For the sovereignty game this matters: it confirms that what is at 
stake is not some fundamental reshuffling of authority but merely more 
of the good old struggle over what the aim of public policy should be and 
how it can best be achieved; a struggle reflecting diverging expert views. 
This is something the sovereignty game has always lived with.
Similarly, the way qualifiers to statehood and sovereignty have devel-
oped and been used has minimized the extent to which conflicts sur-
rounding the emergence of markets come to be structured along the 
private—public divide. The flat responsibilization of (failed, rogue, 
weak, etc.) states and governments for their failure to keep private actors 
invisible is a direct denial of the role that the market or market actors 
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may have played in the process. But more than this, the qualifiers direct 
attention to the North-South divide, and away from the division between 
the public and the private. The states with qualifiers are overwhelmingly 
southern and those using the qualifiers to differentiate sovereign status 
and justify interventions are overwhelmingly northern. Consequently, 
and colonial pasts helping, the conflicts surrounding the introduction of 
qualifiers readily turn into North-South conflicts. In the confrontation 
over qualified sovereign status, the image of a self-sacrificing, human-
itarian, civilizing North contributing to the development in the South 
confronts that of the destructive, exploiting, self-interested North sap-
ping the independence and development prospects of the South. The 
point here is not to adjudicate which of these images is more truthful. 
Rather, the purpose is to underscore the extent to which this North-
South framing casts the dispute in terms that can be used to confirm 
the centrality of states in the sovereignty game; the conflict is ultimately 
about diverging sovereign interests.
The conflict has been transformed from one where public actors might 
have opposed the creation of markets into one where sovereign states with 
differing and sometimes radically opposed interests confront each other. 
The confrontation is turned into a clash of sovereignties. A classical pic-
ture of what the sovereignty game is all about. The same trick is worked 
by the enmeshment of actors: it turns the conflict into one taking place 
within states, opposing divergent different understandings of how best to 
promote the public good, a classical conflict in sovereign forms of pol-
itics. Conflicts that might have arisen as private actors have taken on a 
central role in security and could have been thought to challenge the key 
role of public actors magically disappear. They are transformed into con-
flicts that do not challenge sovereignty as the main ordering principle in 
the field. If anything, the continuation of intense conflict over what pol-
icies to pursue at home and over clashing sovereignties abroad confirms 
sovereignty’s continued significance.
Conclusion: Securing Sovereignty
This chapter has argued that the governance of security through markets 
has been the source both of substantial changes in the sovereignty game 
and of the securing of this game. Market governance has altered the basic 
rule of sovereignty game in security by watering down the state monop-
oly on legitimate force to inexistence. Private actors have both control 
and legitimate authority over the use of force. Market governance has 
also altered the nature and the status of the players in the sovereignty 
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game as the public and private have become increasingly enmeshed and 
sovereignty increasingly differentiated. However, at the same time gov-
ernance through markets has secured sovereignty. It has aligned the 
sovereignty game in security with neoliberal governance forms. It has 
normalized security. But more than this the effects of market governance 
on the nature of the public/private divide has fostered misrecognition of 
the changes under way. Consequently the sovereignty game in security, 
recast in governmental terms, is well secured, probably at least as secure 
as it would have been if market governance had not been introduced.
That profound change in the sovereignty game may be compatible with 
(perhaps even necessary for) its continuity is not a foregone conclusion. 
Scholars who think of sovereignty as a specific set of principles would 
certainly find it difficult to agree. Thomson, for example, suggests that 
if practices changed so much that states could “shirk responsibility for 
non-state violence internationally, by simply claiming that the latter is a 
purely private undertaking” and if there was an “end to or at least sig-
nificant erosion of the state’s monopoly on the authority to deploy vio-
lence beyond its borders” we would be shifting away from sovereignty to 
something else (Thomson 1994, 153). This chapter has suggested that both 
things are occurring but that we have not moved away from sovereignty to 
something else. The reason is that sovereignty (and the sovereignty game) 
is not attached to a specific set of rules but one way of organizing political 
thinking and practice. This mode may well coexist (as I have here argued 
it does) with other forms of governance such as the neoliberal or the dis-
ciplinary. This will cause clashes and tensions. It will not “end” the sover-
eignty game. The game ends when political practice and thinking ceases to 
be organized around states; when the king’s head is finally cut in political 
theory and practice as Foucault phrased it. Governing through markets 
has not led this to happen. If anything the opposite is true.
But for how long is sovereignty secure? Is the market working like a 
time bomb that will eventually explode the sovereign system and lead to 
the dissolution of state authority (as suggested e.g., by von Trotha 2000)? 
Or will the tensions between the governance through markets and gover-
nance through states eventually become so strong that states will have to 
rein in the market and reassert political control (as suggested by Verkuil 
2007)? Obviously, there can be no definitive answer. However, three 
observations drawn from this chapter may be worth keeping in mind 
when contemplating the question. First, the sovereignty game is surpris-
ingly resilient and malleable. It is a grid of practice and interpretation 
that is difficult to escape. Second, (however) neoliberal forms of gover-
nance are so profoundly anchored in contemporary political practice and 
thinking that they pass largely uncontested, not to say unreflected. Third, 
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(this said) how the two coexist is neither strictly fixed nor agreed upon. It 
is constantly struggled over. We are therefore likely to see market gover-
nance and sovereignty continue to coexist, create tensions but also rein-
force each other in surprising ways expressing the constant struggles of 
those concerned by the developments.
Notes
This chapter has benefited from the generous and constructive comments of 
the editors of this volume. Moreover, Stefano Guzzini and the participants in 
the COSTA24 seminar on the private construction of threats (Basel October 20, 
2007), in my fellow-seminar at the Hansewissenschaftskolleg (October 17, 2007), 
and in the DIIS “markets for peace” workshop (December 6–7, 2007) made help-
ful comments. Even if they would all still have many objections to this version of 
the chapter, I hope that they recognize their role in sharpening its argument that 
obviously remains my responsibility.
1. At the time of writing (November 2007) it seems the state department will end 
Blackwater’s Iraq contract after considerable pressure but the process is still 
ongoing and whether there will be any general consequences for Blackwater 
(preventing it from working on other state contracts) remains unclear.
2. Jeremy Scahill is the author of a book on Blackwater (2007a) that launched 
much of the media attention the company has received and an active media 
commentator
3. “There is no historical replacement of historical form [ . . . ] There is in fact a 
triangle: sovereignty, discipline and governmentality” (Foucault 2004: 111).
4. The Foucauldian neoliberal governance form is one where governance is done 
through state withdrawal, the creation of quasi-markets, decentralization, 
responsibilization, and empowerment of individuals (Foucault 2004; Hindess 
2004; Rose and Miller 1992; Leander and van Munster 2007). It is concretely 
expressed government techniques in what goes under the general heading 
“new public management.”
5. There is also profound change in the stakes of the game: technical security 
is more central both in the security field and in other fields. This point is 
not elaborated in this chapter. I have written about it elsewhere including in 
(Leander 2005b, 2007).
6. Today the term mercenary is usually replaced by words coming with less neg-
ative connotations such as contractors, private military firms, or private secu-
rity firms. This masks the similarities between these actors and traditional 
mercenaries.
7. The figures remain uncertain even for contractors employed by firms work-
ing for public US agencies and even more so for other firms. They are par-
ticularly unreliable for “third country nationals,” “local” employees, and 
subcontractors working for the main contractor. Judging from the controver-
sies that have involved South African, Korean, Pilipino, Ugandan, Tanzanian,
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 Peruvian, Fijian, Columbian, and Nepalese (just to mention some) security 
contractors their numbers could be rather extensive.
 8. In a succession of controversial cases, the commission has pushed for the 
opening of the market. See ECJ (2006) and the references therein as well as 
Dorn and Levi (2007).
 9. In its discussions of regulation, the UK government has repeatedly made very 
clear that the sector is to be nurtured and developed nationally and interna-
tionally (Zedner 2006; Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002).
10. There is no proof that outsourcing is efficient but considerable indica-
tions that it is not: Markusen (2003), GAO (2007), Waxman (2007), Rasor 
and Bauman (2007), and Verkuil (2007). These indications are bolstered by 
the resistance of the business against actual measures designed to enhance 
cost savings in the sector. In 2001, for example, DynCorp blocked a bill that 
would have forced federal agencies to justify private contracts on cost-saving 
grounds (War on Want 2006: 19).
11. Security professionals’ motives are complex and varied but interest in 
working actively often figures at least as centrally as earning a good salary 
(Sapone 1999; Fainaru 2007a).
12. This practice is most visible when scandals erupt around illegal recruitments 
or breaches of contract by international firms. The OHCHR working group 
on mercenaries has made an effort to report on some of the scandals in a 
more systematic fashion (UN 2007).
13. The pressure on budgets, the forced dissolution of “neo-patrimonial” sys-
tems and the opening up of markets weakens state institutions in the security 
field and forces those who want protection to look for it outside the state, 
in new arrangements. At the same time it pushes security professionals to 
engage in the market (Clapham 1996; Duffield 2001; Hibou 2004; Leander 
2005a).
14. Jan Schakowski has a longstanding engagement with the issue of security 
contracting and has proposed a series of bills to curb contracting prac-
tices, including the recent SOS (stop outsourcing security) the fate of which 
remains as uncertain as that of her earlier initiatives.
Nissen_Ch09.indd   170 8/22/2008   12:25:20 PM
10
The Refugee, the Sovereign, 
and the Sea: European Union 
Interdiction Policies
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen
Scene: Tarifa beach in Spain on 2 September 2000; in the forefront a 
young couple with a picnic basket sunbathing, in the background the 
body of a dead migrant washed ashore after an unsuccessful attempt to 
cross the treacherous Strait of Gibraltar from North Africa.
When photographer Javier Balauz had his picture published in newspapers across the world, it created public outrage over the 
“indifference of the West.”1 Today, hardly a week goes by without reports 
of migrants dying following attempts to cross the Mediterranean or 
West African Sea to reach Europe. The humanitarian tragedy is perhaps 
the starkest evidence of the difficult situation European Union (EU) is 
experiencing in relation to its southern shores.
On the one hand, it speaks of the growing pressure of immigration by 
destitute and desperate people willing to risk their lives in an unseawor-
thy dingy in the attempt to reach the Canary Islands, Malta, Spain, or 
Italy. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 120,000 irregular migrants 
try to cross the Mediterranean each year (ICMPD 2004, 8). New routes 
are constantly established and human smuggling has grown to be one of 
the most lucrative forms of international crime.
On the other hand, the tragedies may also be seen as a result of the 
ongoing expansion of Europe’s migration control. Following the eastward 
expansion it has become both more difficult and less lucrative to reach 
the EU over land, and the bulk of African and many Asian migrants thus 
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turn to the maritime routes. Simultaneously, advanced radar systems, 
deployment of NATO ships and airplanes, and a number of joint Member 
State naval missions has made it impossible for migrants to take the easy 
corridors, forcing them instead to venture longer and more dangerous 
crossings. In what seems to be a self-sustaining dynamic, every new route 
prompts new control initiatives and vice versa.2
The result has been a radical expansion of the Mediterranean basin and 
parts of the Atlantic Ocean outside West Africa as a venue for migration 
control. Most recently, the EU’s border agency, Frontex, has been coor-
dinating a number of missions between Member States in response to 
what is often referred to as the “tides” or “waves” of migrants “flooding” 
the European shores (Pugh 2004, 54). The objective of these initiatives is 
primarily preventive: to intercept migrants before they reach EU territory 
or territorial waters. As the sovereign ability to control migration flows 
at the borders is coming under pressure, the geographical locus is shifted 
outward, toward the sea and toward cooperation with third States.
The refugee occupies a special position in this development. 
Traditionally, the refugee is the exception to the sovereign right of States 
to enforce migration control. Under international refugee law States in 
principle oblige themselves to allow entrance for any person present-
ing an asylum claim at their borders or within their territories, until the 
validity of that claim has been examined. In a time where concerns over 
both asylum and immigration have risen across Europe, States have been 
keen to come up with policy innovations to somehow rid themselves of 
these obligations.
Moving migration control outside the territory, to the high seas or 
inside foreign territorial waters, has been presented as one such innova-
tion and raises important questions of international law. Although the 
international human rights and refugee law is normally referred to har-
ness restrictive asylum policies within the EU, the applicability of these 
norms to actions performed by Member States outside the Union has 
been the subject of considerable debate and contention.
Taking as its starting point the tricky conceptualization of sovereignty 
within international legal discourse, the present chapter argues that the 
current opaqueness as to the geographical reach of a State’s responsibil-
ities is rooted in the inability of the present refugee regime to truly free 
itself of the territorial principles of the Westphalian State system. Rather 
the question of extraterritorial responsibility is caught in a “late sovereign 
order,” in which questions of jurisdiction may be interpreted both territo-
rially and universally. This interpretive breadth creates a field of contesta-
tion, in which States may rely on different sovereignty claims when acting 
in the extraterritorial context to reconquer their loss of sovereign control 
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by de facto or de jure relinquishing themselves of some of the human 
rights obligations otherwise owed to asylum-seekers and refugees.
There is no generally accepted definition of interception. United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has proposed that
interception is defined as encompassing all measures applied by a State, 
outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the 
movement of persons without the required documentation crossing inter-
national borders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country 
of prospective destination.3
This includes a wide number of instances, ranging from the control 
performed at visa consulates to the privatization of control by sanction-
ing carriers for letting undocumented migrants board their planes. This 
chapter will confine itself to the discussion of interception at sea, which 
is also referred to as interdiction. In particular, the paper focuses on 
the Mediterranean and the sea between the West African coast and the 
Canary Islands as the maritime areas where the EU is currently concen-
trating its efforts to curb migration toward Europe.
The Refugee in the Late Sovereign Order
To understand the particular issue of the refugee in international law, it 
is necessary first to consider the basic structure of State sovereignty as it 
has developed in modern international legal discourse. Within interna-
tional law, the concept of sovereignty can be described as a double-bladed 
sword referring to two rather distinct descriptive frames (Spiermann 
1995, 124–126). On the one hand, it refers to the State as a national sov-
ereign, the principle of self-containment and territorial exclusivity. In 
this sense international law is conceived as a residual system, concerned 
with establishing the principles necessary for the coexistence of States, 
for example, nonintervention. The need for international law only arises 
when States need to settle disputes outside the realm of national law; 
within its territory each State holds absolute jurisdiction (Spiermann 
2005, 79–83).
The basic principle of national sovereignty and independence can 
be illustrated by the following passage by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice from the 1927 SS Lotus Case:
The rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own free 
will . . . . Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be 
presumed.
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Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the con-
trary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another 
State.4
While the second sentence is often cited as a general presumption for 
the sovereign freedom of States against international law, the last sentence 
is perhaps equally important to understand how the principle of sover-
eign independence is vested within a Westphalian framework. In princi-
ple, sovereign power is to be exercised within a “sovereign nation cage,” 
horizontally covering the territory and the territorial sea and vertically 
extending from the “Von Kármán line” 50,550 miles above sea level down 
to the subsoil of national territory ending at the center of the earth (Palan 
2003, 97). However, outside the realm of these sovereign cages, such as 
when disputes arise on the high seas, the international law of coexistence 
becomes accordingly vague (Spiermann 2005, 88).
On the other hand, the State has been conceived as an international 
sovereign, retaining the power to enter into binding agreements with other 
sovereign States. This is the field of treaty law that has grown substantially 
over the last half century. Sovereignty in this sense is not on the basis of 
territorial principles or perpetuating authority, but rather on the sovereign 
capacity of States to commit themselves within an international law of 
cooperation and thereby submit themselves as legal subjects under inter-
national law (Spiermann 2005, 92–94). On the face of it this may appear 
to infringe on the conceptualization of the State as a national sovereign; 
human rights treaties impose a range of obligations for the sovereign State 
within its territory, not just vis-à-vis aliens, but also toward its own citi-
zens. However, it conversely establishes an extension of other States’ sover-
eign sphere to the extent that their legal interests may transgress territorial 
borders on a range of new issues (Werner 2004).
This extension has been articulated by Judge Huber in the 1928 Las 
Palmas case:
Territorial sovereignty . . . involves the exclusive right to display the activi-
ties of a State. This right has as a corollary a duty: the obligation to protect 
within the territory the rights of other States, in particular their rights to 
integrity and inviolability in peace and war, together with the rights which 
each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory.5
Through the development of the international human rights regime, 
this obligation toward aliens of other States could be said to have devel-
oped to include all persons, regardless of nationality. Further, while the 
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earlier remark refers to customary norms of interstate relations, the prin-
ciple is of no less relevance under treaty law or obligations erga omnes 
(Werner 2004).6
How an issue is framed within this double structure is crucial, as the 
different conceptualizations of State sovereignty will point to different legal 
norms taking precedence. This in turn creates a field in which different 
notions of sovereignty have been relied on to advance different arguments. 
While some scholars have emphasized the notion of international sover-
eignty as a mere appendix to the primacy of national sovereignty, others 
have argued that the present era is one in which the international law of 
cooperation is becoming increasingly dominant (Friedmann 1964, 88).
In the following, I shall suggest that while both conceptualizations are 
of continued relevance and must be seen as necessary complements in the 
functioning of international law, it is remarkable how the proliferation 
of treaty and human rights law cannot escape the territorial foundations 
flowing from the conceptualization of sovereignty within a Westphalian 
frame of territorial exclusivity. Borrowing a vocabulary developed by Neil 
Walker, the present configuration of sovereignty claims in respect to ref-
ugees may be described within the framework of late sovereignty.
According to Neil Walker, the conceptual duality of the term sover-
eignty sketched out above is key to understand its present value in artic-
ulating and framing existing power relations in the transitional stage 
between a Westphalian and a post-Westphalian order (N. Walker 2003, 
19–23). In the former order claims to authority are made strictly within 
a statist structure, whereas in the latter sovereign power is increasingly 
asserted along functional boundaries crosscutting the territorial division 
of the Westphalian map. (ibid., 22). The latter may be observed not only 
in the emergence of functionally limited polities, such as the EU, coexist-
ing within the same territorial space as its constituent national sovereign 
Member States, but also in the growing emergence of cooperative legal 
frameworks between EU or Member States and third countries effectively 
extending sovereign functions beyond EU borders.
Yet, despite these functional assertions of power, the Westphalian 
order is not rejected in favor of a new framework for sovereignty, rather 
the territorial or national conceptualization of sovereignty is adapted to 
understand the new order (ibid., 19). This means, first, that the interna-
tional law of cooperation continues to draw in large parts on the basic 
principles of national sovereignty in its justification and implementation. 
Second, and related, the growing cooperation effectively extending sov-
ereign power beyond the territory has not been matched unequivocally 
by a similar deterritorialization of correlate sovereign responsibilities. 
Instead a discursive field is opened in which questions of jurisdiction 
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and State responsibility seems to oscillate between these two poles—the 
territorial and the universal (Werner 2004). In other words, in the estab-
lishment of functional polities such as the EU and in assertion of State 
power beyond the territory, sovereignty becomes an interpretive frame 
that may be used to legitimize both. In the late sovereign order of glob-
alization and increased international governance on the one hand, and 
enduring Westphalian norms of territorial exclusivity on the other, con-
crete interpretations within the sovereignty frame become increasingly 
contested.
The Refugee in International Law
In the case of the refugee these traits are evident both in the constitu-
tion of the refugee within international law and in the current policies 
of extraterritorialization pursued by European States. As one scholar 
notes:
The refugee in international law occupies a legal space characterized, on 
the one hand, by the principle of State sovereignty and related principles 
of territorial supremacy and self-preservation; and, on the other hand, by 
competing humanitarian principles deriving from general international 
law . . . and from treaty. (Goodwin-Gill 1996, v)
As part and parcel of the broader human rights regime, most schol-
ars would probably argue that international refugee law belongs to the 
international law of cooperation. Refugees are the exception to States’ 
legitimate pursuit of migration control, and treaty law, such as the 1951 
Refugee Convention, entails an obligation for State parties to extend 
a number of rights and benefits to all individuals falling within the 
definition.
Yet, the link to principles of State sovereignty and territorial suprem-
acy in the codification of this area of law are indeed striking. Despite the 
appearance of universality, this regime is in the true sense of the word 
international. Refugee protection is not guaranteed in a global homoge-
nous space, but materializes as a patchwork of commitments undertaken 
by individual States, tied together by multilateral treaty agreements 
(Palan 2003, 87).
This concerns first the mechanism of responsibility assignment. At the 
core of the refugee regime is the obligation not to send back, or refouler, 
a refugee to a place in which he or she risks persecution.7 This obligation 
kicks in when an asylum-seeker or a refugee is present within the territory 
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or jurisdiction of the State in question. While in principle this obliges the 
State to undertake a refugee status determination process, as soon as an 
asylum claim is launched within its territory or at its borders, the Refugee 
Convention contains no explicit mention of how and where the asylum 
procedures should be carried out (Fitzpatrick 1996, 229; Goodwin-Gill 
1996, 178; Barnes 2004).8
Second, beyond the non-refoulement prohibition, rights under the 
1951 Refugee Convention are not granted en bloc but rather according 
to a principle of territorial approximation, meaning that more rights are 
acquired as the refugee obtains a higher “level of attachment” to the host 
State. This incremental approach reflects a concern of the drafters not 
to extend the full scope of rights in situations where refugees may arrive 
spontaneously in large numbers (Hathaway 2005, 157). Thus, in particu-
lar the social and economic rights may only be claimed, when a refugee 
is “lawfully staying” or “durably resident” within the territory of the host 
State. Conversely, a refugee outside the territory of a State, but within its 
jurisdiction is only entitled to a very basic set of rights centered on the 
non-refoulement obligation.9
Last, the rights f lowing from international refugee instruments are 
crucially dependent on individual States for their implementation. 
Unlike interstate conflicts under the law of coexistence, obligations 
under refugee and human rights treaties are as a rule owed toward a 
collective of State parties and do not therefore necessarily invoke the 
direct interest of other States. This has left the Refugee Convention 
with no international courts and no effective enforcement mechanisms 
(Goodwin-Gill 1996, 218). Thus, the mechanisms to ensure the imple-
mentation of refugee rights are left to intergovernmental organizations, 
such as the UNHCR, that are highly dependent on financial and political 
support from the very States they are supposed to supervise, and often, 
more importantly, the national courts of each State, which, depending 
on the respective constitutional traditions, may be able to exert a smaller 
or larger influence and to varying degrees draw on international instru-
ments in national adjudication.
Together these traits paint a rather chequered picture of a refugee 
rights regime that, despite the language of universality, is still firmly 
vested within the Westphalian structures of national sovereignty. The 
above may also account for the recent surge to externalize or extrater-
ritorialize both the regulation of migration control and the provision of 
refugee protection. In a world where States’ ability to control flows of peo-
ple across their borders is already challenged, moving migration control 
outside the borders is perceived as a strategy to prevent triggering refugee 
responsibilities and/or shift them to third States.
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Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and 
the Commercialization of Sovereignty
In the late sovereign order, this quest for extraterritorialization brings 
forth two aspects of the way that the interplay between different concep-
tualizations of sovereignty structures State responses to refugees—one 
being the legal debate over extraterritorial jurisdiction and the other the 
political dynamic of commercialization of sovereignty.
The first concerns State jurisdiction as the sphere in which a State may 
legitimately exercise its sovereign functions. The overall point of depar-
ture within human rights and refugee law is that States are bound by 
human rights in relation to all persons within their jurisdiction (Kessing 
2007).10 The question is how jurisdiction is established when moving out-
side the “sovereign nation cage.” Within international law extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has been conceived of in two ways—as a property flowing 
from a State’s effective control over a defined territory, or as a relationship 
between a State’s exercise of authority or control over an individual. The 
first clearly derives from the principle of national sovereignty, extending 
jurisdiction to all geographical areas where a State exercises de facto sov-
ereign control, such as in the case of, for example, military occupation.11 
The second is primarily reflected in more recent case law dealing with 
cases where State agents act inside another State, whether unlawfully or 
following agreement between those States, and seems to reflect an expan-
sive interpretation not to “allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate 
on its own territory.”12
It is important to underline, however, that in both these conceptual-
izations, extraterritorial jurisdiction is conceived of as extraordinary.13 
Despite the proliferation of extraterritorial State functions in a globalized 
world, the territorial jurisdictional competence remains the point of depar-
ture in international law. In practice international courts have thus applied 
rather high tests to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction for the purpose of 
human rights responsibilities. In the Bankovic case, involving the NATO 
air bombings of a radio station in Serbia during the Kosovo conflict, the 
European Court of Human Rights held that a sufficient degree of effective 
control over Serbian territory had not been asserted.14 Similarly, establish-
ing personal jurisdiction has generally been limited to cases involving full 
control over an individual, such as in the case of abduction or detention, 
rather than in relation to particular functions of State sovereignty, such as 
preventing onward passage for an asylum-seeker.15
The notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction has thus been interpreted 
very differently among States and seems to create a disparity where, under 
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a strict reading, States can avoid incurring legal responsibilities for acts 
committed extraterritorially in situations where neither territorial nor 
personal jurisdiction can be established. This has lead some authors to 
argue that the kind of interception operations we see in the Mediterranean, 
the extraterritorial detention of combatants or the outsourcing of other-
wise domestic sovereign functions take place in a “legal vacuum” or “legal 
black hole” (Wilde 2005, 15f). While these terms may be ill-chosen, as 
these actions are more often than not governed by elaborate cooperative 
legal arrangements between States, it may be more correct to argue that 
the interpretive breadth in establishing jurisdiction extraterritorially or 
assigning responsibilities in cases involving competing jurisdictions easily 
defers human rights obligations to the basic modus operandi of territorial 
responsibility assignment.
A second feature of the late sovereign order is the growing “commer-
cialization of sovereignty” as a political strategy in the late sovereign 
order. This term has originally been derived to describe the emergence 
of tax havens and offshore economies. According to Ronen Palan com-
mercialization of sovereignty or “jurisdiction shopping” within this field 
emerges as a result of the inability of international law to bridge the gulf 
between national sovereignty and the internationalization of trade and 
capital (Palan 2002, 164). In other words, the dual conceptualization of 
sovereignty creates the structural conditions for States to try to attract 
international capital by exploiting existing differences between national 
sovereign regulations or intentionally relaxing regulation in particular 
areas of their territory (Palan 2003, 157).
Considering refugees and migration control, this commercialization is 
possible exactly because of the territorial principles of the refugee regime 
in regards to the distribution of responsibilities and the standards of pro-
tection owed. Thus, examples of such bartering of sovereign authority are 
numerous in the attempt to relocate refugee protection or asylum pro-
cessing to less-developed countries where fewer and less costly rights are 
owed, both in Europe and elsewhere.16 In the context of migration con-
trol, a similar trend of “jurisdiction shopping” emerges as EU’s neighbors 
and developing countries, either for economic benefit or under threats 
of sanctions, provide a legal platform in the form of their land and sea 
geography, thereby enabling EU States to operate migration control while 
simultaneously shifting the primary responsibility for refugees to those 
countries within whose territorial jurisdiction control is operated.
Both the varying interpretations of extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
the commercialization of sovereignty effectively constitute sovereignty 
games, in which States, or in this case the EU, may seek to horizon-
tally dislocate responsibilities owed under international law and thereby 
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reassert their sovereign power in areas of regulation that are otherwise 
marred by legal constraints flowing from either national liberal traditions 
or international human rights. In this sense changing the playing field for 
exercising sovereign power away from the national territory becomes a 
strategy for States in the late sovereign order to avoid obligations owed, 
de facto or de jure. As a result, the refugee is left to the unmitigated power 
of the sovereign executive when exercising migration control or to use the 
terminology of Giorgio Agamben, the migrant encountered on the high 
seas is effectively reduced to an “illegal body” to be controlled, to “naked 
life” (Agamben 1998a, 100f; Noll 2003).
EU Interdiction Policies
In the following, it will be sought illustrated how these sovereignty games 
operate in the context of the recent interdiction policies developed by the 
EU and Member States. The first two sections will discuss extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction claims for interdiction taking place on the high seas and 
within the territorial waters of a foreign State, respectively. The third will 
focus on the interplay of different international legal regimes, specifically 
how jurisdiction claims and asylum responsibilities are shifted by rede-
fining operations from “migration control” to “search and rescue at sea.”
Interdiction on the High Seas
Moving migration control to the high seas is not a new phenomenon. 
With the rise of boat refugees in the 1970s and 1980s, high sea interdiction 
practices quickly became the favored response of coastal States concerned 
with mass influx. Outside Europe, the more famous examples include the 
United States’ interception of Haitians and Cubans from the early 1980s up 
until today and more recently the Australian “Pacific Solution,” which was 
developed following the “Tampa” incident in 2001.17 Similarly, in Southern 
Europe interdiction schemes on the high seas have been operated by Italy, 
France, Greece, and Spain in the Adriatic Sea, the Mediterranean, and 
around the Canary Islands (Lutterbeck 2006).
Under the Frontex auspices, the EU has also been looking to expand 
interdiction operations. Of the operational missions already carried out 
two involve interdiction outside territorial waters. One was the Nautilus 
Operation taking place in October 2006, during which the high sea was 
patrolled to prevent migration from Libya reaching Malta, Sicily, or 
Lampedusa. Although this mission was originally conceived to incorpo-
rate Libya, thus allowing for EU vessels to patrol within Libyan territorial 
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waters, it was nonetheless hailed as a success claiming to completely pre-
vent migrants from arriving in Malta during the time of operation.18 The 
second operation was the HERA II set to curb the migration flow toward 
the Canary Islands. Involving planes, helicopters, and navy ships, this 
operation intercepted 14,572 persons on the high seas and Spanish terri-
torial sea and 3,887 in the territorial waters of Senegal, Mauritania, and 
Cape Verde during its five months operation from August 2006.19 This 
mission has been succeeded by HERA III set to run interdictions in the 
same area.
To which extent are States undertaking such interdiction operations on 
the high seas bound by international law not to return those intercepted 
claiming asylum or fearing torture or other inhumane treatment? So far 
courts and governments have varied greatly in their interpretation of the 
jurisdictional implications in such situations. Both the Australian and US 
interdiction policies have been on the basis of an exclusively territorial 
understanding of jurisdiction and thus the non-refoulement obligation. 
Testing the US interdiction and subsequent return of Haitians in Sale v. 
Haitian Centers Council,20 the US Supreme Court supported this interpre-
tation arguing that:
 . . . a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on 
those who ratify it through no more than its general humanitarian intent. 
Because the text of Article 33 [of the 1951 Refugee Convention, setting out 
the non-refoulement principle] cannot reasonably be read to say anything 
at all about a nation’s actions toward aliens outside its own territory, it does 
not prohibit such actions.21
A similar interpretation may have inspired Australia when, follow-
ing the Tampa incident, the 2001 Migration Amendment Act excised 
parts of both Australian sea and land territory, most notably Christmas 
Island and the Ashmore Reef, from the “asylum zone” (Pugh 2004, 60). 
Likewise, for asylum purposes US sovereign territory only extends to the 
high water mark and not government vessels or offshore bases, such as 
that on Guantanamo (ibid.). Both cases can be seen as a radicalization of 
the strictly territorial understanding of jurisdiction, arguing that States 
are even at liberty to withdraw their territorial jurisdiction, so that even 
though an asylum-seeker is de facto present within the territory or terri-
torial sea, she is not recognized as de jure present.
However, both the Sale verdict and the Australian excision practices 
have been widely criticized. International lawyers and human rights 
organizations have argued that the Sale case builds on an erroneous and 
incomplete reading of both the Refugee Convention and extraterritorial 
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jurisdictional principles and represents a “policy decision” that did not 
alter the United States’ international obligations.22
Perhaps more important, the US and Australian interpretations have 
not gained much currency in Europe, where in particular the European 
Court of Human Rights has taken a more expansive reading of extra-
territorial jurisdiction in situations such as those involving interdiction 
in international waters. In Xhavara, the court thus held that Italy was 
exercising jurisdiction within the meaning of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, when a boat with immigrants sunk following collision 
with an Italian navy vessel trying to board it under an agreement between 
the two countries.23 Second, the European Court of Human Rights has 
rejected the ability of States to excise parts of their territory for migration 
purposes. In Amuur v. France, aliens held within French airport transit 
zones were found to be within French jurisdiction and territory for all 
purposes of the Convention, despite any French legislation to differen-
tiate regulation of these zones from the rest of their territory.24 In line 
with this interpretation it is worth noting that migrants intercepted by 
European ships on the high seas under the HERA mission according to 
the authorities all are taken to the Canary Islands, where they have the 
possibility to launch an asylum application.
To the extent that European interdiction policies on the high seas con-
stitute a sovereignty game, it is thus more likely a question of reassert-
ing State power de facto than de jure. As noted earlier, the international 
refugee and human rights regimes are intimately dependent on national 
institutions—courts, appeal mechanisms, NGOs, and press—to ensure 
that individuals are actually able to access international rights. The reach 
of these institutions seldom extends beyond the physical territory of the 
State and even more unlikely to uninhabited geographical areas such 
as the high seas. Both UNHCR and Amnesty International have raised 
concerns that asylum-seekers may not be able to exercise basic rights or 
formalize asylum claims when interdicted at sea or held at closed island 
detention centers such as those in Lampedusa and the Canary Islands; the 
very remoteness of these places is an impediment for national and inter-
national rights organizations to access asylum-seekers and monitor State 
actions (Gil-Bazo 2006, 579).25
This has been a particular concern when interdiction policies leave 
the State unchecked in receiving asylum claims, which raises concerns 
that authorities may downplay the number of asylum-seekers in mixed 
migration flows. From 1981 to 1990, the period before declaring that non-
refoulement only applied on the territory, the United States interdicted 
and returned more than 21,000 Haitians. Yet, despite the grave human 
rights situation in Haiti during this period, the Coast Guard found only 
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six claims strong enough to warrant a full asylum procedure (Legomsky 
2006, 679). On the Canary Islands, authorities have been keen to empha-
size that the vast majority of those intercepted were “illegal immigrants.” 
Despite the increase in migration pressure over the last years, both the 
total number of asylum claims launched and the recognition rates have 
gone down, which has led Amnesty International to suggest that asylum 
claims are deliberately overheard and discouraged.26 Whether this is true 
or not, it does suggest that moving migration from the land to the sea 
entails a possibility for States to carry out control further away from the 
eyes of those institutions that normally constitute the checks and bal-
ances in the exercise of executive power.
Interdiction in Foreign Territorial Waters
A particular aspect of European interdiction policies as developed in the 
Frontex context has been increased cooperation with North and West 
African States and consequently the expansion of geographical scope 
from the high seas into the territorial waters and land territory of third 
States. As argued in the following text, within the theoretical frame-
work set out earlier, this could be seen as a more advanced strategy for 
interdicting States to relieve themselves of international human rights 
responsibilities when conducting migration control. Rather than argue 
for the strict territorial application of, for example, the non-refoulement 
principle, which has proved untenable in the European context, the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of another State may be invoked to shift the primary 
responsibility for any protection-seekers to that State.
As part of the HERA II mission, bilateral arrangements were made that 
allowed the Spanish, Finnish, Italian, and Portuguese ships and airplanes 
to patrol and intercept vessels bound for the Canary Islands, not just on 
the high seas but also inside Cape Verde, Senegalese, and Mauritanian 
territorial sea, contiguous zone or air space.27 Thus, any vessel inter-
cepted within this 24-mile zone of these States is turned back, either to 
its port of departure or to a port within the territorial waters in which 
interdiction occurred. During the 4 months of operation 3,665 persons 
were intercepted within these zones and returned. Cooperation with the 
Senegalese authorities further extended to bringing Senegalese immi-
gration officers on board European ships, and Frontex argued that these 
officers were formally in charge of rejecting migrants’ passage to inter-
national waters. The operation was hailed by Frontex as a great success 
and cooperation with West and North African States is expected to be 
extended for the continuation, HERA III, which was initiated in January 
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this year. Similarly, arrangements with Libya have been sought as part of 
the Nautilus operation in the Eastern Mediterranean to be able to operate 
inside its territorial waters. Although this has not materialized, negotia-
tions are ongoing.28
So, from the viewpoint of international law what does it matter that 
interdiction is carried out inside foreign waters rather than on the high 
seas? The most obvious consequence would be to exclude all asylum-
seekers fleeing directly from their country of origin to invoke the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Article 1 of this Convention clearly stipulates that 
the ratione personae only extends to individuals “outside the country of 
his nationality” and an asylum-seeker would thus have to exit the ter-
ritorial sea to benefit from, fro example, the non-refoulement principle 
enshrined in article 33. While this is obviously of concern, it should be 
noted that, for example, the prohibition against refoulement to torture 
or other inhumane treatment enshrined in article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not have this limitation.
Second, and of primary concern to the present chapter, it may be asked 
whether asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction is effected by moving inter-
diction from the high sea to the territorial sea of a third State. On first look, 
one could make an argument answering in the negative. Flowing from the 
international law of cooperation, the International Law Commission has 
argued that “[i]nternational life provides abundant examples of activities 
carried on in the territory of a State by agents of another State . . . [t]here is 
nothing abnormal in this.”29 Following this reasoning, one should be able 
to assert a principle similar to that of State actions carried out on the high 
seas, namely that since the basic function of human rights is to regulate 
the exercise of public power, it should not matter where this power is exer-
cised (Lawson 2004, 86).
Some case law seems to support this interpretation, both under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the ECHR. In López Burgos,30 the Human Rights Committee held that 
the arrest and subsequent mistreatment of Mr. Burgos by Uruguayan 
Security Forces in Argentina did bring him within Uruguayan jurisdic-
tion. Similarly, in the context of the ECHR, Öcalan31, involving the arrest 
and forcible return of PKK leader Öcalan in Kenya, did establish Turkish 
jurisdiction in respect to the applicant.
In these cases the reasoning built on the premise that the defending 
States had effective personal control of the applicants and that it would be 
“unconscionable . . . to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not 
perpetrate within its own territory.”32 On first look this appears to support 
a rather expansive interpretation of a State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction 
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in cases involving not territorial control but a personal or more incidental 
link between the acting State and an individual.
Other case law does, however, emphasize a rather high test for the level 
of control that a State needs to assert vis-à-vis an individual to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the personal understanding. To several law-
yers, the Grand Chamber ruling of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Bankovic33 came as a surprise. Many had expected that the NATO smart 
bombs killing the relatives of the applicants would be enough to establish 
such a level of control (Coomans and Kamminga 2004; Loucaides 2006). 
Yet, the Court emphasized the extraordinary character of extraterritorial 
personal jurisdiction arguing that:
Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and 
essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being 
exceptional and requiring special justification of each case.34
The court found that in the present case such justification was not met 
in establishing a personal relationship and then went on to conclude that 
since the actions had occurred outside the “legal space” of the conven-
tion (Serbia [FRY] was not a party of the ECHR at the time) and effective 
control of the territory was not established, the acting States could not be 
made responsible under the convention.35
As regards actions taking place on the territory of a State not party 
to the convention, the court thus seems to make a distinction between 
the extraterritorial responsibilities of States in cases where “full control” 
is exercised over an individual, such as in the case of arrest of physical 
detention and State actions that merely result in violations of human 
rights on foreign soil or territorial waters, even when these violations are 
so important that they infringe the right of life (art. 2).
Under such a reading it becomes harder to establish jurisdiction when 
a State is operating interdiction inside foreign territorial waters. Does 
turning back a ship entail effective control in the personal sense? The 
argument could be made in cases where EU ships physically board ships 
or detain those on board, but it is more doubtful whether merely denying 
onward passage or escorting vessels back is sufficient to meet the test of 
extraterritorial personal jurisdiction.
Failing this, interdiction in foreign waters moves back to the ques-
tion of who exercises effective control over the territory in question. 
Although case law does support the possibility of shared extraterritorial 
jurisdiction,36 this has normally required a high degree of structural and 
military involvement over a defined geographical space.37 While one could 
presumably argue that under the traditional international legal doctrine a 
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ship exercising government functions on the high seas or foreign territorial 
sea is to be considered “floating territory” (Ross 1961, 172), the presence of 
Senegalese immigration officers on board Frontex ships is clearly a move 
to underline that not only is this Senegalese jurisdiction, but the actual 
denial of onward passage is also conducted by Senegalese authorities.38
Without going into arguments pro et contra ad infinitum, it should 
be clear that the case for asserting EU Member State responsibility when 
operating interdiction in foreign territorial waters is at best substantially 
weaker than when operating on the high seas. From the case law earlier, 
one may venture the following interpretation: Where on the high seas and 
in situations where responsibility could not meaningfully be attributed 
to the State on whose territory actions are committed (such as following 
unlawful extraterritorial arrests) both the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Human Rights Committee have been keen to avoid “human 
rights vacuums” as to the geographical applicability of the relevant instru-
ments. Yet, when acting within foreign territory under agreement or with 
the direct involvement of another State, it becomes much more alluring to 
fall back on the principle of territorial jurisdiction.
This return to the basic Westphalian order of responsibility-sharing 
may inadvertently support a growing commercialization of sovereignty, 
as States exploit jurisdiction shopping by negotiating arrangements 
to perform migration control inside other States’ sovereign land or sea 
territory.
Regime Shifting: From Interdiction to Rescue at Sea
Reading the press statements from Frontex or the political justifications 
for increased funding to patrol the Mediterranean and West African 
coasts one finds surprisingly few references to a stated aim of migration 
control.39 Rather, these operations primarily seem to be framed as efforts 
to dissuade migrants from the perilous journey toward Europe and the 
need to ensure rescue for those in distress at sea. There is much to say 
in favor of such aspirations. Many vessels embarking on the journey 
have no or limited navigation aids, insufficient engines, fuel, and safety 
equipment onboard. Overcrowded ships entail a number of sanitary and 
health issues and there is a substantial risk of diseases, debilitation, or 
psychological stress spreading among those aboard during the voyage 
(Pugh 2004, 56).
Hardly a week goes by without dead bodies are found washing up 
on the shores between EU and its southern neighbors. According to 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), more 
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than 10,000 persons have died trying to cross the Mediterranean from 
1994 to 2004.40 In addition, Spanish authorities estimate that approxi-
mately 6,000 persons, mainly Senegalese, died last year alone trying to 
reach the Canary Islands.41 The growing human tragedy may in part be 
seen as a result of the reinforcement of migration control at EU’s exter-
nal borders. As the easier routes, such as the Strait of Gibraltar and the 
Spanish enclaves in Morocco, are reinforced, pressure moves toward less 
accessible and typically more dangerous routes, such as the one from 
West Africa to the Canary Islands.
Consequently, interest in reinforcing search and rescue cooper-
ation between EU/Member States and North African States has been 
given high priority on the agenda and in the relations between relevant 
coastal States within the MEDA and European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) frameworks. Even in States with whom EU cooperation is scarce, 
such as Libya, EU missions have been launched defining a “Libyan 
search and rescue area” and establishing operational cooperation in this 
field.42 Yet, beyond a humanitarian imperative, the recent interest in 
rescue at sea may also be viewed as a sovereignty game for the purpose 
of migration control in its own right. First, performing a rescue mission 
at sea supersedes the otherwise established norm prohibiting an acting 
State to intercept and board a vessel f lying the f lag, and thus subject 
to the jurisdiction, of another State.43 Second, cooperation agreements 
in the context of search and rescue operations, such as the framework 
established with Libya, may provide a context for shifting asylum and 
human rights obligations to third States.
Performing rescue operations at sea is a long-established duty under 
international maritime law.44 It contains a responsibility for private, 
commercial, and State vessels to respond to persons in distress at sea. 
Traditionally, the maritime rescue regime has been marred by lack of a 
mechanism to decide where rescued persons should be put ashore and an 
explicit obligation for States to allow disembarkation. This became a par-
ticular problematic issue following the rise of “boat refugees,” which made 
States concerned that asylum processing and protection responsibilities 
would follow from the hitherto relatively trivial issue of disembarkation 
and subsequent return to the country of origin.
Thus, for much of the last decades the issue of rescue at sea has been 
playing out as a variation of the classic problem between self-interested 
States and international cooperation (Barnes 2004, 11). The opaqueness 
in the intersection between refugee and maritime law meant that the 
nearest coastal States (whether within territorial waters or on the high 
sea), flag States of the rescue vessels and States of the next port of call for 
merchant vessels were all arguing against having to take a responsibility 
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themselves. The result has been a number of problematic stalemates and 
costly delays for vessels, eventually leading to a disincentive to undertake 
rescue obligations at all.45
Only recently amendments to the 1979 Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue (SAR) and the 1974 International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) have attempted to establish mechanisms for 
identifying which coastal State is responsible for allowing disembarka-
tion.46 Under this regime the world’s oceans are divided into 13 Search 
and Rescue Regions (SRR). In each region the affected States are respon-
sible for establishing coordination, which effectively has translated into 
drawing a map partitioning the high sea zones in which each coastal State 
is responsible in addition to their territorial waters. While third State or 
private vessels may undertake the rescue missions themselves, the State 
in whose zone the operation takes place holds main responsibility for 
ensuring that distress calls are responded to and, importantly, allow 
disembarkation.47
While these amendments have been broadly celebrated as closing a 
vital gap in the search and rescue regime, one should appreciate how 
these amendments may also favor new interdiction strategies by altering 
the locus of international protection obligations. The intensified Frontex 
patrols and cooperation agreements with North and West African coun-
tries means that EU ships are increasingly operating inside foreign search 
and rescue zones, whether on the high sea or inside foreign territorial 
waters. Under the new disembarkation rules, the respective African 
States will be responsible for allowing disembarkation and therefore, 
presumably, provide asylum procedures or enforce return to the coun-
try of origin. This argument was made by Malta when refusing to let the 
Spanish trawler La Valletta, carrying 51 migrants, dock at Maltese ports. 
Malta was supported by EU Commissioner Franco Frattini, stating that 
“the vessel had picked up illegal immigrants in Libya’s Search and Rescue 
Area and that therefore Malta is under no obligation to take them in.”48
The potential for jurisdiction shopping in such instances is exacer-
bated by the fact that none of the maritime conventions provide a solid 
definition of what constitutes “distress” (Pugh 2004, 58). Instead, the 
master of the intercepting ship has been given authority to evaluate when 
a vessel is in need of rescue or when a vessel is merely unseaworthy by 
modern standards. In the context of Frontex or other European vessels 
operating migration control at sea this seems to provide a system where 
situations may usefully be defined differently to divert responsibilities 
for asylum-seekers at different points in their journey toward Europe; if 
boats are intercepted inside a foreign State’s Search and Rescue zone the 
incentive would be to define it as a rescue operation and thereby shift 
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any disembarkation obligation to that State. If, on the other hand, inter-
diction is conducted inside the European search and rescue zone there 
would be an interest in defining it as migration control and thereby evade 
any direct disembarkation responsibilities and instead deal with the issue 
in the context of varying interpretations of jurisdiction, as discussed 
earlier.
The question remains, of course, whether defining a situation as a 
rescue mission legally supersedes any direct responsibilities vis-à-vis 
asylum-seekers on behalf of the acting State. This is somewhat unclear. 
A case could be made that the rescuing State is still exercising jurisdic-
tion in performing the rescue mission or by virtue of taking onboard res-
cued persons on a State vessel. While not legally binding, the guidelines 
adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime 
Organization on the treatment of persons rescued at sea emphasizes that 
consideration should be given “to avoid disembarkation in territories 
where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of per-
secution would be threatened.”49
In practice, however, it seems that by defining the operation within 
the search and rescue regime, questions regarding refugee protection are 
moved away from the acting State and responsibilities solely assigned 
according to territorial or zone divisions, as agreed among the States 
in the region. The Valletta case mentioned earlier illustrates this quite 
clearly. Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
has a track record of onward expulsion of asylum-seekers and migrants 
returned from Europe to unsafe countries where persons risk torture or 
persecution.50 To the extent that it could be established that these persons 
had been under European jurisdiction, a case could be made that such 
chain-refoulement would constitute a breach of article 3 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. Yet, both the EU commissioner and the 
Maltese government argue that responsibility rested solely with Libya and 
no considerations were seemingly made as to any protection issues.
Before the SAR and SOLAS amendments, rescue at sea could be 
described as a traditional noncooperative sovereignty game, where every 
coastal State had the possibility to “free ride” by denying disembarkation 
with reference to their sovereign right of migration control. This clearly 
disfavored the flag States not being able to put rescued persons ashore 
and perhaps, more importantly, created a substantial negative economic 
externality by delaying commercial vessels. Under the present regime, 
this is replaced by a cooperative sovereignty game in which the interna-
tional legal framework in principle provides a positive obligation for a 
single State at any point in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic Ocean out-
side West Africa. The sovereignty game thus shifts from one of territorial 
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retraction to one in which African coast States may commercialize their 
territorial waters and high sea rescue zones as venues, where Frontex ships 
can effectively intercept migrants without incurring correlate responsi-
bilities for disembarkation, and thus asylum processing.
Conclusions
In its communication on “Reinforcing the management of the EU’s 
Southern Maritime Borders” the commission noted the lack of “clarity 
and predictability” as regards Member State obligations under interna-
tional law and thus the need to:
 . . . analyse the circumstances under which a State may be obliged to 
assume responsibility for the examination of an asylum claim as a result of 
the application of international refugee law, in particular when engaged in 
joint operations or in operations taking place within the territorial waters 
of another State or in the high sea.51
The present chapter has attempted to do exactly this. Yet, the earlier 
analysis does not paint a “clear” picture of international law in this area 
or establish “predictable” mechanisms for designating State responsibil-
ities. Rather, it has tried to elucidate how different interpretations of the 
concept of jurisdiction and interlocking legal regimes has made the exact 
nature of State obligations toward asylum-seekers and refugees a field of 
contestation, in which the extraterritorial applicability of refugee rights 
is open to different interpretations, new cooperation schemes emerge and 
it is possible for States to frame issues within various legal regimes with 
rather different game rules.
The result seems to be an increased maneuverability for States. Whether 
de facto or de jure, the extraterritorialization of migration control works 
to the advantage of European States when it comes to deconstructing or 
shifting responsibilities owed to refugees and asylum-seekers. In partic-
ular, moving regulation into foreign jurisdiction or casting operations 
within the international search and rescue regime seem to improve the 
likelihood that legal responsibilities are settled by falling back on the 
basic Westphalian notion of territorial jurisdiction.
This again has given rise to the increasing commercialization of 
sovereignty for the purpose of migration control. The present chapter 
has confined itself to situations in which European States are directly 
involved in performing offshore migration control. Yet, both the practi-
cal and legal difficulties in asserting State responsibility in such instances 
are presumably only exacerbated when interstate cooperation entails 
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a complete outsourcing of migration control to third States.52 In sum, 
we may be witnessing the beginning of a new offshore human rights 
economy through which “protection in the region” and “cooperation 
with third countries” are both hides for attempts to capitalize on for-
eign territorial jurisdictions and lower national human rights standards 
to shift and reduce burdens of refugee protection away from Europe 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008).
So far there has been a tendency among human rights lawyers and 
refugee advocates to reject the restrictive and territorially based inter-
pretations of extraterritorial jurisdiction as stemming from both State 
practice and international case law as bad reasoning or policy-driven 
misinterpretations. While such misdemeanors are certainly conceivable 
in this field of international law, this chapter has tried to point to a more 
structural explanation for the difficulty in exactly defining the extent of 
extraterritorial human rights responsibilities. Within the late sovereign 
order this difficulty does not amount to a systematic attempt to under-
mine the applicability of international human rights and refugee law, but 
rather points to the inherent duality in the way that sovereignty has been 
conceived within international legal discourse.
From the viewpoint of refugee protection this conclusion may seem 
disappointing. To the extent that Europe hails its human rights regime as 
an attempt to codify universal norms, the least we would expect would be 
for European States to abide by the same human rights standards when 
acting abroad. In this sense, the increasing trend of extraterritorializa-
tion warrants further reconsideration of the primarily territorial framing 
of State jurisdiction and consequently human rights standards. Whether 
this will happen and the late sovereignty order thus continue to develop, 
time will tell; indeed one could agree with the assessment of Richard 
O’Boyle of the ECtHR when in relation to Bankovic he noted that “the law 
on ‘jurisdiction’ is still in its infancy” (O’Boyle 2004, 139).
Notes
1. This was the title accompanying the photograph when published in the New 
York Times, July 10, 2001.
2. For an overview of the history of migration flows and control initiatives in the 
Mediterranean see Lutterbeck 2006.
3. UNHCR (2000). Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugee: The International 
Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach. UN Doc. 
EC/50/SC/CRP.17. June 9, 2000, p. 10.
4. The Case of the S.S. “Lotus.” Judgment of September 7, 1927. Permanent Court 
of International Justice. PCIJ Series A No. 10, p. 14.
Nissen_Ch10.indd   191 8/22/2008   12:27:36 PM
192   THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN
 5. Case of the Island of Palmas. Judgment of April 4, 1928. Permanent Court of 
International Justice. R.I.I.A. Vol II.
 6. Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. 
Judgment of February 5, 1970 (Second Phase). International Court of Justice. 
ICJ Reports 1970.
 7. The non-refoulement principle is set out in a number of international human 
rights instruments, most notably in art. 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
art. 3 of the Convention against Torture, and art. 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).
 8. Since refugee status is declaratory, not constitutive, the non-refoulement 
principle must be applied presumptively to asylum-seekers before refugee-
hood is established. See further UNHCR (2007). Advisory Opinion on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Geneva. 
January 26, 2007, par. 8.
 9. The most pertinent rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention that are spe-
cifically granted without reference to being present or staying at the territory 
include art. 33 (non-refoulement), art. 16 (access to courts), and art. 3 (non-
discrimination). Of somewhat lesser importance, Articles 13 (property), 22 
(education) and 20 (rationing) also apply extraterritorially (Hathaway 2005: 
160–171.).
10. Jurisdiction as the ratione loci of international human rights treaties is spelled 
out in a number of instruments, see in particular art. 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, art 2(1) in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in art 2(1) in the Convention Against 
Torture. Similarly, it has been convincingly argued that the core principles 
of refugee law, such as the non-refoulement principle enshrined in art. 33 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention, is similarly applicable in all cases where a 
refugee falls under a State’s jurisdiction (Hathaway 2005: 339; Lauterpacht 
and Bethlehem 2003, 110; Goodwin-Gill 1996, 141f). It should be noted 
that a number of human rights instruments, for example, the Genocide 
Convention, contains no territorial restrictions but puts an obligation upon 
States to prevent and punish genocide everywhere (Coomans and Kamminga 
2004, 2). Similarly, some rights may be reserved for persons strictly within 
the territory of a State or having a particular relationship to the State. As 
noted earlier, this is the case for the more substantial rights flowing from the 
Refugee Convention.
11. For example, Cyprus v. Turkey (Appl. No. 25781/94). Judgment of May 10, 
2001. European Court of Human Rights.
12. Issa and Others v. Turkey (appl. No. 31821/96). Judgment of November 16, 
2004. European Court of Human Rights, par. 71
13. This has been expressed in, for example, Bankovic, arguing that “from the 
standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a 
State was primarily territorial” and that extraterritorial jurisdictions “were, 
as a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of 
Nissen_Ch10.indd   192 8/22/2008   12:27:36 PM
THE REFUGEE, THE SOVEREIGN, AND THE SEA   193
the other relevant States.” Bankovic and Others v. Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom (Appl. No. 5207/99). Judgment of December 12, 2001. European 
Court of Human Rights, par 71.
14. Bankovic, ibid.
15. López Burgos v. Uruguay. Judgment of June 6, 1979. Human Rights 
Committee. UN Doc. A/36/40. Issa and Others v. Turkey, ibid. Öcalan v. 
Turkey (Appl. no. 46221/99). Judgment of March 12, 2003. European Court 
of Human Rights. But see Xhavara and fifteen v. Italy and Albania (Appl. No. 
39473/98). Judgment of January 11, 2001. European Court of Human Rights.
16. See in particular the Australian “Pacific Solution” and in Europe, though 
never realized, the United Kingdom plans for a New Vision for Refugees 
(Pugh 2004; Kneebone 2006; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2007).
17. See note 45 of this chapter.
18. Notably, no references were made as to whether the vessels presumably inter-
cepted and in particular if any asylum-seekers were turned back toward 
North Africa or allowed disembarkation in other EU States. Agence Europe, 
November 1, 2006.
19. Frontex. (2006). “Longest Frontex coordinated operation—HERA, the 
Canary Islands.” News Releases, December 19, 2006 retrieved March 16, 
2007, from http://frontex.europa.eu.
20. 113 US Supreme Court 2549 (1993).
21. Ibid. at 2565.
22. See in particular the dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmum, the amicus 
curiae and the external comments reprinted in International Journal of 
Refugee Law. 6 (1). (1994), 69–109. Further Hathaway 2005: 336–340 and 
Goodwin-Gill 1996: 143–144.
23. The case was, however, declared inadmissible on grounds of nonexhaustion 
of national remedies. Xhavara, ibid.
24. Amuur v. France. Judgment of June 25, 1996. European Court of Human 
Rights. Reports 1996-III, No. 11.
25. See for example, UNHCR Press Release. “UNHCR deeply concerned over 
Lampedusa deportations.” March 18, 2005; Amnesty International (2005). 
“Spain: The Southern Border.” EUR 41/008/2005; and Human Rights Watch. 
“The Other Face of the Canary Islands: Rights Violations against Migrants 
and Asylum Seekers.” February 2002.
26. Amnesty International. (2005). “Spain: The Southern Border.” EUR 
41/008/2005.
27. The territorial waters may extend 12 nautical miles (22 km) from the low 
water mark or internal waters. This belt is regarded as the sovereign territory 
of a State, except that foreign ships are allowed innocent passage. Control 
over an additional contiguous zone extending up to 24 nautical miles may 
further be claimed by a States to “prevent infringement of its customs, fis-
cal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations.” (Art 24(1) of the Geneva 
Nissen_Ch10.indd   193 8/22/2008   12:27:36 PM
194   THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone). Although this zone 
for other purposes are considered high seas, it reflects a functional extension 
of territorial sovereignty for the above purposes.
28. ISN Security Watch, January 7, 2007. See further http://frontex.europa.eu.
29. International Law Commission (1975). Yearbook of the ILC. Vol. II, p. 83.
30. López Burgos, ibid.
31. Öcalan, ibid.
32. López Burgos, ibid. par. 12.3. See the similar reasoning in Issa cited earlier.
33. Bankovic, ibid.
34. Ibid. par. 43.
35. Ibid.
36. See in particular Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (Appl. No. 
48787/99). Judgment of July 8, 2004. European Court of Human Rights.
37. Ibid. For the premises of effective extraterritorial jurisdiction in the terri-
torial sense, see further Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits). Judgment of December 
18, 1996. European Court of Human Rights. Reports 1996-VI and Cyprus v. 
Turkey, ibid.
38. Whether this is a legitimate argument could again be contested; as long as 
ships are captained by EU officials, these could be claimed to hold effective 
authority.
39. See for example, COM (2006) 733, Reinforcing the management of the 
European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders, 30.11.2006.
40. ICMPD, Irregular transit migration in the Mediterranean—some facts, 
futures, and insights, Vienna, 2004.
41. ISN Security Watch, January 12, 2007.
42. Department of Information, Malta, Press Release no. 1094: “Agreed 
Conclusions of Seminar on ‘Saving Life at Sea and in the Desert’ held in 
Malta on 20th July 2005,” available from www.doi.gov.mt.
43. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 
art. 19.
44. The issue first emerged in international instruments in 1910. Since then it has 
been codified in various forms in the four 1958 Conventions on the Law of 
the Seas, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (super-
seding the 1958 Conventions), the 1974 International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue, and the 1989 International Convention on Salvage. It is further 
established as a general principle of international law (Miltner 2005).
45. One of the most recent examples in the European context is the “Marine 1” 
that broke down in international waters and was rescued by the Spanish 
Coast Guard. The ship was towed to Nouadhibou, the nearest port in 
Mauritania, but the Mauritanian government refused disembarkation on 
the grounds that the shipped likely originated from Guinea and should be 
returned there. Following negotiations, Mauritania allowed disembarkation 
in return for guarantees from the Spanish government that all migrants and 
refugees would be returned or resettled elsewhere. However, repatriation 
has proved equally difficult. Most of the approximately 200 passengers are 
Nissen_Ch10.indd   194 8/22/2008   12:27:36 PM
THE REFUGEE, THE SOVEREIGN, AND THE SEA   195
believed to come from the Kashmir area but do not want to reveal their iden-
tities. Afghanistan and Pakistan have been reluctant to cooperate. Similarly, 
a plane with 35 migrants had to return in midair because Guinea-Bissau 
would not receive them (ECRAN Weekly Update, February 9, 2007 and 
February 17, 2007).
Outside Europe the most notorious example of such a détente concerned 
the Norwegian ship “MV Tampa” that in 2001 responded to the Australian 
Search and Rescue authorities’ request to investigate a distress call from an 
Indonesian vessel, which turned out to carry 433 Afghan asylum-seekers. 
Australia refused to let the Tampa enter Australian waters. Health problems 
onboard made the Tampa ignore this and the ship was subsequently boarded 
by Australian troops. Following another week of negotiations, Australia 
struck a deal with Papua New-Guinea and Nauru where the asylum-seekers 
were taken for processing. The incident gave rise to Australia’s plans for inter-
ception and offshore asylum processing, what is now commonly referred to 
as the Pacific Solution. For more information on this case, see Barnes 2004, 
Pugh 2004, and Kneebone 2006.
46. The amendments to both Conventions were adopted by the International 
Maritime Organisation in 2004 and entered into force on July 1, 2006. See 
MSC 78/26/Add. 1, Annex 3 and 5 respectively.
47. Ibid.
48. Department of Information, Malta, Press Release no. 1094, ibid. It should be 
noted, however, that Libya refused to take on any responsibilities in this mat-
ter, and that the migrants were disembarked in Spain after being stranded off 
the Maltese coast for eight days.
49. This language closely resembles that used in articles 1 and 33 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention prohibiting refoulement. See Maritime Safety 
Committee, Guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at sea, Resolution 
MSC.167(78), adopted on May 20, 2004, par. 6.17.
50. Notably, on the basis of Red Crescent information the Italian journalist 
Fabrizio Gatti reported that more than 100 people had died following Libya’s 
expulsion of “illegal migrants” through the Saharan desert. A number of 
these had previously been deported to Libya from the Italian island deten-
tion centre Lampedusa (L’Espresso, March 24, 2005).
51. COM (2006) 733, 30.11.2006, par. 34.
52. For some perspectives on the scope of such outsourcing in the EU context, 
see Gammeltoft-Hansen 2006 and Lutterbeck 2006.
Nissen_Ch10.indd   195 8/22/2008   12:27:36 PM
Nissen_Ch10.indd   196 8/22/2008   12:27:36 PM
11
Epilogue: Three Layers of 
a Contested Concept
Rebecca Adler-Nissen and 
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen
Closing our pursuit of sovereignty games we hope to have sketched a number of both theoretical and practical examples for others to 
add additional illustrations and perspectives. Throughout the volume, 
we have argued for the emergence of new and the return of old games 
in which sovereignty, or claims to sovereignty, have been instrumen-
talized by States and other players for a multitude of purposes. In the 
analysis of both vertical and horizontal sovereignty games, we have 
tried to show how new scenarios may be emerging, rules twisted, and 
new moves contemplated. The majority of the chapters have thus been 
devoted to analyzing the implications of these sovereignty games for 
the world we live in.
The empirical outlook of the preceding chapters has been predomi-
nantly European. Yet, the overarching dynamics that have been pursued 
are far from limited to any one region or continent. European policies to 
interdict immigrants on the high seas or foreign territorial waters have 
found inspiration in similar policies enacted by the United States and 
Australia. In its underlying logic, Chinese deregulation of Shanghai and 
Hong Kong to allow outsourcing by Western companies share certain 
traits with the facilitation of CIA interrogation facilities and rendition 
flights in a number of European countries; both constitute cooperative 
sovereignty games, in which the territorial State barters off sovereign 
prerogatives for the outsourcing State or company to avoid constraints 
imposed by national or international law (Ong 1999). Similarly, parallels 
to the vertical sovereignty games played out among the European Union 
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(EU) and its Member States can be found, though in rather different vari-
ations, in the struggles over the legitimate level authority between the 
State of Israel and the claim for Palestine or in the struggles between sov-
ereignty claims at both the subnational and international level in the case 
of “failed States” and international occupations.
The question less explicitly tackled is the converse relationship, 
namely the implication of this analysis for the conceptual framework set 
out. Although sovereignty games may change the daily lives of legal and 
political practitioners, how do sovereignty games themselves change? To 
be sure, sovereignty games are not a new phenomenon, yet all our con-
tributions have suggested a dynamic component to these games. Where 
disagreement remains, however, is in regards to the deeper transforma-
tive potential of the present structure for the concept of sovereignty. In 
particular, the analysis points to the need for a more refined approach in 
terms of where such transformation takes place. Although sovereignty 
practices are constantly taking new forms, do the rules of the sovereignty 
game or even the epistemic core prove equally fluid? Put plainly, is sover-
eignty all there is?
Thus, rather than trying to simply summarize the preceding chapters, 
this chapter will take the opportunity to revisit the theoretical underpin-
nings set out in the first part of the volume and pit them against some of 
the conclusions reached in the more applied analyses. In doing so, we may 
challenge our arguments against competing ways of thinking about sov-
ereignty and its future. Our exploration of sovereignty games addresses 
the ways in which established meanings and functions of sovereignty are 
accepted, contested, or transformed in theory as well as practice. The con-
tributions to this volume have examined three levels or layers of sover-
eignty: the first and deepest is the foundational institution of sovereignty, 
the second layer is sovereignty as a legal and political concept of ultimate 
and indivisible authority, and the third layer is sovereignty as social prac-
tice. The three layers of sovereignty are interrelated, but they have a rela-
tive autonomy. Each layer of meaning has given rise to specific legal and 
political debates that contribute to the contestedness of sovereignty. The 
subsequent sections set out to explore these layers before turning to the 
broader question of transformation in and between them.
Sovereignty as a Foundational Institution
Discussing the meaning of sovereignty involves tackling its both consti-
tutive and functional dimensions. Sovereignty constitutes the State sys-
tem as the “meta-political authority in world politics” (Thomson 1995: 
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214). But once this constitution has taken place, or rather is taken for 
granted, it also functions as a framework of action; it regulates interna-
tional relations and law, and it provides the rules of the game. This is the 
double character of sovereignty. Sovereignty is already instituted, but it 
also needs to be maintained through political, legal, and social practices.
The first contest over sovereignty emerges because of this binary con-
ceptualization. Who constitutes sovereignty and how? And what makes 
it legitimate? The ontological status of sovereignty has not been resolved 
and is not likely to be so. It is intrinsically ambivalent because it is ontolog-
ically before our imagination of the political and legal world. Sovereignty 
constitutes the world as we know it in the sense that it provides us with 
the possibility of distinguishing between internal and external politics, 
national, and international polities. Sovereignty is a frame, which cannot 
be given an a priori meaning outside the context of its articulation. It is 
an interpretive concept, just as equality and liberty, a concept that is sub-
ject to interpretation and hence contestation (Tanja Aalberts and Wouter 
Werner; Rebecca Adler-Nissen). But does the status of sovereignty as an 
interpretative concept mean that sovereignty is an empty box, an essen-
tially contested concept (Sarooshi 2004)?
Some of the chapters (e.g., Tanja Aalberts and Wouter Werner), point 
to a lack of foundation for sovereignty, which shares the image of an 
empty space where society has to understand itself with another related 
and contested concept, democracy (Lefort 1986). The site, locus, of power 
is in principle empty. Politics is therefore continuous, but in the end con-
stitutes futile attempts to take the place of the absolutist King and fill 
out the space where totalitarian ideologies placed the unity of the people. 
Following Claude Lefort, the site of power can no longer belong to any-
one; it is and should be impersonal. According to this line of thinking, 
the “sovereign people” is an abstraction and democratic sovereignty is 
based on a paradoxical uncertainty about its own foundation. If sover-
eignty is built on this presence of an absence, then all essentialist ideas 
about sovereignty are problematic. Drawing on such insights and tak-
ing them further, Chantal Mouffe has argued that democracy must then 
be seen as the constitutional site where antagonisms or choices with no 
rational solution will be played out (Mouffe 1999). As a claim to authority, 
sovereignty in modern democracy will be a claim, the content of which 
has to be filled out through debates and struggles. As such, sovereignty 
constitutes an unresolved basis for authority in the forms of power, law, 
and knowledge.
Other contributions (Neil Walker; Jens Bartelson) take the opposite 
position. According to Walker, sovereignty is not empty; it is a metaphys-
ical understanding of political presence and organization. By treating it 
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simply as a speech-act and analyzing only what sovereignty does, not what 
it is or what it should be, the “real” problem of sovereignty is confiscated; 
the normative questions about how sovereignty should be exercised are 
not asked. In this sense, there seems to be a trade-off between on the one 
hand, philosophical debates on sovereignty, its constitutive dimension and 
on the other hand, more applied studies of the function of sovereignty in 
world politics. Since the meaning of sovereignty as a foundational insti-
tution is contested, it follows that the determination of the functions of 
sovereignty cannot be distinguished from the values it entails and from 
the normative discussion in which it is embedded (Besson 2004). This 
would warrant a double research strategy of both analysis and critique. 
As Bartelson elucidates, however, any critical analysis of the foundational 
structures of sovereignty tends to presuppose and institutionalize the 
very object of critique. To investigate sovereignty, we inevitably start by 
imposing a set of definite meanings to the concept.
Although each of these approaches undoubtedly has merit, the recipro-
cal critique interestingly points to a mutual difficulty in writing, and even 
thinking, beyond sovereignty. Under the former, claims to sovereignty 
may be increasingly stretched in regards to whom and what is claimed 
for sovereignty. Yet, the question remains whether the epistemic starting 
point for such claims can ever make sense outside a reference to existing 
power structures and thus a Statist framework. Even claims to power and 
the legitimate use of force by nonstate actors, seen by many as a key chal-
lenge to State sovereignty, has a way of referring back to the State as the 
necessary starting point for speaking about these issues (Anna Leander). 
Under the latter approach, a critical stance may be launched toward the 
foundational core of the concept, yet in search for the Archimedean point 
necessary to turn around the existing, a fixture of meaning is almost 
inevitably presupposed. Thus, while the legal framework of human and 
refugee rights are borne by an underlying idea to move beyond the State 
as the sole holder of entitlements in the international arena, its institu-
tionalization and formulation is solidly reaffirming State sovereignty and 
seemingly anachronistic principles of territoriality (Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen).
In conclusion, it seems difficult to move beyond sovereignty at the 
foundational level. Unlike some of the more radical and critical theories 
of international law and politics, none of the contributions in the present 
volume suggest that we should or can abandon sovereignty altogether. In 
fact, such attempts only seem to reproduce the fundamental importance 
of sovereignty; as Spiermann pointedly puts it “[ . . . ] nobody would care 
about striking off an irrelevant word” (Ole Spiermann).
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Sovereignty as Legal and Political Authority
The second layer has sovereignty conceived as authority or the rules reg-
ulating all sovereignty games. We may define these rules in both legal 
and political terms, as norms prescribed by sovereignty or as an insti-
tutionalization of political power. In political terms, sovereignty at 
this level signifies the political structures projecting power within and 
between boundaries. In legal terms, sovereignty is the ordering prin-
ciple; it points toward the State as the source of political authority and 
sets out its prerogatives, internally and externally. At the most general 
level, this ordering institution spell out the principle to allow ab-solute, 
meaning un-bound, power for the polity to command within the com-
monwealth, and externally principles for the mutual recognition of the 
polity qua  polity (N. Walker 2003). In the spheres of international law and 
politics these manifest themselves in a multitude of explicit and implicit 
rules for the entitlement and constraints of sovereigns, be it the coordi-
nating principle of nonintervention or the cooperative doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda—international agreement must be respected. Although the 
different disciplines of law and politics may express these rules in slightly 
different languages, they point to the same understanding of sovereignty 
as an institution setting out and distributing authority.
A particular issue at this level of analysis concerns the role of the State 
and the extent to which sovereignty gives primacy to this particular type 
of polity. As we have seen in the preceding chapters new players are emerg-
ing in the sovereignty games, be it private organizations or supranational 
institutions such as the EU. This may challenge the ability of States to 
effectuate their monopoly of power; however, it does necessarily imply 
a fundamental shift in the game rules. As sovereignty is not about the 
actual control, but rather the claimed authority, new players on the world 
stage do not automatically impact on the State’s status as sovereign. As 
Glencross demonstrates, current strategies to sideline sovereignty claims 
by Member States in the context of the EU have failed to do anything 
but reinforce their importance (Andrew Glencross). Similarly, despite the 
multiplication of nonstate actors on the world scene, international law 
remains a tool of coordination and cooperation, rather than the subordi-
nation or disintegration, of equal sovereignties. If there is change at the 
level of authority because of new actors it is taking more subtle guises—
those looking down from the State might point to the increasing pos-
sibilities of individual representation before international courts, those 
looking up to the accession of supranational organizations to instruments 
like the European Convention on Human Rights.
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The second issue relates to the possibility of game rules to change 
as a consequence of new practices. In some cases, international law has 
adapted quite rapidly to the “new world order” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, 
and Perraton 1999, 70). Horizontally, the principle of nonintervention, 
establishing the right for States to conduct their affairs without outside 
interference, is challenged both by the prevalence of so-called humani-
tarian interventions and by practices whereby States “invite” interven-
tion in otherwise domestic issues, such as when handing over sovereign 
competence in particular policy areas to supranational organizations. 
Importantly, however, the principle of nonintervention is not simply aban-
doned but rather complemented by what Georg Sørensen calls “regulated 
intervention” to which new rules clearly apply (2004, 115). International 
law is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty in these cases, but 
the object of protection is less the power base of the dictator or the appa-
ratus of a totalitarian political order, but the State as an international law 
subject and the continuing capacity of a population freely to express and 
affect choices about the identities and policies of its governors (Sarooshi 
2004). Importantly, authority and popular democracy is still claimed 
and exercised in terms of sovereignty, there is no “end of sovereignty,” 
but international law and the double structure of sovereignty provides 
a framework for shifts in its particular meaning and regulatory effects 
(Spiermann 1995).
Further, not all developments necessarily spawn new game rules. As 
dealt with in several of the preceding chapters, the current-day frame-
work of international exchanges is not entirely governed by international 
law or political principles. International legal and political rules are 
inherently backward looking: they reflect needs as they arose in games 
played in the past. Today, some economic, legal, and political practices 
are not subject to any international regulation and hence escape the con-
trol of States as well as international organizations. This may give rise 
to different strategies in the sovereignty games. One such strategy may 
be to intentionally suppress development of new rules to reassert power 
in the regulatory lacunas that emerge as new practices develop (Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen). Another strategy could be to retreat from the very 
ambition of establishing solid game rules for all areas of international life. 
Hence, many seem to have accepted the proposition that it is utterly unre-
alistic to expect monetary and financial markets to be regulated to the 
extent that a single State or a group of States actually control what goes on 
(Christoph Herrmann).
This leads us to our third consideration, namely the extent to which 
seeming changes at the level of authority and rules are fixed or fluid. As 
pointed out earlier, many of the current moves in the sovereignty game 
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imply that sovereignty is exercised outside its “normal” sites. These 
moves have usually been addressed in terms of globalization and trans-
national interactions thereby hiding their fundamental strategic char-
acter. However, many of these moves are State-driven, and when States 
delegate the exercise of certain policies to international organizations 
or private actors, they do not give away sovereignty, but they transfer 
political and legal control. Hence, from a legal point of view it is con-
testable whether the transfer of authority over monetary policy to, for 
instance, the European Central Bank is definitive (Rebecca Adler-Nissen). 
However, de facto, transfer of competencies can be definitive in that the 
legal right is only hypothetic. To withdraw from the Euro zone and recap-
ture economic sovereignty may be legally imaginable, but politically and 
economically out of the question (Christoph Herrmann). We would argue 
that much of the existing literature on globalization and cosmopolitan-
ism fails to come to terms with this dynamic dimension of sovereignty 
and ignores that concrete strategic actors and moves are often behind the 
instrumentalization of sovereignty.
What emerges is an opportunity for bargaining sovereign authority 
among the players, which is increasingly exploited. Climbing up or down 
the ladder of authority between national, regional, and global levels, or 
moving sideways across State borders, are tactical maneuvers in sover-
eignty games. These vertical and horizontal moves make it more diffi-
cult to understand and monitor both the content and the consequences 
of State decisions. This may be exactly the idea behind the moves when 
State executives delegate authority to supranational organizations or pri-
vate companies and hence blur the question of responsibility, yet often 
remaining in de facto control (Anna Leander). This dispersion of sites 
where sovereignty is exercised is an important part of contemporary 
sovereignty games. The way politics may be disguised as law, and hence 
depoliticize the moves in these sovereignty games (Gammeltoft-Hansen), 
points to the third level of sovereignty—practice—as a privileged site for 
the study of sovereignty games.
Sovereignty as Practice
The most visible layer of sovereignty is found in the social, legal, and polit-
ical practices. Here, sovereignty is practiced by real-life actors in every-
day situations from immigration officials to constitutional monarchs. 
This moves us from the idea of sovereignty as an ontological ground of 
power and order and its institution as political and legal authority to the 
more tentative claims and discourses of sovereignty that are performed by 
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individuals, State representatives, and private companies on a day-to-day 
basis. On this layer, the academic debates take a sociological turn oriented 
toward the interpretation of praxis, rituals, and symbols. This daily face 
of sovereignty comes up when competing sovereign claims are made as 
part of struggles over power, identity, and law. Campaigns by secession 
movements in the Basques regions and Greenland are example of such 
sovereign practices where the conflicts over political authority and the 
rightful expression of a collective political will are at stake. Here, sover-
eignty is linked to the way people conceive of legitimate power. The prac-
tical, everyday use of concepts such as “State” and “sovereignty” derive 
their meaning from the specific context and the commonsense ideas and 
knowledge of those participating in the practice (Wight 2006, 270). In 
this sense, practitioners operate within a certain scope or knowledge of 
the epistemic core and authority rules defined at the deeper layers. Yet, 
while the international lawyer may pay homage to a broad range of adju-
dicative history, the ongoing application will be a balancing act to suit 
the case at hand and thus in itself holds the potential of renewal. In this 
way, concrete games may have an effect on the “deeper” layers of sover-
eignty, its regulative functions and on a longer term, though in our view 
unlikely, perhaps even shake sovereignty as the foundational institution 
of international relations. We shall return to this idea in the last section 
of this chapter.
In the sovereignty games, we see how State authorities play and manip-
ulate with ideas about legitimate authority and power. The quality of the 
relationship between individuals and the State can be severely affected 
by the transfer of power to unaccountable and seemingly distant interna-
tional institutions such as the European institutions in Brussels or private 
security companies in North Carolina. We can see the impact of changes 
in legislative authority and the relationship between domestic popula-
tions and their political representatives in the resurgence of demands for 
referenda to decide on important changes to the European cooperation 
project. The French and Dutch “non” and “nee” to the Constitutional 
Treaty of the EU in 2005 were at first sight the exercise of a sovereign 
will, but they also signified a crisis of democracy. Despite the rejection of 
the Constitutional Treaty, the treaty may be surviving almost untouched 
with the new and less controversial label of the Lisbon Treaty. To some 
observers this expresses that the principle of popular sovereignty is sab-
otaged because the “will” of the political authority is imposed on the 
people (Baudrillard 2005). To others, contemporary demands for refer-
enda do not represent so much the reassertion of the sovereign power of 
member States on the integration process; rather, it is a lack of faith with 
national processes of representations and accountability that is creating 
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the demands for referenda. In any event, the strategic renegotiations of 
democracy by State executives and supranational bureaucracies represent 
an elusion of what many would take to be an expression of the voice of the 
sovereign people.
Such strategic moves may disturb commonsense understandings of 
sovereignty and its legitimate exercise and raise the question of respon-
sibility. Who are to be rendered accountable when sovereignty is played 
around? Take the example of the outsourcing of military tasks—is it 
the private military company or the outsourcing State who is responsi-
ble if civilians are killed during a mission? Or is it simply naïve to talk 
of responsibilities because of the rudimentary character of international 
law? To render private military actors directly accountable under interna-
tional law would require a change in the rules that constitute the sover-
eignty game. Indeed, what is often suggested instead is soft law, codes of 
conducts, and transparent legal contract between States and companies, 
which would supplement the original model of sovereignty that charac-
terized the nation-State (Anna Leander). By codifying this grey zone of 
State-private action, the rules of the game are being rewritten. This is 
the official reason for why States have so far avoided codifying private-
military actor responsibilities in conventions. However, as Aalberts and 
Werner suggest, perhaps the real reason is rather that intervening States 
prefer to hide behind the stretched principle of sovereignty (and legiti-
mate self-defense) to avoid responsibility?
Each time the norms are modified or developed, actors adapt their 
strategies. New holes in the international legal regime will be found. The 
interrelatedness between the philosophical, legal, political, and social 
dimensions of sovereignty suggests that despite decades of attempts to 
bring order and discipline into the study of sovereignty, we must accept 
that there is a limit to this order.
The Dynamic Structure of Sovereignty Games: Layer by Layer
In the beginning of this book, we wondered about the transformative 
potential in the sovereignty games. Is world politics changing to a degree 
that sovereignty is seriously challenged as the metaframe for understand-
ing politics and law? Put differently, how much can sovereignty change 
without becoming something else? Inevitably, the shape of things to 
come is hazy, but it is possible to detect the contours of the immediate to 
medium-term landscape. Our argument is that changes in the way sov-
ereignty games are played may impact the organization of political and 
legal authority, which again may affect the epistemic core of sovereignty. 
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There is no automacity to these shifts, but changes at one layer can splash 
down to the next. The deeper the layer, the more stabilized is the meaning 
of sovereignty (figure 11.1).
Change in practices related to sovereignty occurs all the time in the 
form of more or less strategic moves. Sometimes these practices force us to 
think of authority in new ways. The outsourcing of military actions, inter-
ventions in failed States, and the European integration process may lead to 
change in the authority structure. Domestically, changing social practices 
involves asking new questions about which form of political rule is legit-
imate and how popular sovereignty should be organized. Internationally, 
new ways of exercising authority relate to disputes on controversial phe-
nomena such as neoimperialism, military interventions, and global hier-
archies. If new practices lead to a rethinking of sovereignty as authority, 
they may also in the end affect the deepest level of sovereignty, sovereignty 
as an epistemic idea. This is indirectly what Neil Walker refers to with 
the concept of “late sovereignty” (N. Walker 2003). Walker describes a 
Change in practices
Change in authority
Change in the
epistemic idea
Figure 11.1 Three layers of sovereignty
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fundamental shift in the way we think of sovereignty, a new condition, just 
as “late modernity,” from where the world can never be the same again.
However, there is a real disagreement as to both the transformative 
potential and the assessment of our current stage. Some argue that we 
already live in a “post-Westphalian order” (Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid. 
2001). The claim is often made as a rejection of the essentialist positions, 
both in the traditionalist version in which sovereignty remains an abso-
lute and indivisible property—either the State has sovereignty or it does 
not (Sørensen 2004, 104)—and in the increasingly popular relativist posi-
tions, where sovereignty is cut up and measured along its proclaimed 
constituent parts (Krasner 1999). Further, little agreement exists as to 
what shall be the successor of sovereignty. On one end of the spectrum, 
cosmopolitans argue that new rules should apply in new types of respon-
sibilities and rights on new actors in the evolving word community and 
future world order (Held 2002). The EU and EU law has in this perspec-
tive been seen as a cosmopolitan laboratory for a new polycentric system 
of rights and duties, which takes the individual, rather than the State, as 
its point of departure (Habermas 1998; Morgan 2005, 3). On the other 
end of the spectrum, but equally dissatisfied, critical theorists argue that 
imperialism or “Empire” is the shape of the future world system and sov-
ereignty has to be understood accordingly and critically. Hence, while 
the Westphalian definition of sovereignty may have provided for equal-
ity among Western States, it does not extend the same status to the non-
Western world (Schmitt 2006; Hardt and Negri 2000, 70). Sovereignty 
in this context acts to reinforce inequality between the developed and 
developing world. Inequality, in turn, provides a justification for the 
interference, exploitation, or conquest of the “other” by the West to fulfill 
a multitude of missions—exploitation of resources for industrialization, 
civilizing the uncivilized, and so on (Grovogui 2002). Instead of viewing 
the development of international law as providing order among sovereign 
equals, it is seen as a tool used by the West to embed structural inequality 
into the international system (Anghie 2005). Sovereignty becomes a mere 
cover for the real thing: imperialism.
However, in our view, many of these alternative approaches fail to 
grasp the epistemic and symbolic dimensions of sovereignty. Sovereignty 
is a powerful institution and instituting phenomenon, it may be instru-
mentalized, but it is not simply an empty shell. What the analysis of the 
previous chapters all seem to suggest is that while sovereignty games are 
abundant at the level of practices and may result in a number of changes 
at the regulatory layer and in the emergence of new international legal 
and political norms, transition is much harder to imagine to the founda-
tional or epistemic layer.
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As R.B.J. Walker has aptly put it,
State sovereignty works because it has come to seem to be simply there, out 
in the world, demarcating the national orders of here and there. But the 
lessons that theorists of international relations have consistently refused to 
learn since Hobbes is that sovereignty is never simply there. And what was 
never simply there can never simply disappear. (1995, 322)
In this sense those proclaiming the end of sovereignty seem to fall prey 
to the same reductionism as the essentialists to whom they react. While 
it is correct that new moves, players and even game rules may substan-
tially alter how the game is being played, sovereignty, strangely enough, 
remains largely intact as “the only game in town” (Krasner 2004b, 1077). 
On this basis we suggest to move beyond both the essentialist and the 
post-Westphalian trench wars in search of an understanding of sover-
eignty that spends less time pondering what sovereignty “really” is, but 
instead looks at what functions sovereignty serves in our contemporary 
legal and political lives. It is in this sense that the framework of sover-
eignty games might prove useful.
This is not to say that sovereignty games may not result in wide rang-
ing and important transformations in the intertwined realm of interna-
tional law and world politics. First of all, horizontal shifts have seen the 
emergence of new players and new locations. Nonstate actors are increas-
ingly taking over tasks the State will not or cannot engage in, from illegal 
groups, over private military companies, to international organizations. 
These practices have been situated within a continuum of legitimacy, 
“ranging from tranquil conviviality to open challenges of State sover-
eignty” (Blom-Hansen and Stepputat 2006, 306). States may maintain 
international presence and the machinery and ideology to sustain this. 
But as pointed out by Leander, the nonstate world may be instrumen-
tal to the State authorities who delegate certain tasks and policies to for 
instance private companies, which occupy strategic positions between 
State institutions and the population.
The horizontal shifts in sovereignty do not only cover offshore inter-
rogation centers or migration control on the high seas, but also a virtual 
and vertical extension ranging from the Internet to outer space. Online 
communities, such as the growing game world of Second Life, do hold a 
potential to challenge the ordering principle of sovereign territoriality. 
The World Wide Web represents an area where ideas of world commu-
nity and extreme individualism are blossoming; here the State is only one 
among other players. However, it would be mistaken to suppose that there 
are white spots on the map where the State has not, or will not seek to, 
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control—be it Antarctica, planet Mars, or the Internet. Treaties between 
State parties regulate their actions on and in relation to Antarctica as well 
as Mars. Chinese authorities have introduced scores of regulations, closed 
Internet cafés and blocked e-mails, search engines, foreign news, and 
politically sensitive Web sites. There may be technical difficulties in this, 
but the State has so far been able to catch up with nonstate inventions that 
challenge its authority. New representations of sovereignty will present 
themselves as new actors, rules, and moves—ready and available codes 
for deciphering the world. Yet, to understand these evolving forms of sov-
ereignty requires us to think out of the State box and examine some of the 
paradoxes in the way sovereignty games are played out (Weldes 1999).
On the vertical dimension, State governments and institutions pro-
vide a clear limit to how dramatic the changes caused by sovereignty 
games will be. States are still eager to limit and control the expansion of 
the competencies of international and regional organizations. In the EU, 
more tasks will be transferred to the supranational level and this may lead 
to a redefinition of what is implied as responsibilities lying under State 
authority in the sense of who does what, when, and how. This may create 
legitimacy deficits as authority is moved out of the State, and areas tra-
ditionally important for the domestic conception of national interest are 
depoliticized. In the current multispeed integration process, Europe is 
characterized by a sovereignty surplus in the sense that many conflicting 
sovereignty claims are made at the same time. Judging from these com-
peting attempts of claiming ultimate authority, neither the State nor the 
EU comes out as a winner (Goetschel 2007).
Ultimately, our reading of sovereignty could be labeled neoclassical, 
because contrary to much of the existing literature, we do not claim to 
study a post-sovereign order. Instead, a central proposition in this book 
has been that sovereignty plays a genuine part in the current changes of 
legal and political practices in international relations. Sovereignty is part 
of, not external to, processes of globalization and Europeanization. It is 
the sovereignty games, the instrumentalization of sovereignty, that give 
much of world politics its dynamic quality. Sovereignty is constitutive of 
both international relations and international law, but when sovereignty 
games are played out and new practices are invented, the tensions between 
these realms and the deeper meanings of sovereignty come to the fore and 
affect our world imaginaries. Understanding these imaginaries demands 
the backward journey of continually probing the practices, principles, 
and epistemic core of the concept around which we organize both law 
and politics.
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